mirror of
https://github.com/koala73/worldmonitor.git
synced 2026-04-25 17:14:57 +02:00
main
10 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Elie Habib
|
044598346e |
feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated (#3097)
* feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated
Opt-in contract path in runSeed: when opts.declareRecords is provided, write
{_seed, data} envelope to the canonical key alongside legacy seed-meta:*
(dual-write). State machine: OK / OK_ZERO / RETRY with zeroIsValid opt.
declareRecords throws or returns non-integer → hard fail (contract violation).
extraKeys[*] support per-key declareRecords; each extra key writes its own
envelope. Legacy seeders (no declareRecords) entirely unchanged.
Migrated all 91 scripts/seed-*.mjs to contract mode. Each exports
declareRecords returning the canonical record count, and passes
schemaVersion: 1 + maxStaleMin (matched to api/health.js SEED_META, or 2.5x
interval where no registry entry exists). Contract conformance reports 84/86
seeders with full descriptor (2 pre-existing warnings).
Legacy seed-meta keys still written so unmigrated readers keep working;
follow-up slices flip health.js + readers to envelope-first.
Tests: 61/61 PR 1 tests still pass.
Next slices for PR 2:
- api/health.js registry collapse + 15 seed-bundle-*.mjs canonicalKey wiring
- reader migration (mcp, resilience, aviation, displacement, regional-snapshot)
- direct writers — ais-relay.cjs, consumer-prices-core publish.ts
- public-boundary stripSeedEnvelope + test migration
Plan: docs/plans/2026-04-14-002-fix-runseed-zero-record-lockout-plan.md
* fix(seed-contract): unwrap envelopes in internal cross-seed readers
After PR 2a enveloped 91 canonical keys as {_seed, data}, every script-side
reader that returned the raw parsed JSON started silently handing callers the
envelope instead of the bare payload. WoW baselines (bigmac, grocery-basket,
fear-greed) saw undefined .countries / .composite; seed-climate-anomalies saw
undefined .normals from climate:zone-normals:v1; seed-thermal-escalation saw
undefined .fireDetections from wildfire:fires:v1; seed-forecasts' ~40-key
pipeline batch returned envelopes for every input.
Fix: route every script-side reader through unwrapEnvelope(...).data. Legacy
bare-shape values pass through unchanged (unwrapEnvelope returns
{_seed: null, data: raw} for any non-envelope shape).
Changed:
- scripts/_seed-utils.mjs: import unwrapEnvelope; redisGet, readSeedSnapshot,
verifySeedKey all unwrap. Exported new readCanonicalValue() helper for
cross-seed consumers.
- 18 seed-*.mjs scripts with local redisGet-style helpers or inline fetch
patched to unwrap via the envelope source module (subagent sweep).
- scripts/seed-forecasts.mjs pipeline batch: parse() unwraps each result.
- scripts/seed-energy-spine.mjs redisMget: unwraps each result.
Tests:
- tests/seed-utils-envelope-reads.test.mjs: 7 new cases covering envelope
+ legacy + null paths for readSeedSnapshot and verifySeedKey.
- Full seed suite: 67/67 pass (was 61, +6 new).
Addresses both of user's P1 findings on PR #3097.
* feat(seed-contract): envelope-aware reads in server + api helpers
Every RPC and public-boundary reader now automatically strips _seed from
contract-mode canonical keys. Legacy bare-shape values pass through unchanged
(unwrapEnvelope no-ops on non-envelope shapes).
Changed helpers (one-place fix — unblocks ~60 call sites):
- server/_shared/redis.ts: getRawJson, getCachedJson, getCachedJsonBatch
unwrap by default. cachedFetchJson inherits via getCachedJson.
- api/_upstash-json.js: readJsonFromUpstash unwraps (covers api/mcp.ts
tool responses + all its canonical-key reads).
- api/bootstrap.js: getCachedJsonBatch unwraps (public-boundary —
clients never see envelope metadata).
Left intentionally unchanged:
- api/health.js / api/seed-health.js: read only seed-meta:* keys which
remain bare-shape during dual-write. unwrapEnvelope already imported at
the meta-read boundary (PR 1) as a defensive no-op.
