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* feat(auth): user-facing API key management (create / list / revoke) Adds full-stack API key management so authenticated users can create, list, and revoke their own API keys from the Settings UI. Backend: - Convex `userApiKeys` table with SHA-256 key hash storage - Mutations: createApiKey, listApiKeys, revokeApiKey - Internal query validateKeyByHash + touchKeyLastUsed for gateway - HTTP endpoints: /api/api-keys (CRUD) + /api/internal-validate-api-key - Gateway middleware validates user-owned keys via Convex + Redis cache Frontend: - New "API Keys" tab in UnifiedSettings (visible when signed in) - Create form with copy-on-creation banner (key shown once) - List with prefix display, timestamps, and revoke action - Client-side key generation + hashing (plaintext never sent to DB) Closes #3116 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-keys): address PR review — cache invalidation, prefix validation, revoked-key guard - Invalidate Redis cache on key revocation so gateway rejects revoked keys immediately instead of waiting for 5-min TTL expiry (P1) - Enforce `wm_` prefix format with regex instead of loose length check (P2) - Skip `touchKeyLastUsed` for revoked keys to preserve clean audit trail (P2) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-keys): address consolidated PR review (P0–P3) P0: gate createApiKey on pro entitlement (tier >= 1); isCallerPremium now verifies key-owner tier instead of treating existence as premium. P1: wire wm_ user keys into the domain gateway auth path with async Convex-backed validation; user keys go through entitlement checks (only admin keys bypass). Lower cache TTL 300s → 60s and await revocation cache-bust instead of fire-and-forget. P2: remove dead HTTP create/list/revoke path from convex/http.ts; switch to cachedFetchJson (stampede protection, env-prefixed keys, standard NEG_SENTINEL); add tenancy check on cache-invalidation endpoint via new /api/internal-get-key-owner route; add 22 Convex tests covering tier gate, per-user limit, duplicate hash, ownership revoke guard, getKeyOwner, and touchKeyLastUsed debounce. P3: tighten keyPrefix regex to exactly 5 hex chars; debounce touchKeyLastUsed (5 min); surface PRO_REQUIRED in UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-keys): gate on apiAccess (not tier), wire wm_ keys through edge routes, harden error paths - Gate API key creation/validation on features.apiAccess instead of tier >= 1. Pro (tier 1, apiAccess=false) can no longer mint keys — only API_STARTER+. - Wire wm_ user keys through standalone edge routes (shipping/route-intelligence, shipping/webhooks) that were short-circuiting on validateApiKey before async Convex validation could run. - Restore fail-soft behavior in validateUserApiKey: transient Convex/network errors degrade to unauthorized instead of bubbling a 500. - Fail-closed on cache invalidation endpoint: ownership check errors now return 503 instead of silently proceeding (surfaces Convex outages in logs). - Tests updated: positive paths use api_starter (apiAccess=true), new test locks Pro-without-API-access rejection. 23 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(webhooks): remove wm_ user key fallback from shipping webhooks Webhook ownership is keyed to SHA-256(apiKey) via callerFingerprint(), not to the user. With user-owned keys (up to 5 per user), this causes cross-key blindness (webhooks invisible when calling with a different key) and revoke-orphaning (revoking the creating key makes the webhook permanently unmanageable). User keys remain supported on the read-only route-intelligence endpoint. Webhook ownership migration to userId will follow in a separate PR. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elie Habib <elie.habib@gmail.com>
185 lines
5.6 KiB
TypeScript
185 lines
5.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { ConvexError, v } from "convex/values";
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import { internalMutation, internalQuery, mutation, query } from "./_generated/server";
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import { requireUserId } from "./lib/auth";
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/** Maximum number of active (non-revoked) API keys per user. */
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const MAX_KEYS_PER_USER = 5;
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Public mutations & queries (require Clerk JWT via ctx.auth)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Create a new API key.
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*
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* The caller must generate the random key client-side (or in the HTTP action)
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* and pass the SHA-256 hex hash + the first 8 chars (prefix) here.
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* The plaintext key is NEVER stored in Convex.
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*
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* Requires an active entitlement with apiAccess=true (API_STARTER+ plans).
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* Pro plans (tier 1) have apiAccess=false and cannot create keys.
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*/
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export const createApiKey = mutation({
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args: {
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name: v.string(),
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keyPrefix: v.string(),
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keyHash: v.string(),
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},
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handler: async (ctx, args) => {
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const userId = await requireUserId(ctx);
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// Entitlement gate: only users with apiAccess may create API keys.
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// This is catalog-driven — Pro (tier 1) has apiAccess=false;
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// API_STARTER+ (tier 2+) have apiAccess=true.
