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8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Elie Habib
|
044598346e |
feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated (#3097)
* feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated
Opt-in contract path in runSeed: when opts.declareRecords is provided, write
{_seed, data} envelope to the canonical key alongside legacy seed-meta:*
(dual-write). State machine: OK / OK_ZERO / RETRY with zeroIsValid opt.
declareRecords throws or returns non-integer → hard fail (contract violation).
extraKeys[*] support per-key declareRecords; each extra key writes its own
envelope. Legacy seeders (no declareRecords) entirely unchanged.
Migrated all 91 scripts/seed-*.mjs to contract mode. Each exports
declareRecords returning the canonical record count, and passes
schemaVersion: 1 + maxStaleMin (matched to api/health.js SEED_META, or 2.5x
interval where no registry entry exists). Contract conformance reports 84/86
seeders with full descriptor (2 pre-existing warnings).
Legacy seed-meta keys still written so unmigrated readers keep working;
follow-up slices flip health.js + readers to envelope-first.
Tests: 61/61 PR 1 tests still pass.
Next slices for PR 2:
- api/health.js registry collapse + 15 seed-bundle-*.mjs canonicalKey wiring
- reader migration (mcp, resilience, aviation, displacement, regional-snapshot)
- direct writers — ais-relay.cjs, consumer-prices-core publish.ts
- public-boundary stripSeedEnvelope + test migration
Plan: docs/plans/2026-04-14-002-fix-runseed-zero-record-lockout-plan.md
* fix(seed-contract): unwrap envelopes in internal cross-seed readers
After PR 2a enveloped 91 canonical keys as {_seed, data}, every script-side
reader that returned the raw parsed JSON started silently handing callers the
envelope instead of the bare payload. WoW baselines (bigmac, grocery-basket,
fear-greed) saw undefined .countries / .composite; seed-climate-anomalies saw
undefined .normals from climate:zone-normals:v1; seed-thermal-escalation saw
undefined .fireDetections from wildfire:fires:v1; seed-forecasts' ~40-key
pipeline batch returned envelopes for every input.
Fix: route every script-side reader through unwrapEnvelope(...).data. Legacy
bare-shape values pass through unchanged (unwrapEnvelope returns
{_seed: null, data: raw} for any non-envelope shape).
Changed:
- scripts/_seed-utils.mjs: import unwrapEnvelope; redisGet, readSeedSnapshot,
verifySeedKey all unwrap. Exported new readCanonicalValue() helper for
cross-seed consumers.
- 18 seed-*.mjs scripts with local redisGet-style helpers or inline fetch
patched to unwrap via the envelope source module (subagent sweep).
- scripts/seed-forecasts.mjs pipeline batch: parse() unwraps each result.
- scripts/seed-energy-spine.mjs redisMget: unwraps each result.
Tests:
- tests/seed-utils-envelope-reads.test.mjs: 7 new cases covering envelope
+ legacy + null paths for readSeedSnapshot and verifySeedKey.
- Full seed suite: 67/67 pass (was 61, +6 new).
Addresses both of user's P1 findings on PR #3097.
* feat(seed-contract): envelope-aware reads in server + api helpers
Every RPC and public-boundary reader now automatically strips _seed from
contract-mode canonical keys. Legacy bare-shape values pass through unchanged
(unwrapEnvelope no-ops on non-envelope shapes).
Changed helpers (one-place fix — unblocks ~60 call sites):
- server/_shared/redis.ts: getRawJson, getCachedJson, getCachedJsonBatch
unwrap by default. cachedFetchJson inherits via getCachedJson.
- api/_upstash-json.js: readJsonFromUpstash unwraps (covers api/mcp.ts
tool responses + all its canonical-key reads).
- api/bootstrap.js: getCachedJsonBatch unwraps (public-boundary —
clients never see envelope metadata).
Left intentionally unchanged:
- api/health.js / api/seed-health.js: read only seed-meta:* keys which
remain bare-shape during dual-write. unwrapEnvelope already imported at
the meta-read boundary (PR 1) as a defensive no-op.
Tests: 67/67 seed tests pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.
This is the blast-radius fix the PR #3097 review called out — external
readers that would otherwise see {_seed, data} after the writer side
migrated.
* fix(test): strip export keyword in vm.runInContext'd seed source
cross-source-signals-regulatory.test.mjs loads scripts/seed-cross-source-signals.mjs
via vm.runInContext, which cannot parse ESM `export` syntax. PR 2a added
`export function declareRecords` to every seeder, which broke this test's
static-analysis approach.