Tests: 67/67 seed tests pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.
This is the blast-radius fix the PR #3097 review called out — external
readers that would otherwise see {_seed, data} after the writer side
migrated.
* fix(test): strip export keyword in vm.runInContext'd seed source
cross-source-signals-regulatory.test.mjs loads scripts/seed-cross-source-signals.mjs
via vm.runInContext, which cannot parse ESM `export` syntax. PR 2a added
`export function declareRecords` to every seeder, which broke this test's
static-analysis approach.
Fix: strip the `export` keyword from the declareRecords line in the
preprocessed source string so the function body still evaluates as a plain
declaration.
Full test:data suite: 5307/5307 pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.
* feat(seed-contract): consumer-prices publish.ts writes envelopes
Wrap the 5 canonical keys written by consumer-prices-core/src/jobs/publish.ts
(overview, movers:7d/30d, freshness, categories:7d/30d/90d, retailer-spread,
basket-series) in {_seed, data} envelopes. Legacy seed-meta:<key> writes
preserved for dual-write.
Inlined a buildEnvelope helper (10 lines) rather than taking a cross-package
dependency — consumer-prices-core is a standalone npm package. Documented the
four-file parity contract (mjs source, ts mirror, js edge mirror, this copy).
Contract fields: sourceVersion='consumer-prices-core-publish-v1', schemaVersion=1,
state='OK' (recordCount>0) or 'OK_ZERO' (legitimate zero).
Typecheck: no new errors in publish.ts.
* fix(seed-contract): 3 more server-side readers unwrap envelopes
Found during final audit:
- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_shared.ts: resilience score reader
parsed cached GetResilienceScoreResponse raw. Contract-mode seed-resilience-scores
now envelopes those keys.
- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/get-resilience-ranking.ts: p05/p95
interval lookup parsed raw from seed-resilience-scores' extra-key path.
- server/worldmonitor/infrastructure/v1/_shared.ts: mgetJson() used for
count-source keys (wildfire:fires:v1, news:insights:v1) which are both
contract-mode now.
All three now unwrap via server/_shared/seed-envelope. Legacy shapes pass
through unchanged.
Typecheck clean.
* feat(seed-contract): ais-relay.cjs direct writes produce envelopes
32 canonical-key write sites in scripts/ais-relay.cjs now produce {_seed, data}
envelopes. Inlined buildEnvelope() (CJS module can't require ESM source) +
envelopeWrite(key, data, ttlSeconds, meta) wrapper. Enveloped keys span market
bootstrap, aviation, cyber-threats, theater-posture, weather-alerts, economic
spending/fred/worldbank, tech-events, corridor-risk, usni-fleet, shipping-stress,
social:reddit, wsb-tickers, pizzint, product-catalog, chokepoint transits,
ucdp-events, satellites, oref.
Left bare (not seeded data keys): seed-meta:* (dual-write legacy),
classifyCacheKey LLM cache, notam:prev-closed-state internal state,
wm:notif:scan-dedup flags.
Updated tests/ucdp-seed-resilience.test.mjs regex to accept both upstashSet
(pre-contract) and envelopeWrite (post-contract) call patterns.
* feat(seed-contract): 15 bundle files add canonicalKey for envelope gate
54 bundle sections across 12 files now declare canonicalKey alongside the
existing seedMetaKey. _bundle-runner.mjs (from PR 1) prefers canonicalKey
when both are present — gates section runs on envelope._seed.fetchedAt
read directly from the data key, eliminating the meta-outlives-data class
of bugs.
Files touched:
- climate (5), derived-signals (2), ecb-eu (3), energy-sources (6),
health (2), imf-extended (4), macro (10), market-backup (9),
portwatch (4), relay-backup (2), resilience-recovery (5), static-ref (2)
Skipped (14 sections, 3 whole bundles): multi-key writers, dynamic
templated keys (displacement year-scoped), or non-runSeed orchestrators
(regional brief cron, resilience-scores' 222-country publish, validation/
benchmark scripts). These continue to use seedMetaKey or their own gate.
seedMetaKey preserved everywhere — dual-write. _bundle-runner.mjs falls
back to legacy when canonicalKey is absent.
