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+# SWF classification rubric (haircut factors for sovereignFiscalBuffer)
+
+Central rubric for classifying sovereign wealth funds under the
+resilience `sovereignFiscalBuffer` dimension. Supports
+`scripts/shared/swf-classification-manifest.yaml`.
+
+Every fund in the manifest has three coefficients in its
+`classification:` block:
+
+```yaml
+classification:
+  access:       0..1
+  liquidity:    0..1
+  transparency: 0..1
+```
+
+These multiply together to form the haircut the scorer applies when
+computing effective SWF months of reserve coverage:
+
+```
+effectiveMonths = rawSwfMonths × access × liquidity × transparency
+score           = 100 × (1 − exp(−effectiveMonths / 12))
+```
+
+This doc defines **what each coefficient value means** with named
+tiers + concrete precedents, so:
+
+1. Every rating in the manifest is defensible by pointing to a
+   tier + precedent.
+2. Future manifest PRs that add or revise ratings have an explicit
+   benchmark to evaluate against.
+3. A reviewer can audit the manifest without re-deriving the
+   rubric from first principles each time.
+
+**Scope boundary.** This is a methodology doc, not a ground-truth
+table. The coefficient values live in the manifest YAML; the
+rubric here explains the semantic tiers those values live on.
+Revising a fund's rating is a manifest-YAML edit cited against a
+tier here, not a rubric edit.
+
+---
+
+## Axis 1 — Access
+
+"How directly can the state deploy fund assets into budget support
+during a fiscal shock?"
+
+Operationalized as a combination of legal mechanism (is there a
+withdrawal rule?), political clarity (who authorizes deployment?),
+and historical precedent (has deployment actually happened?).
+Deployment SPEED (weeks vs months vs years) is the core signal.
+
+| Tier | Value | Meaning | Concrete precedents |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Nil access | **0.1** | Sanctions, asset freeze, or political paralysis makes deployment effectively impossible within a crisis window | Russia NWF (post-2022 asset freeze), Libya LIA (sanctions + frozen assets), Iran NDFI (sanctions + access concerns). Currently deferred from v1 for this reason. |
+| Intergenerational savings | **0.3** | Pure long-horizon wealth-preservation mandate; no explicit stabilization rule; withdrawal requires ruler / head-of-state / parliamentary discretion with no codified trigger | ADIA (Abu Dhabi, intergenerational mandate, ruler-discretionary); Brunei BIA (deferred candidate) |
+| Hybrid / constrained | **0.5** | Mandate mixes strategic + savings + partial stabilization; deployment is mechanically possible but constrained by strategic allocation locked to policy objectives (Vision 2030, industrial policy, geopolitical holdings) | PIF (Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030-locked), QIA (Qatar, long-horizon wealth-management with amiri-decree deployment), Mubadala (UAE, strategic + financial hybrid), Ireland ISIF (strategic-development mandate) |
+| Explicit stabilization with rule | **0.7** | Legislated or rule-based mechanism for fiscal support during specific shock classes, with historical precedent of actual deployment | KIA General Reserve Fund (legislated finance of budget shortfalls from oil-revenue swings). NO GPFG is BORDERLINE — has a fiscal rule capping withdrawal at ~3% expected real return, which is an access MECHANISM but also an access CONSTRAINT (see below). NOTE: GIC is discussed in the alignment table below as a candidate for this tier based on its NIRC framework, but the current manifest rates it 0.6 — so it's a 0.7 *candidate*, not a 0.7 *precedent*. |
+| Pure automatic stabilization | **0.9** | Deployment triggers automatically when a named macro signal crosses a threshold; stabilization is the primary mandate; political authorization is post-hoc or symbolic | Chile ESSF (deploys when copper revenue falls below a rule-based target); deferred v1 candidate |
+
+### Edge case — fiscal-rule caps
+
+A fiscal rule like Norway's ~3%-of-expected-real-return withdrawal
+cap creates an ambiguous access signal:
+
+- **Positive direction**: the rule makes access PREDICTABLE and
+  mechanically available for budget support every year, without
+  political negotiation.