Fix: strip the `export` keyword from the declareRecords line in the
preprocessed source string so the function body still evaluates as a plain
declaration.
Full test:data suite: 5307/5307 pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.
* feat(seed-contract): consumer-prices publish.ts writes envelopes
Wrap the 5 canonical keys written by consumer-prices-core/src/jobs/publish.ts
(overview, movers:7d/30d, freshness, categories:7d/30d/90d, retailer-spread,
basket-series) in {_seed, data} envelopes. Legacy seed-meta:<key> writes
preserved for dual-write.
Inlined a buildEnvelope helper (10 lines) rather than taking a cross-package
dependency — consumer-prices-core is a standalone npm package. Documented the
four-file parity contract (mjs source, ts mirror, js edge mirror, this copy).
Contract fields: sourceVersion='consumer-prices-core-publish-v1', schemaVersion=1,
state='OK' (recordCount>0) or 'OK_ZERO' (legitimate zero).
Typecheck: no new errors in publish.ts.
* fix(seed-contract): 3 more server-side readers unwrap envelopes
Found during final audit:
- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_shared.ts: resilience score reader
parsed cached GetResilienceScoreResponse raw. Contract-mode seed-resilience-scores
now envelopes those keys.
- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/get-resilience-ranking.ts: p05/p95
interval lookup parsed raw from seed-resilience-scores' extra-key path.
- server/worldmonitor/infrastructure/v1/_shared.ts: mgetJson() used for
count-source keys (wildfire:fires:v1, news:insights:v1) which are both
contract-mode now.
All three now unwrap via server/_shared/seed-envelope. Legacy shapes pass
through unchanged.
Typecheck clean.
* feat(seed-contract): ais-relay.cjs direct writes produce envelopes
32 canonical-key write sites in scripts/ais-relay.cjs now produce {_seed, data}
envelopes. Inlined buildEnvelope() (CJS module can't require ESM source) +
envelopeWrite(key, data, ttlSeconds, meta) wrapper. Enveloped keys span market
bootstrap, aviation, cyber-threats, theater-posture, weather-alerts, economic
spending/fred/worldbank, tech-events, corridor-risk, usni-fleet, shipping-stress,
social:reddit, wsb-tickers, pizzint, product-catalog, chokepoint transits,
ucdp-events, satellites, oref.
Left bare (not seeded data keys): seed-meta:* (dual-write legacy),
classifyCacheKey LLM cache, notam:prev-closed-state internal state,
wm:notif:scan-dedup flags.
Updated tests/ucdp-seed-resilience.test.mjs regex to accept both upstashSet
(pre-contract) and envelopeWrite (post-contract) call patterns.
* feat(seed-contract): 15 bundle files add canonicalKey for envelope gate
54 bundle sections across 12 files now declare canonicalKey alongside the
existing seedMetaKey. _bundle-runner.mjs (from PR 1) prefers canonicalKey
when both are present — gates section runs on envelope._seed.fetchedAt
read directly from the data key, eliminating the meta-outlives-data class
of bugs.
Files touched:
- climate (5), derived-signals (2), ecb-eu (3), energy-sources (6),
health (2), imf-extended (4), macro (10), market-backup (9),
portwatch (4), relay-backup (2), resilience-recovery (5), static-ref (2)
Skipped (14 sections, 3 whole bundles): multi-key writers, dynamic
templated keys (displacement year-scoped), or non-runSeed orchestrators
(regional brief cron, resilience-scores' 222-country publish, validation/
benchmark scripts). These continue to use seedMetaKey or their own gate.
seedMetaKey preserved everywhere — dual-write. _bundle-runner.mjs falls
back to legacy when canonicalKey is absent.
All 15 bundles pass node --check. test:data: 5307/5307. typecheck:all: clean.
* fix(seed-contract): 4 PR #3097 review P1s — transform/declareRecords mismatches + envelope leaks
Addresses both P1 findings and the extra-key seed-meta leak surfaced in review:
1. runSeed helper-level invariant: seed-meta:* keys NEVER envelope.
scripts/_seed-utils.mjs exports shouldEnvelopeKey(key) — returns false for
any key starting with 'seed-meta:'. Both atomicPublish (canonical) and
writeExtraKey (extras) gate the envelope wrap through this helper. Fixes
seed-iea-oil-stocks' ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY silently getting enveloped,
which broke health.js parsing the value as bare {fetchedAt, recordCount}.
Also defends against any future manual writeExtraKey(..., envelopeMeta)
call that happens to target a seed-meta:* key.
2. seed-token-panels canonical + extras fixed.
publishTransform returns data.defi (the defi panel itself, shape {tokens}).
