Files
worldmonitor/scripts/seed-radiation-watch.mjs
Elie Habib 044598346e feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated (#3097)
* feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated

Opt-in contract path in runSeed: when opts.declareRecords is provided, write
{_seed, data} envelope to the canonical key alongside legacy seed-meta:*
(dual-write). State machine: OK / OK_ZERO / RETRY with zeroIsValid opt.
declareRecords throws or returns non-integer → hard fail (contract violation).
extraKeys[*] support per-key declareRecords; each extra key writes its own
envelope. Legacy seeders (no declareRecords) entirely unchanged.

Migrated all 91 scripts/seed-*.mjs to contract mode. Each exports
declareRecords returning the canonical record count, and passes
schemaVersion: 1 + maxStaleMin (matched to api/health.js SEED_META, or 2.5x
interval where no registry entry exists). Contract conformance reports 84/86
seeders with full descriptor (2 pre-existing warnings).

Legacy seed-meta keys still written so unmigrated readers keep working;
follow-up slices flip health.js + readers to envelope-first.

Tests: 61/61 PR 1 tests still pass.

Next slices for PR 2:
- api/health.js registry collapse + 15 seed-bundle-*.mjs canonicalKey wiring
- reader migration (mcp, resilience, aviation, displacement, regional-snapshot)
- direct writers — ais-relay.cjs, consumer-prices-core publish.ts
- public-boundary stripSeedEnvelope + test migration

Plan: docs/plans/2026-04-14-002-fix-runseed-zero-record-lockout-plan.md

* fix(seed-contract): unwrap envelopes in internal cross-seed readers

After PR 2a enveloped 91 canonical keys as {_seed, data}, every script-side
reader that returned the raw parsed JSON started silently handing callers the
envelope instead of the bare payload. WoW baselines (bigmac, grocery-basket,
fear-greed) saw undefined .countries / .composite; seed-climate-anomalies saw
undefined .normals from climate:zone-normals:v1; seed-thermal-escalation saw
undefined .fireDetections from wildfire:fires:v1; seed-forecasts' ~40-key
pipeline batch returned envelopes for every input.

Fix: route every script-side reader through unwrapEnvelope(...).data. Legacy
bare-shape values pass through unchanged (unwrapEnvelope returns
{_seed: null, data: raw} for any non-envelope shape).

Changed:
- scripts/_seed-utils.mjs: import unwrapEnvelope; redisGet, readSeedSnapshot,
  verifySeedKey all unwrap. Exported new readCanonicalValue() helper for
  cross-seed consumers.
- 18 seed-*.mjs scripts with local redisGet-style helpers or inline fetch
  patched to unwrap via the envelope source module (subagent sweep).
- scripts/seed-forecasts.mjs pipeline batch: parse() unwraps each result.
- scripts/seed-energy-spine.mjs redisMget: unwraps each result.

Tests:
- tests/seed-utils-envelope-reads.test.mjs: 7 new cases covering envelope
  + legacy + null paths for readSeedSnapshot and verifySeedKey.
- Full seed suite: 67/67 pass (was 61, +6 new).

Addresses both of user's P1 findings on PR #3097.

* feat(seed-contract): envelope-aware reads in server + api helpers

Every RPC and public-boundary reader now automatically strips _seed from
contract-mode canonical keys. Legacy bare-shape values pass through unchanged
(unwrapEnvelope no-ops on non-envelope shapes).

Changed helpers (one-place fix — unblocks ~60 call sites):
- server/_shared/redis.ts: getRawJson, getCachedJson, getCachedJsonBatch
  unwrap by default. cachedFetchJson inherits via getCachedJson.
- api/_upstash-json.js: readJsonFromUpstash unwraps (covers api/mcp.ts
  tool responses + all its canonical-key reads).
- api/bootstrap.js: getCachedJsonBatch unwraps (public-boundary —
  clients never see envelope metadata).