All 15 bundles pass node --check. test:data: 5307/5307. typecheck:all: clean.
* fix(seed-contract): 4 PR #3097 review P1s — transform/declareRecords mismatches + envelope leaks
Addresses both P1 findings and the extra-key seed-meta leak surfaced in review:
1. runSeed helper-level invariant: seed-meta:* keys NEVER envelope.
scripts/_seed-utils.mjs exports shouldEnvelopeKey(key) — returns false for
any key starting with 'seed-meta:'. Both atomicPublish (canonical) and
writeExtraKey (extras) gate the envelope wrap through this helper. Fixes
seed-iea-oil-stocks' ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY silently getting enveloped,
which broke health.js parsing the value as bare {fetchedAt, recordCount}.
Also defends against any future manual writeExtraKey(..., envelopeMeta)
call that happens to target a seed-meta:* key.
2. seed-token-panels canonical + extras fixed.
publishTransform returns data.defi (the defi panel itself, shape {tokens}).
Old declareRecords counted data.defi.tokens + data.ai.tokens + data.other.tokens
on the transformed payload → 0 → RETRY path → canonical market:defi-tokens:v1
never wrote, and because runSeed returned before the extraKeys loop,
market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 stayed stale too.
New: declareRecords counts data.tokens on the transformed shape. AI_KEY +
OTHER_KEY extras reuse the same function (transforms return structurally
identical panels). Added isMain guard so test imports don't fire runSeed.
3. api/product-catalog.js cached reader unwraps envelope.
ais-relay.cjs now envelopes product-catalog:v2 via envelopeWrite(). The
edge reader did raw JSON.parse(result) and returned {_seed, data} to
clients, breaking the cached path. Fix: import unwrapEnvelope from
./_seed-envelope.js, apply after JSON.parse. One site — :238-241 is
downstream of getFromCache(), so the single reader fix covers both.
4. Regression lock tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs (11 cases):
- shouldEnvelopeKey invariant: seed-meta:* false, canonical true
- Token-panels declareRecords works on transformed shape (canonical + both extras)
- Explicit repro of pre-fix buggy signature returning 0 — guards against revert
- resolveRecordCount accepts 0, rejects non-integer
- Product-catalog envelope unwrap returns bare shape; legacy passes through
Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5318/5318 pass (was 5307 — 11 new regressions)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check on every modified script
iea-oil-stocks canonical declareRecords was NOT broken (user confirmed during
review — buildIndex preserves .members); only its ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY
was affected, now covered generically by commit 1's helper invariant.
* fix(seed-contract): seed-token-panels validateFn also runs on post-transform shape
Review finding: fixing declareRecords wasn't sufficient — atomicPublish() runs
validateFn(publishData) on the transformed payload too. seed-token-panels'
validate() checked data.defi/.ai/.other on the transformed {tokens} shape,
returned false, and runSeed took the early skipped-write branch (before even
reaching the declareRecords RETRY logic). Net effect: same as before the
declareRecords fix — canonical + both extras stayed stale.
Fix: validate() now checks the canonical defi panel directly (Array.isArray
(data?.tokens) && has at least one t.price > 0). AI/OTHER panels are validated
implicitly by their own extraKey declareRecords on write.
Audited the other 9 seeders with publishTransform (bls-series, bis-extended,
bis-data, gdelt-intel, trade-flows, iea-oil-stocks, jodi-gas, sanctions-pressure,
forecasts): all validateFn's correctly target the post-transform shape. Only
token-panels regressed.
Added 4 regression tests (tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs):
- validate accepts transformed panel with priced tokens
- validate rejects all-zero-price tokens
- validate rejects empty/missing tokens
- Explicit pre-fix repro (buggy old signature fails on transformed shape)
Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5322/5322 pass (was 5318; +4 new)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check clean
* feat(seed-contract): add /api/seed-contract-probe validation endpoint
Single machine-readable gate for 'is PR #3097 working in production'.
Replaces the curl/jq ritual with one authenticated edge call that returns
HTTP 200 ok:true or 503 + failing check list.