Old declareRecords counted data.defi.tokens + data.ai.tokens + data.other.tokens
on the transformed payload → 0 → RETRY path → canonical market:defi-tokens:v1
never wrote, and because runSeed returned before the extraKeys loop,
market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 stayed stale too.
New: declareRecords counts data.tokens on the transformed shape. AI_KEY +
OTHER_KEY extras reuse the same function (transforms return structurally
identical panels). Added isMain guard so test imports don't fire runSeed.
3. api/product-catalog.js cached reader unwraps envelope.
ais-relay.cjs now envelopes product-catalog:v2 via envelopeWrite(). The
edge reader did raw JSON.parse(result) and returned {_seed, data} to
clients, breaking the cached path. Fix: import unwrapEnvelope from
./_seed-envelope.js, apply after JSON.parse. One site — :238-241 is
downstream of getFromCache(), so the single reader fix covers both.
4. Regression lock tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs (11 cases):
- shouldEnvelopeKey invariant: seed-meta:* false, canonical true
- Token-panels declareRecords works on transformed shape (canonical + both extras)
- Explicit repro of pre-fix buggy signature returning 0 — guards against revert
- resolveRecordCount accepts 0, rejects non-integer
- Product-catalog envelope unwrap returns bare shape; legacy passes through
Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5318/5318 pass (was 5307 — 11 new regressions)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check on every modified script
iea-oil-stocks canonical declareRecords was NOT broken (user confirmed during
review — buildIndex preserves .members); only its ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY
was affected, now covered generically by commit 1's helper invariant.
* fix(seed-contract): seed-token-panels validateFn also runs on post-transform shape
Review finding: fixing declareRecords wasn't sufficient — atomicPublish() runs
validateFn(publishData) on the transformed payload too. seed-token-panels'
validate() checked data.defi/.ai/.other on the transformed {tokens} shape,
returned false, and runSeed took the early skipped-write branch (before even
reaching the declareRecords RETRY logic). Net effect: same as before the
declareRecords fix — canonical + both extras stayed stale.
Fix: validate() now checks the canonical defi panel directly (Array.isArray
(data?.tokens) && has at least one t.price > 0). AI/OTHER panels are validated
implicitly by their own extraKey declareRecords on write.
Audited the other 9 seeders with publishTransform (bls-series, bis-extended,
bis-data, gdelt-intel, trade-flows, iea-oil-stocks, jodi-gas, sanctions-pressure,
forecasts): all validateFn's correctly target the post-transform shape. Only
token-panels regressed.
Added 4 regression tests (tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs):
- validate accepts transformed panel with priced tokens
- validate rejects all-zero-price tokens
- validate rejects empty/missing tokens
- Explicit pre-fix repro (buggy old signature fails on transformed shape)
Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5322/5322 pass (was 5318; +4 new)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check clean
* feat(seed-contract): add /api/seed-contract-probe validation endpoint
Single machine-readable gate for 'is PR #3097 working in production'.
Replaces the curl/jq ritual with one authenticated edge call that returns
HTTP 200 ok:true or 503 + failing check list.
What it validates:
- 8 canonical keys have {_seed, data} envelopes with required data fields
and minRecords floors (fsi-eu, zone-normals, 3 token panels + minRecords
guard against token-panels RETRY regression, product-catalog, wildfire,
earthquakes).
- 2 seed-meta:* keys remain BARE (shouldEnvelopeKey invariant; guards
against iea-oil-stocks ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY-class regressions).
- /api/product-catalog + /api/bootstrap responses contain no '_seed' leak.
Auth: x-probe-secret header must match RELAY_SHARED_SECRET (reuses existing
Vercel↔Railway internal trust boundary).
Probe logic is exported (checkProbe, checkPublicBoundary, DEFAULT_PROBES) for
hermetic testing. tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs covers every branch:
envelope pass/fail on field/records/shape, bare pass/fail on shape/field,
missing/malformed JSON, Redis non-2xx, boundary seed-leak detection,
DEFAULT_PROBES sanity (seed-meta invariant present, token-panels minRecords
guard present).
Usage:
curl -H "x-probe-secret: $RELAY_SHARED_SECRET" \
https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/seed-contract-probe
PR 3 will extend the probe with a stricter mode that asserts seed-meta:*
keys are GONE (not just bare) once legacy dual-write is removed.
Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 15/15 pass
- npm run test:data → 5338/5338 (was 5322; +16 new incl. conformance)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
* fix(seed-contract): tighten probe — minRecords on AI/OTHER + cache-path source header
Review P2 findings: the probe's stated guards were weaker than advertised.