Left intentionally unchanged:
- api/health.js / api/seed-health.js: read only seed-meta:* keys which
  remain bare-shape during dual-write. unwrapEnvelope already imported at
  the meta-read boundary (PR 1) as a defensive no-op.

Tests: 67/67 seed tests pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.

This is the blast-radius fix the PR #3097 review called out — external
readers that would otherwise see {_seed, data} after the writer side
migrated.

* fix(test): strip export keyword in vm.runInContext'd seed source

cross-source-signals-regulatory.test.mjs loads scripts/seed-cross-source-signals.mjs
via vm.runInContext, which cannot parse ESM `export` syntax. PR 2a added
`export function declareRecords` to every seeder, which broke this test's
static-analysis approach.

Fix: strip the `export` keyword from the declareRecords line in the
preprocessed source string so the function body still evaluates as a plain
declaration.

Full test:data suite: 5307/5307 pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.

* feat(seed-contract): consumer-prices publish.ts writes envelopes

Wrap the 5 canonical keys written by consumer-prices-core/src/jobs/publish.ts
(overview, movers:7d/30d, freshness, categories:7d/30d/90d, retailer-spread,
basket-series) in {_seed, data} envelopes. Legacy seed-meta:<key> writes
preserved for dual-write.

Inlined a buildEnvelope helper (10 lines) rather than taking a cross-package
dependency — consumer-prices-core is a standalone npm package. Documented the
four-file parity contract (mjs source, ts mirror, js edge mirror, this copy).

Contract fields: sourceVersion='consumer-prices-core-publish-v1', schemaVersion=1,
state='OK' (recordCount>0) or 'OK_ZERO' (legitimate zero).

Typecheck: no new errors in publish.ts.

* fix(seed-contract): 3 more server-side readers unwrap envelopes

Found during final audit:

- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_shared.ts: resilience score reader
  parsed cached GetResilienceScoreResponse raw. Contract-mode seed-resilience-scores
  now envelopes those keys.
- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/get-resilience-ranking.ts: p05/p95
  interval lookup parsed raw from seed-resilience-scores' extra-key path.
- server/worldmonitor/infrastructure/v1/_shared.ts: mgetJson() used for
  count-source keys (wildfire:fires:v1, news:insights:v1) which are both
  contract-mode now.

All three now unwrap via server/_shared/seed-envelope. Legacy shapes pass
through unchanged.

Typecheck clean.

* feat(seed-contract): ais-relay.cjs direct writes produce envelopes

32 canonical-key write sites in scripts/ais-relay.cjs now produce {_seed, data}
envelopes. Inlined buildEnvelope() (CJS module can't require ESM source) +
envelopeWrite(key, data, ttlSeconds, meta) wrapper. Enveloped keys span market
bootstrap, aviation, cyber-threats, theater-posture, weather-alerts, economic
spending/fred/worldbank, tech-events, corridor-risk, usni-fleet, shipping-stress,
social:reddit, wsb-tickers, pizzint, product-catalog, chokepoint transits,
ucdp-events, satellites, oref.

Left bare (not seeded data keys): seed-meta:* (dual-write legacy),
classifyCacheKey LLM cache, notam:prev-closed-state internal state,
wm:notif:scan-dedup flags.

Updated tests/ucdp-seed-resilience.test.mjs regex to accept both upstashSet
(pre-contract) and envelopeWrite (post-contract) call patterns.

* feat(seed-contract): 15 bundle files add canonicalKey for envelope gate

54 bundle sections across 12 files now declare canonicalKey alongside the
existing seedMetaKey. _bundle-runner.mjs (from PR 1) prefers canonicalKey
when both are present — gates section runs on envelope._seed.fetchedAt
read directly from the data key, eliminating the meta-outlives-data class
of bugs.

Files touched:
- climate (5), derived-signals (2), ecb-eu (3), energy-sources (6),
  health (2), imf-extended (4), macro (10), market-backup (9),
  portwatch (4), relay-backup (2), resilience-recovery (5), static-ref (2)

Skipped (14 sections, 3 whole bundles): multi-key writers, dynamic
templated keys (displacement year-scoped), or non-runSeed orchestrators
(regional brief cron, resilience-scores' 222-country publish, validation/
benchmark scripts). These continue to use seedMetaKey or their own gate.

seedMetaKey preserved everywhere — dual-write. _bundle-runner.mjs falls
back to legacy when canonicalKey is absent.