What it validates:
- 8 canonical keys have {_seed, data} envelopes with required data fields
and minRecords floors (fsi-eu, zone-normals, 3 token panels + minRecords
guard against token-panels RETRY regression, product-catalog, wildfire,
earthquakes).
- 2 seed-meta:* keys remain BARE (shouldEnvelopeKey invariant; guards
against iea-oil-stocks ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY-class regressions).
- /api/product-catalog + /api/bootstrap responses contain no '_seed' leak.
Auth: x-probe-secret header must match RELAY_SHARED_SECRET (reuses existing
Vercel↔Railway internal trust boundary).
Probe logic is exported (checkProbe, checkPublicBoundary, DEFAULT_PROBES) for
hermetic testing. tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs covers every branch:
envelope pass/fail on field/records/shape, bare pass/fail on shape/field,
missing/malformed JSON, Redis non-2xx, boundary seed-leak detection,
DEFAULT_PROBES sanity (seed-meta invariant present, token-panels minRecords
guard present).
Usage:
curl -H "x-probe-secret: $RELAY_SHARED_SECRET" \
https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/seed-contract-probe
PR 3 will extend the probe with a stricter mode that asserts seed-meta:*
keys are GONE (not just bare) once legacy dual-write is removed.
Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 15/15 pass
- npm run test:data → 5338/5338 (was 5322; +16 new incl. conformance)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
* fix(seed-contract): tighten probe — minRecords on AI/OTHER + cache-path source header
Review P2 findings: the probe's stated guards were weaker than advertised.
1. market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 probes claimed to guard the
token-panels extra-key RETRY regression but only checked shape='envelope'
+ dataHas:['tokens']. If an extra-key declareRecords regressed to 0, both
probes would still pass because checkProbe() only inspects _seed.recordCount
when minRecords is set. Now both enforce minRecords: 1.
2. /api/product-catalog boundary check only asserted no '_seed' leak — which
is also true for the static fallback path. A broken cached reader
(getFromCache returning null or throwing) could serve fallback silently
and still pass this probe. Now:
- api/product-catalog.js emits X-Product-Catalog-Source: cache|dodo|fallback
on the response (the json() helper gained an optional source param wired
to each of the three branches).
- checkPublicBoundary declaratively requires that header's value match
'cache' for /api/product-catalog, so a fallback-serve fails the probe
with reason 'source:fallback!=cache' or 'source:missing!=cache'.
Test updates (tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs):
- Boundary check reworked to use a BOUNDARY_CHECKS config with optional
requireSourceHeader per endpoint.
- New cases: served-from-cache passes, served-from-fallback fails with source
mismatch, missing header fails, seed-leak still takes precedence, bad
status fails.
- Token-panels sanity test now asserts minRecords≥1 on all 3 panels.
Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 17/17 pass (was 15, +2 net)
- npm run test:data → 5340/5340
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
|
||
|
Elie Habib
|
77ca4976ef |
fix(intelligence): fail-closed on any upstream miss, counts key TTL extension (#2512)
P1: expand null guard from sanctions-only to all three Redis keys so a transient miss on risk:scores or intelligence:advisories also returns upstreamUnavailable:true, preventing CDN from caching partial data. P1: add sanctions:country-counts:v1 to extraKeys so runSeed's failure path calls extendExistingTtl on it alongside the canonical key, preventing the counts key from expiring independently after a failed OFAC run. |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
8aee4d340e |
feat(intelligence): GetCountryRisk RPC + MCP tool for per-country risk scores (#2502)