1. market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 probes claimed to guard the
token-panels extra-key RETRY regression but only checked shape='envelope'
+ dataHas:['tokens']. If an extra-key declareRecords regressed to 0, both
probes would still pass because checkProbe() only inspects _seed.recordCount
when minRecords is set. Now both enforce minRecords: 1.
2. /api/product-catalog boundary check only asserted no '_seed' leak — which
is also true for the static fallback path. A broken cached reader
(getFromCache returning null or throwing) could serve fallback silently
and still pass this probe. Now:
- api/product-catalog.js emits X-Product-Catalog-Source: cache|dodo|fallback
on the response (the json() helper gained an optional source param wired
to each of the three branches).
- checkPublicBoundary declaratively requires that header's value match
'cache' for /api/product-catalog, so a fallback-serve fails the probe
with reason 'source:fallback!=cache' or 'source:missing!=cache'.
Test updates (tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs):
- Boundary check reworked to use a BOUNDARY_CHECKS config with optional
requireSourceHeader per endpoint.
- New cases: served-from-cache passes, served-from-fallback fails with source
mismatch, missing header fails, seed-leak still takes precedence, bad
status fails.
- Token-panels sanity test now asserts minRecords≥1 on all 3 panels.
Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 17/17 pass (was 15, +2 net)
- npm run test:data → 5340/5340
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
|
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Elie Habib
|
249c088639 | fix: add fetch error cause logging to all remaining seed scripts (#1643) | ||
|
Elie Habib
|
fe67111dc9 |
feat: harness engineering P0 - linting, testing, architecture docs (#1587)
* feat: harness engineering P0 - linting, testing, architecture docs
Add foundational infrastructure for agent-first development:
- AGENTS.md: agent entry point with progressive disclosure to deeper docs
- ARCHITECTURE.md: 12-section system reference with source-file refs and ownership rule
- Biome 2.4.7 linter with project-tuned rules, CI workflow (lint-code.yml)
- Architectural boundary lint enforcing forward-only dependency direction (lint-boundaries.mjs)
- Unit test CI workflow (test.yml), all 1083 tests passing
- Fixed 9 pre-existing test failures (bootstrap sync, deploy-config headers, globe parity, redis mocks, geometry URL, import.meta.env null safety)
- Fixed 12 architectural boundary violations (types moved to proper layers)
- Added 3 missing cache tier entries in gateway.ts
- Synced cache-keys.ts with bootstrap.js
- Renamed docs/architecture.mdx to "Design Philosophy" with cross-references
- Deprecated legacy docs/Docs_To_Review/ARCHITECTURE.md
- Harness engineering roadmap tracking doc
* fix: address PR review feedback on harness-engineering-p0
- countries-geojson.test.mjs: skip gracefully when CDN unreachable
instead of failing CI on network issues
- country-geometry-overrides.test.mts: relax timing assertion
(250ms -> 2000ms) for constrained CI environments
- lint-boundaries.mjs: implement the documented api/ boundary check
(was documented but missing, causing false green)
* fix(lint): scan api/ .ts files in boundary check
The api/ boundary check only scanned .js/.mjs files, missing the 25
sebuf RPC .ts edge functions. Now scans .ts files with correct rules:
- Legacy .js: fully self-contained (no server/ or src/ imports)
- RPC .ts: may import server/ and src/generated/ (bundled at deploy),
but blocks imports from src/ application code
* fix(lint): detect import() type expressions in boundary lint
- Move AppContext back to app/app-context.ts (aggregate type that
references components/services/utils belongs at the top, not types/)
- Move HappyContentCategory and TechHQ to types/ (simple enums/interfaces)
- Boundary lint now catches import('@/layer') expressions, not just
from '@/layer' imports
- correlation-engine imports of AppContext marked boundary-ignore
(type-only imports of top-level aggregate)
|
||
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Elie Habib
|
9211339d1c |
fix(seeds): prevent API quota burn and respect rate limits (#1167)
* fix(cyber): prevent AbuseIPDB quota burn when Redis rate check fails
The catch block in fetchAbuseIpDb() was falling through to the API call
when the Redis rate-limit check failed (e.g. Redis down, first run with
no key). With a 10-minute cron interval, this could exhaust the 100
calls/day free-plan limit in under 17 hours.
Now returns early with { ok: false, threats: [] } so the other 4 IOC
sources still seed normally while AbuseIPDB is safely skipped.
* fix(seeds): respect API rate limits and log fetch failures
1. seed-fire-detections.mjs: increase delay from 200ms to 6s between
FIRMS API calls. Free tier allows 10 req/min; 27 calls at 200ms
exceeded this and caused silent failures.