+- **Negative direction**: the rule CAPS how much can be tapped,
+  so in a severe shock the fund cannot be liquidated beyond the
+  rule. The mechanism protects the savings against panic but
+  rate-limits the stabilization function.
+
+**Rubric treatment**: fiscal-rule-capped funds sit at the 0.5-0.7
+boundary. Norway's GPFG at 0.6 (current manifest value) is
+defensible as "between hybrid-constrained and rule-based
+stabilization."
+
+### Edge case — state holding companies
+
+Temasek-style state-holding-company assets can be deployed for
+fiscal support only via DIVIDEND FLOW, not via primary-asset
+liquidation (which would disrupt portfolio companies). This
+mechanism is slow (dividends are typically annual) and bounded
+(can't exceed portfolio earnings in a shock year). Rubric
+treatment: 0.3-0.4 tier, NOT the 0.5 hybrid tier — the
+mechanical deployment path is materially slower than QIA's
+amiri-decree route.
+
+---
+
+## Axis 2 — Liquidity
+
+"What share of the fund's AUM is in listed public markets and
+thus liquidatable within days/weeks without fire-sale discount?"
+
+Operationalized as (public equities + listed fixed income +
+cash) ÷ total AUM, per the fund's most recent published asset
+mix. When the disclosure is a range (ADIA publishes 55-70%, not
+an exact ratio), the rubric uses the **upper-bound** of the
+range — the fund's own public statement is that it COULD be up
+to that figure, and haircut factors are designed to reward
+disclosed LIQUIDITY CAPACITY, not the conservative worst case.
+ADIA's 70% upper bound lands in the 0.7 tier (65-85%); if
+future ADIA disclosures tighten the range so the upper bound
+drops below 65%, the rubric directs the rating to 0.5.
+
+| Tier | Value | Meaning | Concrete precedents |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Illiquid-strategic dominant | **0.1** | Primarily domestic strategic holdings + policy banks + political stakes; < 30% public-market. No v1 fund sits here; reserved for future outliers | — (aspirational floor) |
+| Private + illiquid majority | **0.3** | 30-50% public-market; majority in private equity, real estate, infrastructure, or strategic holdings | PIF (estimated ~40% public, dominated by Aramco + domestic megaprojects). Current manifest values PIF liquidity = 0.4 — AT BOUNDARY, defensible under either 0.3 or 0.5 tier |
+| Mid-liquid mix | **0.5** | 50-65% public-market with material private sleeve | Mubadala (~50/50 per 2024 annual report); Temasek (~50% listed, ~50% unlisted per Temasek Review 2025); QIA (~60% public) — note current manifest QIA = 0.6, at the boundary of 0.5 and 0.7 tiers |
+| Majority public | **0.7** | 65-85% public-market with modest private allocation | ADIA (55-70% public-market range per 2024 review, balance in alternatives + real assets) |
+| Predominantly liquid | **0.9** | 85-95% public-market with modest cash + short-duration sleeves | KIA (~75-85% listed equities + fixed income — boundary 0.7/0.9, current manifest = 0.8); GIC (~90% public per 2024/25 annual report) |
+| Fully liquid | **1.0** | 100% listed public markets — equities + fixed income + listed real estate. No private at all | GPFG (NBIM 2025 — 100% listed, no private markets) |
+
+### Edge case — listed real estate
+
+GPFG's listed real estate counts toward its liquidity score; PIF's
+direct real estate holdings do NOT. The distinction matters for
+boundary calls (0.7 vs 0.9): listed = liquidatable daily;
+directly-owned = months to sell at disclosed valuations.
+
+---
+
+## Axis 3 — Transparency
+
+"How well-documented is the fund's governance + financials?"