* feat(intelligence): GetCountryRisk RPC for per-country risk intelligence Adds a new fast Redis-read RPC that consolidates CII score, travel advisory level, and OFAC sanctions exposure into a single per-country response. Replaces the need to call GetRiskScores (all-countries) and filter client-side. Wired to MCP as get_country_risk tool (no LLM, ~200ms, good for agent screening). - proto/intelligence/v1/get_country_risk.proto (new) - server/intelligence/v1/get-country-risk.ts (reads 3 pre-seeded Redis keys) - gateway.ts: slow cache tier - api/mcp.ts: RpcToolDef with 8s timeout - tests/mcp.test.mjs: update tool count 27→28 * fix(intelligence): upstream-unavailable signal, fetchedAt from CII, drop redundant catch P1: return upstreamUnavailable:true when all Redis reads are null — prevents CDN from caching false-negative sanctions/risk responses during Redis outages. P2: fetchedAt now uses cii.computedAt (actual data age) instead of request time. P2: removed redundant .catch(() => null) — getCachedJson already swallows errors. * fix(intelligence): accurate OFAC counts and country names for GetCountryRisk P1: sanctions:pressure:v1.countries is a top-12 slice — switch to a new sanctions:country-counts:v1 key (ISO2→count across ALL 40K+ OFAC entries). Written by seed-sanctions-pressure.mjs in afterPublish alongside entity index. P1: trigger upstreamUnavailable:true when sanctions key alone is missing, preventing false-negative sanctionsActive:false from being cached by CDN. P2: advisory seeder now writes byCountryName (ISO2→display name) derived from country-names.json reverse map. Handler uses it as fallback so countries outside TIER1_COUNTRIES (TH, CO, BD, IT...) get proper names. |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
3321069fb3 |
feat(sanctions): entity lookup index + OpenSanctions search (#2042) (#2085)
* feat(sanctions): entity lookup index + OpenSanctions search (#2042) * fix: guard tokens[0] access in sanctions lookup * fix: use createIpRateLimiter pattern in sanctions-entity-search * fix: add sanctions-entity-search to allowlist and cache tier * fix: add LookupSanctionEntity RPC to service.proto, regenerate * fix(sanctions): strip _entityIndex/_state from main key publish, guard limit NaN P0: seed-sanctions-pressure was writing the full _entityIndex array and _state snapshot into sanctions:pressure:v1 because afterPublish runs after atomicPublish. Add publishTransform to strip both fields before the main key write so the pressure payload stays compact; afterPublish and extraKeys still receive the full data object and write the correct separate keys. P1: limit param in sanctions-entity-search edge function passed NaN to OpenSanctions when a non-numeric value was supplied. Fix with Number.isFinite guard. P2: add 200-char max length on q param to prevent oversized upstream requests. * fix(sanctions): maxStaleMin 2x interval, no-store on entity search health.js: 720min (1x) → 1440min (2x) for both sanctionsPressure and sanctionsEntities. A single missed 12h cron was immediately flagging stale. sanctions-entity-search.js: Cache-Control public → no-store. Sanctions lookups include compliance-sensitive names in the query string; public caching would have logged/stored these at CDN/proxy layer. |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
df29d59ff7 |
fix(health): enforce 1h+ TTL buffer across all seed jobs (#2072)
Full audit of seed TTL vs cron cadence. Rule: TTL >= cron_interval + 1h. CRITICAL (TTL = cron, 0 buffer): - seed-supply-chain-trade: tariffTrendsUs TRADE_TTL(6h) → TARIFF_TTL(8h) - seed-supply-chain-trade: customsRevenue TRADE_TTL(6h) → CUSTOMS_TTL(24h) - seed-sanctions-pressure: CACHE_TTL 12h → 15h (12h cron, 3h buffer) - seed-usa-spending: CACHE_TTL 1h → 2h (1h cron, 1h buffer) WARN (<1h buffer): - seed-security-advisories: TTL 2h → 3h (1h cron, now 2h buffer) - seed-token-panels: TTL 1h → 90min (30min cron, now 1h buffer) - seed-etf-flows: TTL 1h → 90min (15min cron, now 75min buffer) - seed-stablecoin-markets: TTL 1h → 90min (10min cron, now 80min buffer) - seed-gulf-quotes: TTL 1h → 90min (10min cron, now 80min buffer) - seed-crypto-quotes: TTL 1h → 2h (5min cron, now 115min buffer) - ais-relay CRYPTO_SEED_TTL: 1h → 2h - ais-relay STABLECOIN_SEED_TTL: 1h → 2h - ais-relay SECTORS_SEED_TTL: 1h → 2h |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
56f237c37f |