2. ais-relay.cjs (positive events): increase GDELT delay from 500ms to
5.5s to respect the documented 1 req/5s rate limit.
3. ais-relay.cjs (cyber fetchers): replace 5 silent `catch { return [] }`
blocks with `console.warn` logging so failures are visible in Railway
logs. Dead code today (cyber loop disabled) but sets the right example
for contributors.
* fix(seeds): extend FIRMS lock TTL and restore AbuseIPDB resilience
P1: seed-fire-detections.mjs — the 6s FIRMS pacing makes the job take
~162s minimum, exceeding the default 120s lock TTL. Extend lockTtlMs
to 300s (5 min) to prevent overlapping cron invocations.
P2: seed-cyber-threats.mjs — revert the early return on Redis rate-check
failure. A transient Redis blip should not permanently disable AbuseIPDB
for that run. Instead, log a warning and proceed with caution. The 2h
rate-limit interval + 10-min cron means at most 1 extra call per Redis
outage window, well within the 100/day budget.
* fix(wildfire): extend lock TTL to 10 min for worst-case FIRMS timeouts
27 calls × (6s pacing + 30s per-request timeout) = 972s worst case.
300s lock was still too short under partial upstream slowness.
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Elie Habib
|
804e4128f6 |
fix(cyber): suppress MaxListenersExceededWarning in GeoIP hydration (#1120)
setMaxListeners on AbortSignal to match concurrent fetch count, preventing 100+ warning lines in Railway logs. |
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Elie Habib
|
5e25bb1386 |
fix(health): resolve all critical health check failures (#1111)
## Summary - Reclassify 10 on-demand keys (BIS, supply chain, theater posture, etc.) from BOOTSTRAP → STANDALONE + ON_DEMAND to stop false CRITs - Fix seed-insights Railway OOM by correcting service-level settings - Unify LLM fallback chain (Groq → OpenRouter → Ollama) in seed-insights - Switch OpenRouter model to `openai/gpt-oss-safeguard-20b:nitro` - Fix GDELT v2/geo → v1/gkg_geojson for unrestEvents and positiveGeoEvents (v2 endpoint is dead) - Add seed-meta writes for marketQuotes/commodityQuotes in AIS relay (zero extra Yahoo calls) - Remove aggressive coord filter in cyber threats that dropped all threats when GeoIP rate-limited ## Health impact - 6 false CRITs → eliminated (reclassified as on-demand) - marketQuotes/commodityQuotes STALE_SEED → OK (seed-meta tracking) - unrestEvents EMPTY_DATA → OK (GDELT v1 fix) - positiveGeoEvents EMPTY_DATA → OK (GDELT v1 fix in relay) - cyberThreats resilience improved (coord filter removal) |
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Elie Habib
|
478df641fa |
fix: rate-guard AbuseIPDB calls and disable duplicate cyber seed loop (#1055)
Root cause: AbuseIPDB has 100 calls/day limit. The cyber seed cron runs every 2h with a 2h TTL — tight race causes Vercel handler fallthrough to live fetches when the key expires between cron runs. Three fixes: 1. Rate-guard AbuseIPDB in seed-cyber-threats.mjs: checks Redis key `rate:abuseipdb:last-call` before calling API, uses cached threats from `cache:abuseipdb:threats` between calls (2h minimum interval) 2. Disable duplicate cyber seed loop in ais-relay.cjs (standalone cron handles it — avoids 12 extra AbuseIPDB calls/day) 3. Increase seed TTL from 2h to 3h to survive 1 missed cron cycle |
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Elie Habib
|
78a14306d9 |
feat: add seed-first pattern to 15 RPC handlers with Railway seed scripts (#989)
Migrate handlers from direct external API calls to seed-first pattern: Railway cron seeds Redis → handlers read from Redis → fallback to live fetch if seed stale and SEED_FALLBACK_* env enabled. Handlers updated: earthquakes, fire-detections, internet-outages, climate-anomalies, unrest-events, cyber-threats, market-quotes, commodity-quotes, crypto-quotes, etf-flows, gulf-quotes, stablecoin-markets, natural-events, displacement-summary, risk-scores. Also adds: - scripts/_seed-utils.mjs (shared seed framework with atomic publish, distributed locks, retry, freshness metadata) - 13 seed scripts for Railway cron - api/seed-health.js monitoring endpoint - scripts/validate-seed-migration.mjs post-deploy validation - Restored multi-source CII in get-risk-scores (8 sources: ACLED, UCDP, outages, climate, cyber, fires, GPS, Iran) |