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const entitlement = await ctx.db
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.query("entitlements")
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.withIndex("by_userId", (q) => q.eq("userId", userId))
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.first();
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if (
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!entitlement ||
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entitlement.validUntil < Date.now() ||
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!entitlement.features.apiAccess
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) {
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throw new ConvexError("API_ACCESS_REQUIRED");
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}
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if (!args.name.trim()) {
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throw new ConvexError("INVALID_NAME");
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}
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if (!/^wm_[a-f0-9]{5}$/.test(args.keyPrefix)) {
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throw new ConvexError("INVALID_PREFIX");
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}
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if (!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(args.keyHash)) {
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throw new ConvexError("INVALID_HASH");
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}
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// Enforce per-user key limit (count only non-revoked keys)
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const existing = await ctx.db
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.query("userApiKeys")
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.withIndex("by_userId", (q) => q.eq("userId", userId))
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.collect();
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const activeCount = existing.filter((k) => !k.revokedAt).length;
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if (activeCount >= MAX_KEYS_PER_USER) {
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throw new ConvexError("KEY_LIMIT_REACHED");
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}
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// Guard against duplicate hash (astronomically unlikely, but belt-and-suspenders)
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const dup = await ctx.db
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.query("userApiKeys")
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.withIndex("by_keyHash", (q) => q.eq("keyHash", args.keyHash))
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.first();
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if (dup) {
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throw new ConvexError("DUPLICATE_KEY");
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}
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const id = await ctx.db.insert("userApiKeys", {
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userId,
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name: args.name.trim(),
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keyPrefix: args.keyPrefix,
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keyHash: args.keyHash,
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createdAt: Date.now(),
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});
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return { id, name: args.name.trim(), keyPrefix: args.keyPrefix };
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},
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});
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/** List all API keys for the current user (active + revoked). */
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export const listApiKeys = query({
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args: {},
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handler: async (ctx) => {
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const userId = await requireUserId(ctx);
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const keys = await ctx.db
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.query("userApiKeys")
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.withIndex("by_userId", (q) => q.eq("userId", userId))
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.collect();
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return keys.map((k) => ({
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id: k._id,
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name: k.name,
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keyPrefix: k.keyPrefix,
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createdAt: k.createdAt,
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lastUsedAt: k.lastUsedAt,
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revokedAt: k.revokedAt,
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}));
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},
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});
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/** Revoke a key owned by the current user. */
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export const revokeApiKey = mutation({
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args: { keyId: v.id("userApiKeys") },
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handler: async (ctx, args) => {
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const userId = await requireUserId(ctx);
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const key = await ctx.db.get(args.keyId);
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if (!key || key.userId !== userId) {
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throw new ConvexError("NOT_FOUND");
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}
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if (key.revokedAt) {
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throw new ConvexError("ALREADY_REVOKED");
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}
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await ctx.db.patch(args.keyId, { revokedAt: Date.now() });
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return { ok: true, keyHash: key.keyHash };
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},
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Internal (service-to-service) — called from HTTP actions / middleware
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Look up an API key by its SHA-256 hash.
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* Returns the key row (with userId) if found and not revoked, else null.
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* Used by the edge gateway to validate incoming API keys.
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*/
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export const validateKeyByHash = internalQuery({
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args: { keyHash: v.string() },
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handler: async (ctx, args) => {
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const key = await ctx.db
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.query("userApiKeys")
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.withIndex("by_keyHash", (q) => q.eq("keyHash", args.keyHash))
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.first();
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if (!key || key.revokedAt) return null;
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return {
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id: key._id,
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userId: key.userId,
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name: key.name,
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};
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},
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});
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/**
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* Look up the owner of a key by its hash, regardless of revoked status.
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* Used by the cache-invalidation endpoint to verify tenancy.
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*/
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export const getKeyOwner = internalQuery({
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args: { keyHash: v.string() },
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handler: async (ctx, args) => {
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const key = await ctx.db
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.query("userApiKeys")
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.withIndex("by_keyHash", (q) => q.eq("keyHash", args.keyHash))
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.first();
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return key ? { userId: key.userId } : null;
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},
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});
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/**
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* Bump lastUsedAt for a key (fire-and-forget from the gateway).
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* Skips the write if lastUsedAt was updated within the last 5 minutes
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* to reduce Convex write load for hot keys.
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*/
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const TOUCH_DEBOUNCE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
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export const touchKeyLastUsed = internalMutation({
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args: { keyId: v.id("userApiKeys") },
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handler: async (ctx, args) => {
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const key = await ctx.db.get(args.keyId);
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if (!key || key.revokedAt) return;
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if (key.lastUsedAt && key.lastUsedAt > Date.now() - TOUCH_DEBOUNCE_MS) return;
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await ctx.db.patch(args.keyId, { lastUsedAt: Date.now() });
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},
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});
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