+
+Operationalized as the Linaburg-Maduell (LM) Transparency Index
+score, normalized against IFSWF membership status and the
+granularity of the fund's annual reporting.
+
+The LM index is a 10-point scale (1 = lowest, 10 = highest). IFSWF
+membership is binary (member / observer / non-member). Annual-report
+granularity gates tier promotion independently of LM/IFSWF.
+
+| Tier | Value | Meaning | LM benchmark | Concrete precedents |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Opaque | **0.1** | No public AUM, no governance reporting, no LM score | LM ≤ 1 | Deferred candidates: BIA (Brunei) if LM pins at the floor post-audit |
+| Partial disclosure | **0.3** | Governance structure published but AUM undisclosed; no asset-mix disclosure; LM 2-4 | LM 2-4 | PIF (audited financials but line-item allocation limited; IFSWF observer not full member; LM ~4 per current manifest) |
+| Asset-class disclosed | **0.5** | Audited AUM or published ranges, asset-class-level mix, partial IFSWF engagement | LM 5-6 | ADIA (annual review with asset-class ranges, partial IFSWF engagement, LM=6). QIA (limited public disclosure, IFSWF full member with audited filings, LM=5) — QIA currently manifest=0.4 may be marginally under-rated. KIA (LM=6, partial IFSWF engagement) currently manifest=0.4 — arguably under-rated |
+| Audited AUM + returns | **0.7** | Audited AUM, asset-mix breakdown, benchmark-relative returns disclosed, IFSWF full member | LM 7-8 | GIC (asset-class breakdown + 20-year rolling returns, IFSWF full member, LM=8). Mubadala (audited AUM + asset-mix, IFSWF member, LM=10) — Mubadala LM=10 argues for 0.9 tier; current manifest=0.6 may be under-rated |
+| Holdings-level | **0.9** | Full asset-class + top-holdings disclosure; regular updates; IFSWF full compliance | LM 9-10 | Temasek (audited NPV + benchmarked returns + top-20 holdings + LM=10, current manifest=0.9 ✓) |
+| Full holdings-level daily | **1.0** | Daily returns disclosed, holdings-level reporting, full IFSWF compliance | LM=10 | GPFG (NBIM full audited AUM, daily returns, holdings-level reporting, LM=10, IFSWF full compliance) |
+
+### Edge case — LM score vs disclosure depth
+
+The LM index measures 10 governance signals (publication of
+financials, independent audit, public objectives, etc.). A fund
+can score LM=10 under the index while still publishing only
+RANGED asset-mix rather than exact holdings (Mubadala, Temasek).
+The rubric distinguishes these cases: LM=10 + holdings-level
+disclosure → 0.9-1.0 tier; LM=10 + asset-class-only disclosure →
+0.7-0.8 tier. Mubadala's current manifest 0.6 under-rates the
+LM=10 signal against the rubric.
+
+### Edge case — sealed filings
+
+KIA files detailed financials to the Kuwaiti National Assembly
+but the filings are SEALED from public disclosure. Under the
+rubric this sits at the 0.5 tier (asset-class disclosed + IFSWF
+engagement) rather than the 0.3 tier (no AUM), because the AUM
+is audited and disclosed to the oversight body — just not
+publicly. Current manifest = 0.4 is at the 0.3/0.5 boundary.
+
+---
+
+## Current manifest × rubric alignment (informational, not PR-changes)
+
+Reviewing each of the 8 current manifest values against the
+rubric tiers. **This PR does NOT edit the manifest.** The
+column "Rubric tier" shows where the rating falls under this
+rubric; "Manifest value" is the current YAML value; "Aligned?"
+flags whether the rating fits the rubric or looks off.