All 15 bundles pass node --check. test:data: 5307/5307. typecheck:all: clean.

* fix(seed-contract): 4 PR #3097 review P1s — transform/declareRecords mismatches + envelope leaks

Addresses both P1 findings and the extra-key seed-meta leak surfaced in review:

1. runSeed helper-level invariant: seed-meta:* keys NEVER envelope.
   scripts/_seed-utils.mjs exports shouldEnvelopeKey(key) — returns false for
   any key starting with 'seed-meta:'. Both atomicPublish (canonical) and
   writeExtraKey (extras) gate the envelope wrap through this helper. Fixes
   seed-iea-oil-stocks' ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY silently getting enveloped,
   which broke health.js parsing the value as bare {fetchedAt, recordCount}.
   Also defends against any future manual writeExtraKey(..., envelopeMeta)
   call that happens to target a seed-meta:* key.

2. seed-token-panels canonical + extras fixed.
   publishTransform returns data.defi (the defi panel itself, shape {tokens}).
   Old declareRecords counted data.defi.tokens + data.ai.tokens + data.other.tokens
   on the transformed payload → 0 → RETRY path → canonical market:defi-tokens:v1
   never wrote, and because runSeed returned before the extraKeys loop,
   market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 stayed stale too.
   New: declareRecords counts data.tokens on the transformed shape. AI_KEY +
   OTHER_KEY extras reuse the same function (transforms return structurally
   identical panels). Added isMain guard so test imports don't fire runSeed.

3. api/product-catalog.js cached reader unwraps envelope.
   ais-relay.cjs now envelopes product-catalog:v2 via envelopeWrite(). The
   edge reader did raw JSON.parse(result) and returned {_seed, data} to
   clients, breaking the cached path. Fix: import unwrapEnvelope from
   ./_seed-envelope.js, apply after JSON.parse. One site — :238-241 is
   downstream of getFromCache(), so the single reader fix covers both.

4. Regression lock tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs (11 cases):
   - shouldEnvelopeKey invariant: seed-meta:* false, canonical true
   - Token-panels declareRecords works on transformed shape (canonical + both extras)
   - Explicit repro of pre-fix buggy signature returning 0 — guards against revert
   - resolveRecordCount accepts 0, rejects non-integer
   - Product-catalog envelope unwrap returns bare shape; legacy passes through

Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5318/5318 pass (was 5307 — 11 new regressions)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check on every modified script

iea-oil-stocks canonical declareRecords was NOT broken (user confirmed during
review — buildIndex preserves .members); only its ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY
was affected, now covered generically by commit 1's helper invariant.

* fix(seed-contract): seed-token-panels validateFn also runs on post-transform shape

Review finding: fixing declareRecords wasn't sufficient — atomicPublish() runs
validateFn(publishData) on the transformed payload too. seed-token-panels'
validate() checked data.defi/.ai/.other on the transformed {tokens} shape,
returned false, and runSeed took the early skipped-write branch (before even
reaching the declareRecords RETRY logic). Net effect: same as before the
declareRecords fix — canonical + both extras stayed stale.

Fix: validate() now checks the canonical defi panel directly (Array.isArray
(data?.tokens) && has at least one t.price > 0). AI/OTHER panels are validated
implicitly by their own extraKey declareRecords on write.

Audited the other 9 seeders with publishTransform (bls-series, bis-extended,
bis-data, gdelt-intel, trade-flows, iea-oil-stocks, jodi-gas, sanctions-pressure,
forecasts): all validateFn's correctly target the post-transform shape. Only
token-panels regressed.