fix(sanctions): replace fast-xml-parser with SAX streaming to fix Railway OOM (#2008)
The seed was being SIGKILL'd on Railway (512MB limit) because fast-xml-parser built a ~300MB object tree from the 120MB OFAC SDN XML download, causing both the raw XML string and the full parsed object to coexist in heap simultaneously. Switch to sax (already a transitive dep) with a streaming pipeline: response.body is piped chunk-by-chunk via a TextDecoder into the SAX parser. The full XML string is never held in memory. Reference maps (areaCodes, featureTypes, legalBasis, locations, parties) are populated as SAX events arrive, and entries are emitted one at a time on </SanctionsEntry>. All DOM-traversal helpers (listify, textValue, buildEpoch, buildReferenceMaps, buildLocationMap, extractPartyName, resolveEntityType, extractPartyCountries, buildPartyMap, extractPrograms, extractEffectiveAt, extractNote, buildEntriesForDocument) are removed. Output-stage pure functions (uniqueSorted, compactNote, sortEntries, buildCountryPressure, buildProgramPressure) are kept. Tests updated to match: removed test blocks for deleted DOM helpers, kept coverage for the remaining pure functions (2173/2173 pass). |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
2bf825feb0 |
fix(sanctions): reduce peak heap in seed to prevent OOM kill on Railway (#2001)
The sdn_advanced.xml file has grown to ~120MB. During XML_PARSER.parse() both the raw string (~120MB) and the parsed JS object tree (~200-300MB) coexist in memory, exceeding Railway's 512MB limit and causing a silent SIGKILL with no error output in logs. Block-scope the xml string so it is GC-eligible immediately after parse returns, and yield to the event loop so GC can reclaim it before buildEntriesForDocument allocates the entry objects. Also corrects the stale ~10MB comment that was written before the file grew. |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
e486f077c7 | fix(sanctions): add progress logging to seed (fetch size, entry count, new count) (#1758) | ||
|
Elie Habib
|
1a59114d05 |
refactor(sanctions): simplify handler to Redis-read-only, fix seed OOM risk (#1753)
* refactor(sanctions): simplify handler to Redis-read-only, fix seed OOM risk Handler (424→56 lines): - Remove live OFAC fetch fallback from Vercel Edge handler: XMLParser, OFAC_SOURCES, fetchSource, collectPressure, cachedFetchJson fallback. Vercel reads Redis only; Railway makes all external API calls. - On seed miss/empty, return emptyResponse() matching the radiation pattern. Seed: - Fetch SDN then Consolidated sequentially instead of Promise.all. Combined parallel parse peaks at ~150MB, tight against 512MB heap limit. Tests: - Add gold standard compliance assertions (no XMLParser, no OFAC_SOURCES). - Add memory safety assertion (no Promise.all on OFAC sources). - Replace handler XML-function tests (removed code) with Redis-read assertions. * chore: exclude DMCA-TAKEDOWN-NOTICE.md from markdownlint |
||
|
Elie Habib
|
babb9b6836 |
feat(sanctions): add OFAC sanctions pressure intelligence (#1739)
* feat(sanctions): add OFAC sanctions pressure intelligence * fix(sanctions): strip _state from API response, fix code/name alignment, cap seed limit - trimResponse now destructures _state before spreading to prevent seed internals leaking to API clients during the atomicPublish→afterPublish window - buildLocationMap and extractPartyCountries now sort (code, name) as aligned pairs instead of calling uniqueSorted independently on each array; fixes code↔name mispairing for OFAC-specific codes like XC (Crimea) where alphabetic order of codes and names diverges - DEFAULT_RECENT_LIMIT reduced from 120 to 60 to match MAX_ITEMS_LIMIT so seeded entries beyond the handler cap are not written unnecessarily - Add tests/sanctions-pressure.test.mjs covering all three invariants * fix(sanctions): register sanctions:pressure:v1 in health.js BOOTSTRAP_KEYS and SEED_META Adds sanctionsPressure to health.js so the health endpoint monitors the seeded key for emptiness (CRIT) and freshness via seed-meta:sanctions:pressure (maxStaleMin: 720 matches 12h seed TTL). Without this, health was blind to stale or missing sanctions data. |