+
+| Fund | Axis | Manifest value | Rubric tier | Aligned? | Notes |
+|---|---|---:|---|---|---|
+| GPFG (NO) | access | 0.6 | Rule-constrained stabilization (between 0.5 and 0.7) | ✓ | Fiscal rule caps withdrawal — justifies boundary rating |
+| GPFG (NO) | liquidity | 1.0 | Fully liquid | ✓ | NBIM 2025 confirms 100% listed |
+| GPFG (NO) | transparency | 1.0 | Full holdings-level daily | ✓ | LM=10 + full IFSWF compliance |
+| ADIA (AE) | access | 0.3 | Intergenerational savings | ✓ | No explicit stabilization mandate; ruler-discretionary |
+| ADIA (AE) | liquidity | 0.7 | Majority public | ✓ | 55-70% public-market per 2024 review |
+| ADIA (AE) | transparency | 0.5 | Asset-class disclosed | ✓ | LM=6; IFSWF partial engagement |
+| Mubadala (AE) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained — below 0.5 tier | ⚠ | Current 0.4 is slightly under the 0.5 tier midpoint; 2024 ADQ merger arguably strengthens case for 0.5 |
+| Mubadala (AE) | liquidity | 0.5 | Mid-liquid mix | ✓ | ~50/50 per 2024 report |
+| Mubadala (AE) | transparency | 0.6 | Between 0.5 and 0.7 | ⚠ | LM=10 + IFSWF member argues for 0.7 (audited AUM + mix + returns); currently under-rated |
+| PIF (SA) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained — below 0.5 tier | ⚠ | 0.5 tier fits the hybrid-mandate description; 0.4 is conservative. Arguable either way |
+| PIF (SA) | liquidity | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | ⚠ | ~40% public-market sits at the top of 0.3 tier rather than middle of 0.5; 0.3 may be more honest |
+| PIF (SA) | transparency | 0.3 | Partial disclosure | ✓ | LM ~4 + IFSWF observer-only |
+| KIA (KW) | access | 0.7 | Explicit stabilization with rule | ✓ | General Reserve Fund's legislated budget-financing mandate is the canonical 0.7 example |
+| KIA (KW) | liquidity | 0.8 | Between 0.7 and 0.9 | ✓ | 75-85% listed; defensible boundary rating |
+| KIA (KW) | transparency | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | ⚠ | LM=6 + IFSWF partial-engagement argues for 0.5; current 0.4 is at the boundary; 0.5 may be slightly more accurate |
+| QIA (QA) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained — below 0.5 tier | ⚠ | Long-horizon wealth management with amiri-decree deployment. 0.5 fits the hybrid tier; 0.4 is conservative |
+| QIA (QA) | liquidity | 0.6 | Between 0.5 and 0.7 | ✓ | ~60% public-market sits at the tier boundary |
+| QIA (QA) | transparency | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | ⚠ | LM=5 + IFSWF full member with audited filings argues for 0.5; current 0.4 is at the boundary |
+| GIC (SG) | access | 0.6 | Rule-mechanism with NIRC | ⚠ | NIRC framework is explicit fiscal-contribution — arguably 0.7 tier (rule-based stabilization with historical precedent); current 0.6 is conservative |
+| GIC (SG) | liquidity | 0.9 | Predominantly liquid | ✓ | ~90% public per 2024/25 report |
+| GIC (SG) | transparency | 0.8 | Audited AUM + returns | ✓ | Asset-class + 20-year rolling returns; LM=8 |
+| Temasek (SG) | access | 0.4 | State holding company — dividend-flow only | ✓ | Mechanical deployment is dividend-bound; 0.3-0.4 tier fits |
+| Temasek (SG) | liquidity | 0.5 | Mid-liquid mix | ✓ | ~50% listed per 2025 Review |
+| Temasek (SG) | transparency | 0.9 | Holdings-level | ✓ | Top-20 exposures + LM=10 |
+
+**Summary of rubric-flagged ratings** — 8 coefficients across 5 funds
+(Mubadala ×2, PIF ×2, KIA ×1, QIA ×2, GIC ×1) out of 24 total
+(8 funds × 3 axes):
+
+- Mubadala access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); transparency 0.6 (arguably 0.7)
+- PIF access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); liquidity 0.4 (arguably 0.3)
+- KIA transparency 0.4 (arguably 0.5)
+- QIA access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); transparency 0.4 (arguably 0.5)
+- GIC access 0.6 (arguably 0.7)
+
+**None of these changes are made in this PR.** The flags are
+informational — a future manifest-edit PR (PR 4b per the plan)
+should evaluate each flag, cite the rubric tier, and either
+confirm the current rating with a stronger rationale or revise
+it to match the tier.