Added 4 regression tests (tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs):
- validate accepts transformed panel with priced tokens
- validate rejects all-zero-price tokens
- validate rejects empty/missing tokens
- Explicit pre-fix repro (buggy old signature fails on transformed shape)

Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5322/5322 pass (was 5318; +4 new)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check clean

* feat(seed-contract): add /api/seed-contract-probe validation endpoint

Single machine-readable gate for 'is PR #3097 working in production'.
Replaces the curl/jq ritual with one authenticated edge call that returns
HTTP 200 ok:true or 503 + failing check list.

What it validates:
- 8 canonical keys have {_seed, data} envelopes with required data fields
  and minRecords floors (fsi-eu, zone-normals, 3 token panels + minRecords
  guard against token-panels RETRY regression, product-catalog, wildfire,
  earthquakes).
- 2 seed-meta:* keys remain BARE (shouldEnvelopeKey invariant; guards
  against iea-oil-stocks ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY-class regressions).
- /api/product-catalog + /api/bootstrap responses contain no '_seed' leak.

Auth: x-probe-secret header must match RELAY_SHARED_SECRET (reuses existing
Vercel↔Railway internal trust boundary).

Probe logic is exported (checkProbe, checkPublicBoundary, DEFAULT_PROBES) for
hermetic testing. tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs covers every branch:
envelope pass/fail on field/records/shape, bare pass/fail on shape/field,
missing/malformed JSON, Redis non-2xx, boundary seed-leak detection,
DEFAULT_PROBES sanity (seed-meta invariant present, token-panels minRecords
guard present).

Usage:
  curl -H "x-probe-secret: $RELAY_SHARED_SECRET" \
       https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/seed-contract-probe

PR 3 will extend the probe with a stricter mode that asserts seed-meta:*
keys are GONE (not just bare) once legacy dual-write is removed.

Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 15/15 pass
- npm run test:data → 5338/5338 (was 5322; +16 new incl. conformance)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean

* fix(seed-contract): tighten probe — minRecords on AI/OTHER + cache-path source header

Review P2 findings: the probe's stated guards were weaker than advertised.

1. market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 probes claimed to guard the
   token-panels extra-key RETRY regression but only checked shape='envelope'
   + dataHas:['tokens']. If an extra-key declareRecords regressed to 0, both
   probes would still pass because checkProbe() only inspects _seed.recordCount
   when minRecords is set. Now both enforce minRecords: 1.

2. /api/product-catalog boundary check only asserted no '_seed' leak — which
   is also true for the static fallback path. A broken cached reader
   (getFromCache returning null or throwing) could serve fallback silently
   and still pass this probe. Now:
   - api/product-catalog.js emits X-Product-Catalog-Source: cache|dodo|fallback
     on the response (the json() helper gained an optional source param wired
     to each of the three branches).
   - checkPublicBoundary declaratively requires that header's value match
     'cache' for /api/product-catalog, so a fallback-serve fails the probe
     with reason 'source:fallback!=cache' or 'source:missing!=cache'.

Test updates (tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs):
- Boundary check reworked to use a BOUNDARY_CHECKS config with optional
  requireSourceHeader per endpoint.
- New cases: served-from-cache passes, served-from-fallback fails with source
  mismatch, missing header fails, seed-leak still takes precedence, bad
  status fails.
- Token-panels sanity test now asserts minRecords≥1 on all 3 panels.

Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 17/17 pass (was 15, +2 net)
- npm run test:data → 5340/5340
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
2026-04-15 09:16:27 +04:00

