Files
ladybird/AK/Random.cpp
Colleirose bf7fd80140 LibCrypto+AK: Merge LibCrypto/SecureRandom into AK/Random
AK/Random is already the same as SecureRandom. See PR for more details.

ProcessPrng is used on Windows for compatibility w/ sandboxing measures
See e.g. https://crbug.com/40277768
2026-01-23 15:53:27 +01:00

131 lines
4.3 KiB
C++

/*
* Copyright (c) 2021, the SerenityOS developers.
* Copyright (c) 2024, the Ladybird developers.
* Copyright (c) 2025-2026, Colleirose <criticskate@pm.me>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
*/
#include <AK/Assertions.h>
#include <AK/Platform.h>
#include <AK/Random.h>
#include <AK/UFixedBigInt.h>
#include <AK/UFixedBigIntDivision.h>
#if defined(AK_OS_LINUX)
# include <sys/random.h>
#endif
#if defined(AK_OS_WINDOWS)
# include <AK/Windows.h>
#endif
static inline ErrorOr<void> csprng(void* const buf, size_t size)
{
// We shouldn't use OpenSSL's RAND_bytes function here, because we want to avoid adding dependencies to AK.
// Therefore, we will use the best platform-specific CSPRNG.
#if defined(AK_OS_SERENITY) || defined(AK_OS_ANDROID) || defined(AK_OS_BSD_GENERIC) || defined(AK_OS_HAIKU) || AK_LIBC_GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 36)
// This target also covers MacOS and iOS and they both seem to support arc4random_buf
arc4random_buf(buf, size);
#elif defined(AK_OS_LINUX)
unsigned char* out = (unsigned char*)buf;
while (size > 0u) {
// EINTR can be handled safely by just trying again. Others are fatal
// See manual for more details
int ret = getrandom(out, size, 0);
if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR) [[unlikely]]
return Error::from_errno(errno);
// If ret > 0 then ret indicates how much was copied
if (ret > 0) [[likely]] {
size -= ret;
out += ret;
}
}
#elif defined(AK_OS_WINDOWS)
// Documented to always return TRUE
g_system.ProcessPrng((PBYTE)buf, size);
#else
static_assert(false, "This build target doesn't have a valid CSPRNG interface specified in AK/Random.cpp.");
#endif
return {};
}
namespace AK {
void fill_with_random(Bytes bytes)
{
MUST(csprng(bytes.data(), bytes.size()));
}
u32 get_random_uniform(u32 max_bounds)
{
// If we try to divide all 2**32 numbers into groups of "max_bounds" numbers, we may end up
// with a group around 2**32-1 that is a bit too small. For this reason, the implementation
// `arc4random() % max_bounds` would be insufficient. Here we compute the last number of the
// last "full group". Note that if max_bounds is a divisor of UINT32_MAX,
// then we end up with UINT32_MAX:
u32 const max_usable = UINT32_MAX - (static_cast<u64>(UINT32_MAX) + 1) % max_bounds;
auto random_value = get_random<u32>();
for (int i = 0; i < 20 && random_value > max_usable; ++i) {
// By chance we picked a value from the incomplete group. Note that this group has size at
// most 2**31-1, so picking this group has a chance of less than 50%.
// In practice, this means that for the worst possible input, there is still only a
// once-in-a-million chance to get to iteration 20. In theory we should be able to loop
// forever. Here we prefer marginally imperfect random numbers over weird runtime behavior.
random_value = get_random<u32>();
}
return random_value % max_bounds;
}
u64 get_random_uniform_64(u64 max_bounds)
{
// Uses the same algorithm as `get_random_uniform`,
// by replacing u64 with u128 and u32 with u64.
u64 const max_usable = UINT64_MAX - static_cast<u64>((static_cast<u128>(UINT64_MAX) + 1) % max_bounds);
auto random_value = get_random<u64>();
for (int i = 0; i < 20 && random_value > max_usable; ++i) {
random_value = get_random<u64>();
}
return random_value % max_bounds;
}
XorShift128PlusRNG::XorShift128PlusRNG()
{
// Splitmix64 is used as xorshift is sensitive to being seeded with all 0s
u64 seed = get_random<u64>();
m_low = splitmix64(seed);
seed = get_random<u64>();
m_high = splitmix64(seed);
}
double XorShift128PlusRNG::get()
{
u64 value = advance() & ((1ULL << 53) - 1);
return value * (1.0 / (1ULL << 53));
}
u64 XorShift128PlusRNG::splitmix64(u64& state)
{
u64 z = (state += 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15ULL);
z = (z ^ (z >> 30)) * 0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9ULL;
z = (z ^ (z >> 27)) * 0x94d049bb133111ebULL;
return z ^ (z >> 31);
}
// Apparently this set of constants is better: https://stackoverflow.com/a/34432126
u64 XorShift128PlusRNG::advance()
{
u64 s1 = m_low;
u64 const s0 = m_high;
u64 const result = s0 + s1;
m_low = s0;
s1 ^= s1 << 23;
s1 ^= s1 >> 18;
s1 ^= s0 ^ (s0 >> 5);
m_high = s1;
return result + s1;
}
}