+
+### Directional impact of the flagged ratings (if revised upward)
+
+- Mubadala 0.4 → 0.5 on access, 0.6 → 0.7 on transparency: the
+  access × transparency product moves from 0.24 to 0.35 (+46%).
+  Combined with unchanged liquidity 0.5: haircut multiplier
+  0.12 → 0.175. UAE gains material SWF-months.
+- PIF access 0.4 → 0.5: modest lift. PIF liquidity 0.4 → 0.3:
+  modest dampening. Net: small.
+- KIA transparency 0.4 → 0.5: haircut multiplier 0.7×0.8×0.4
+  = 0.224 → 0.7×0.8×0.5 = 0.28 (+25%). KW already top-quartile.
+- QIA access 0.4 → 0.5 + transparency 0.4 → 0.5: QIA haircut
+  0.096 → 0.15 (+56%). Material lift for QA.
+- GIC access 0.6 → 0.7: haircut 0.432 → 0.504 (+17%). SG lift.
+
+The directional impact analysis is INFORMATIONAL and should NOT
+be treated as a decision to revise. Per the plan's anti-pattern
+note, rubric flags shouldn't be motivated by a target ranking
+outcome. A future manifest PR should revise ratings because the
+rubric + cited precedents support the change, not because the
+resulting ranking looks better.
+
+---
+
+## How to use this rubric
+
+### When adding a new fund to the manifest
+
+1. Locate each axis value on the tier table.
+2. Cite the tier PLUS at least one concrete precedent (annual
+   report page, LM index page, IFSWF profile URL).
+3. If the fund sits between two tiers, pick the lower tier and
+   explain the boundary rating in the YAML `rationale:` block.
+4. PR review checks: does the rationale's cited evidence actually
+   land the fund at the claimed tier?
+
+### When revising an existing fund
+
+1. Cite what EVIDENCE changed: new annual report, LM score
+   revision, IFSWF membership change, mandate amendment.
+2. Map the new evidence to a tier per this rubric.
+3. Update BOTH the coefficient AND the `rationale:` text in the
+   same PR.
+4. For PRs that shift multiple coefficients: run the cohort-
+   sanity audit (see `docs/methodology/cohort-sanity-release-gate.md`)
+   and publish the contribution-decomposition table for the
+   affected countries.
+
+### When the rubric itself needs revising
+
+Out of scope for a manifest PR. A rubric revision requires:
+
+1. A separate methodology-decision PR citing the construct gap
+   the revision fixes (e.g., "the current rubric doesn't handle
+   state holding companies well — add a dedicated tier").
+2. Re-evaluation of every existing fund under the new rubric
+   (the rubric and the manifest must stay in lockstep).
+3. Cohort-sanity audit snapshot before/after.
+
+## References
+
+- Manifest: `scripts/shared/swf-classification-manifest.yaml`
+- Scorer: `server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_dimension-scorers.ts`
+  line 1654 (`scoreSovereignFiscalBuffer`)
+- Saturating transform: `score = 100 × (1 − exp(−effectiveMonths / 12))`
+- Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index methodology:
+  https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index
+- IFSWF member directory: https://www.ifswf.org/members
+- Santiago Principles self-assessments: https://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles
+- Plan reference:
+  `docs/plans/2026-04-24-002-fix-resilience-cohort-ranking-structural-audit-plan.md`
+  §PR 4