482 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
import { loadEnvFile, CHROME_UA, runSeed } from './_seed-utils.mjs';
loadEnvFile(import.meta.url);
const CANONICAL_KEY = 'radiation:observations:v1';
const CACHE_TTL = 7200;
const EPA_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
const SAFECAST_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
const BASELINE_WINDOW_SIZE = 168;
const BASELINE_MIN_SAMPLES = 48;
const SAFECAST_BASELINE_WINDOW_SIZE = 96;
const SAFECAST_MIN_SAMPLES = 24;
const SAFECAST_DISTANCE_KM = 120;
const SAFECAST_LOOKBACK_DAYS = 400;
const SAFECAST_CPM_PER_USV_H = 350;
const EPA_SITES = [
{ anchorId: 'us-anchorage', state: 'AK', slug: 'ANCHORAGE', name: 'Anchorage', country: 'United States', lat: 61.2181, lon: -149.9003 },
{ anchorId: 'us-san-francisco', state: 'CA', slug: 'SAN%20FRANCISCO', name: 'San Francisco', country: 'United States', lat: 37.7749, lon: -122.4194 },
{ anchorId: 'us-washington-dc', state: 'DC', slug: 'WASHINGTON', name: 'Washington, DC', country: 'United States', lat: 38.9072, lon: -77.0369 },
{ anchorId: 'us-honolulu', state: 'HI', slug: 'HONOLULU', name: 'Honolulu', country: 'United States', lat: 21.3099, lon: -157.8581 },
{ anchorId: 'us-chicago', state: 'IL', slug: 'CHICAGO', name: 'Chicago', country: 'United States', lat: 41.8781, lon: -87.6298 },
{ anchorId: 'us-boston', state: 'MA', slug: 'BOSTON', name: 'Boston', country: 'United States', lat: 42.3601, lon: -71.0589 },
{ anchorId: 'us-albany', state: 'NY', slug: 'ALBANY', name: 'Albany', country: 'United States', lat: 42.6526, lon: -73.7562 },
{ anchorId: 'us-philadelphia', state: 'PA', slug: 'PHILADELPHIA', name: 'Philadelphia', country: 'United States', lat: 39.9526, lon: -75.1652 },
{ anchorId: 'us-houston', state: 'TX', slug: 'HOUSTON', name: 'Houston', country: 'United States', lat: 29.7604, lon: -95.3698 },
{ anchorId: 'us-seattle', state: 'WA', slug: 'SEATTLE', name: 'Seattle', country: 'United States', lat: 47.6062, lon: -122.3321 },
];
const SAFECAST_SITES = [
...EPA_SITES.map(({ anchorId, name, country, lat, lon }) => ({ anchorId, name, country, lat, lon })),
{ anchorId: 'jp-tokyo', name: 'Tokyo', country: 'Japan', lat: 35.6895, lon: 139.6917 },
{ anchorId: 'jp-fukushima', name: 'Fukushima', country: 'Japan', lat: 37.7608, lon: 140.4747 },
];
function round(value, digits = 1) {
const factor = 10 ** digits;
return Math.round(value * factor) / factor;
}
function parseRadNetTimestamp(raw) {
const match = String(raw || '').trim().match(/^(\d{2})\/(\d{2})\/(\d{4}) (\d{2}):(\d{2}):(\d{2})$/);
if (!match) return null;
const [, month, day, year, hour, minute, second] = match;
return Date.UTC(
Number(year),
Number(month) - 1,
Number(day),
Number(hour),
Number(minute),
Number(second),
);
}
function classifyFreshness(observedAt) {
const ageMs = Date.now() - observedAt;
if (ageMs <= 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000) return 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_LIVE';
if (ageMs <= 14 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) return 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_RECENT';
return 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_HISTORICAL';
}
function classifySeverity(delta, zScore, freshness) {
if (freshness === 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_HISTORICAL') return 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL';
if (delta >= 15 || zScore >= 3) return 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_SPIKE';
if (delta >= 8 || zScore >= 2) return 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_ELEVATED';
return 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL';
}
function severityRank(value) {
switch (value) {
case 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_SPIKE': return 3;
case 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_ELEVATED': return 2;
default: return 1;
}
}
function freshnessRank(value) {
switch (value) {
case 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_LIVE': return 3;
case 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_RECENT': return 2;
default: return 1;
}
}
function confidenceRank(value) {
switch (value) {
case 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_HIGH': return 3;
case 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM': return 2;
default: return 1;
}
}
function average(values) {
return values.length > 0
? values.reduce((sum, value) => sum + value, 0) / values.length
: 0;
}
function stdDev(values, mean) {
if (values.length < 2) return 0;
const variance = values.reduce((sum, value) => sum + ((value - mean) ** 2), 0) / (values.length - 1);
return Math.sqrt(Math.max(variance, 0));
}
function downgradeConfidence(value) {
if (value === 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_HIGH') return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM';
return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_LOW';
}
function normalizeUnit(value, unit) {
const normalizedUnit = String(unit || '').trim().replace('μ', 'u').replace('µ', 'u');
if (!Number.isFinite(value)) return null;
if (normalizedUnit === 'nSv/h') {
return { value, unit: 'nSv/h', convertedFromCpm: false, directUnit: true };
}
if (normalizedUnit === 'uSv/h') {
return { value: value * 1000, unit: 'nSv/h', convertedFromCpm: false, directUnit: true };
}
if (normalizedUnit === 'cpm') {
return {
value: (value / SAFECAST_CPM_PER_USV_H) * 1000,
unit: 'nSv/h',
convertedFromCpm: true,
directUnit: false,
};
}
return null;
}
function parseApprovedReadings(csv) {
const lines = String(csv || '').trim().split(/\r?\n/);
if (lines.length < 2) return [];
const readings = [];
for (let i = 1; i < lines.length; i++) {
const line = lines[i];
if (!line) continue;
const columns = line.split(',');
if (columns.length < 3) continue;
const status = columns[columns.length - 1]?.trim().toUpperCase();
if (status !== 'APPROVED') continue;
const observedAt = parseRadNetTimestamp(columns[1] ?? '');
const value = Number(columns[2] ?? '');
if (!observedAt || !Number.isFinite(value)) continue;
readings.push({ observedAt, value });
}
return readings.sort((a, b) => a.observedAt - b.observedAt);
}
function buildBaseObservation({
id,
anchorId,
source,
locationName,
country,
lat,
lon,
value,
unit,
observedAt,
freshness,
baselineValue,
delta,
zScore,
severity,
baselineSamples,
convertedFromCpm,
directUnit,
}) {
return {
id,
anchorId,
source,
locationName,
country,
location: {
latitude: lat,
longitude: lon,
},
value: round(value, 1),
unit,
observedAt,
freshness,
baselineValue: round(baselineValue, 1),
delta: round(delta, 1),
zScore: round(zScore, 2),
severity,
contributingSources: [source],
confidence: 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_LOW',
corroborated: false,
conflictingSources: false,
convertedFromCpm,
sourceCount: 1,
_baselineSamples: baselineSamples,
_directUnit: directUnit,
};
}
function toEpaObservation(site, readings) {
if (readings.length < 2) return null;
const latest = readings[readings.length - 1];
const freshness = classifyFreshness(latest.observedAt);
const baselineReadings = readings.slice(-1 - BASELINE_WINDOW_SIZE, -1);
const baselineValues = baselineReadings.map((reading) => reading.value);
const baselineValue = baselineValues.length > 0 ? average(baselineValues) : latest.value;
const sigma = baselineValues.length >= BASELINE_MIN_SAMPLES ? stdDev(baselineValues, baselineValue) : 0;
const delta = latest.value - baselineValue;
const zScore = sigma > 0 ? delta / sigma : 0;
const severity = classifySeverity(delta, zScore, freshness);
return buildBaseObservation({
id: `epa:${site.state}:${site.slug}:${latest.observedAt}`,
anchorId: site.anchorId,
source: 'RADIATION_SOURCE_EPA_RADNET',
locationName: site.name,
country: site.country,
lat: site.lat,
lon: site.lon,
value: latest.value,
unit: 'nSv/h',
observedAt: latest.observedAt,
freshness,
baselineValue,
delta,
zScore,
severity,
baselineSamples: baselineValues.length,
convertedFromCpm: false,
directUnit: true,
});
}
function toSafecastObservation(site, measurements) {
if (measurements.length < 2) return null;
const latest = measurements[measurements.length - 1];
const freshness = classifyFreshness(latest.observedAt);
const baselineReadings = measurements.slice(-1 - SAFECAST_BASELINE_WINDOW_SIZE, -1);
const baselineValues = baselineReadings.map((reading) => reading.value);
const baselineValue = baselineValues.length > 0 ? average(baselineValues) : latest.value;
const sigma = baselineValues.length >= SAFECAST_MIN_SAMPLES ? stdDev(baselineValues, baselineValue) : 0;
const delta = latest.value - baselineValue;
const zScore = sigma > 0 ? delta / sigma : 0;
const severity = classifySeverity(delta, zScore, freshness);
return buildBaseObservation({
id: `safecast:${site.anchorId}:${latest.id ?? latest.observedAt}`,
anchorId: site.anchorId,
source: 'RADIATION_SOURCE_SAFECAST',
locationName: latest.locationName || site.name,
country: site.country,
lat: latest.lat,
lon: latest.lon,
value: latest.value,
unit: latest.unit,
observedAt: latest.observedAt,
freshness,
baselineValue,
delta,
zScore,
severity,
baselineSamples: baselineValues.length,
convertedFromCpm: latest.convertedFromCpm,
directUnit: latest.directUnit,
});
}
function baseConfidence(observation) {
if (observation.freshness === 'RADIATION_FRESHNESS_HISTORICAL') return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_LOW';
if (observation.convertedFromCpm) return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_LOW';
if (observation._baselineSamples >= BASELINE_MIN_SAMPLES) return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM';
if (observation._directUnit && observation._baselineSamples >= SAFECAST_MIN_SAMPLES) return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM';
return 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_LOW';
}
function observationPriority(observation) {
return (
severityRank(observation.severity) * 10000 +
freshnessRank(observation.freshness) * 1000 +
(observation._directUnit ? 200 : 0) +
Math.min(observation._baselineSamples || 0, 199)
);
}
function supportsSameSignal(primary, secondary) {
if (primary.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL' && secondary.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL') {
return Math.abs(primary.value - secondary.value) <= 15;
}
if (primary.severity !== 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL' && secondary.severity !== 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL') {
const sameDirection = Math.sign(primary.delta || 0.1) === Math.sign(secondary.delta || 0.1);
return sameDirection && Math.abs(primary.delta - secondary.delta) <= 20;
}
return false;
}
function materiallyConflicts(primary, secondary) {
if (primary.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL' && secondary.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL') {
return false;
}
if (primary.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL' || secondary.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL') {
return true;
}
const oppositeDirection = Math.sign(primary.delta || 0.1) !== Math.sign(secondary.delta || 0.1);
return oppositeDirection || Math.abs(primary.delta - secondary.delta) > 30;
}
function finalizeObservationGroup(group) {
const sorted = [...group].sort((a, b) => {
const priorityDelta = observationPriority(b) - observationPriority(a);
if (priorityDelta !== 0) return priorityDelta;
return b.observedAt - a.observedAt;
});
const primary = sorted[0];
if (!primary) {
throw new Error('Cannot finalize empty radiation observation group');
}
const distinctSources = [...new Set(sorted.map((observation) => observation.source))];
const alternateSources = sorted.filter((observation) => observation.source !== primary.source);
const corroborated = alternateSources.some((observation) => supportsSameSignal(primary, observation));
const conflictingSources = alternateSources.some((observation) => materiallyConflicts(primary, observation));
let confidence = baseConfidence(primary);
if (corroborated && distinctSources.length >= 2) confidence = 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_HIGH';
if (conflictingSources) confidence = downgradeConfidence(confidence);
return {
id: primary.id,
source: primary.source,
locationName: primary.locationName,
country: primary.country,
location: primary.location,
value: primary.value,
unit: primary.unit,
observedAt: primary.observedAt,
freshness: primary.freshness,
baselineValue: primary.baselineValue,
delta: primary.delta,
zScore: primary.zScore,
severity: primary.severity,
contributingSources: distinctSources,
confidence,
corroborated,
conflictingSources,
convertedFromCpm: sorted.some((observation) => observation.convertedFromCpm),
sourceCount: distinctSources.length,
};
}
function sortFinalObservations(a, b) {
const severityDelta = severityRank(b.severity) - severityRank(a.severity);
if (severityDelta !== 0) return severityDelta;
const confidenceDelta = confidenceRank(b.confidence) - confidenceRank(a.confidence);
if (confidenceDelta !== 0) return confidenceDelta;
if (a.corroborated !== b.corroborated) return a.corroborated ? -1 : 1;
const freshnessDelta = freshnessRank(b.freshness) - freshnessRank(a.freshness);
if (freshnessDelta !== 0) return freshnessDelta;
return b.observedAt - a.observedAt;
}
function summarizeObservations(observations) {
const sorted = [...observations].sort(sortFinalObservations);
return {
observations: sorted,
fetchedAt: Date.now(),
epaCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.contributingSources.includes('RADIATION_SOURCE_EPA_RADNET')).length,
safecastCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.contributingSources.includes('RADIATION_SOURCE_SAFECAST')).length,
anomalyCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.severity !== 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_NORMAL').length,
elevatedCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_ELEVATED').length,
spikeCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.severity === 'RADIATION_SEVERITY_SPIKE').length,
corroboratedCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.corroborated).length,
lowConfidenceCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.confidence === 'RADIATION_CONFIDENCE_LOW').length,
conflictingCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.conflictingSources).length,
convertedFromCpmCount: sorted.filter((item) => item.convertedFromCpm).length,
};
}
async function fetchEpaObservation(site, year) {
const url = `https://radnet.epa.gov/cdx-radnet-rest/api/rest/csv/${year}/fixed/${site.state}/${site.slug}`;
const response = await fetch(url, {
headers: { 'User-Agent': CHROME_UA },
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(EPA_TIMEOUT_MS),
});
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`EPA RadNet ${response.status} for ${site.name}`);
const csv = await response.text();
return toEpaObservation(site, parseApprovedReadings(csv));
}
async function fetchSafecastObservation(site, capturedAfter) {
const params = new URLSearchParams({
distance: String(SAFECAST_DISTANCE_KM),
latitude: String(site.lat),
longitude: String(site.lon),
captured_after: capturedAfter,
});
const response = await fetch(`https://api.safecast.org/measurements.json?${params.toString()}`, {
headers: { Accept: 'application/json', 'User-Agent': CHROME_UA },
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SAFECAST_TIMEOUT_MS),
});
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Safecast ${response.status} for ${site.name}`);
const measurements = await response.json();
const normalized = (Array.isArray(measurements) ? measurements : [])
.map((measurement) => {
const numericValue = Number(measurement?.value);
const normalizedUnit = normalizeUnit(numericValue, measurement?.unit);
const observedAt = measurement?.captured_at ? Date.parse(measurement.captured_at) : NaN;
const lat = Number(measurement?.latitude);
const lon = Number(measurement?.longitude);
if (!normalizedUnit || !Number.isFinite(observedAt) || !Number.isFinite(lat) || !Number.isFinite(lon)) {
return null;
}
return {
id: measurement?.id ?? null,
locationName: typeof measurement?.location_name === 'string' ? measurement.location_name.trim() : '',
observedAt,
lat,
lon,
value: normalizedUnit.value,
unit: normalizedUnit.unit,
convertedFromCpm: normalizedUnit.convertedFromCpm,
directUnit: normalizedUnit.directUnit,
};
})
.filter(Boolean)
.sort((a, b) => a.observedAt - b.observedAt);
return toSafecastObservation(site, normalized);
}
async function fetchRadiationWatch() {
const currentYear = new Date().getUTCFullYear();
const capturedAfter = new Date(Date.now() - SAFECAST_LOOKBACK_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString().slice(0, 10);
const results = await Promise.allSettled([
...EPA_SITES.map((site) => fetchEpaObservation(site, currentYear)),
...SAFECAST_SITES.map((site) => fetchSafecastObservation(site, capturedAfter)),
]);
const grouped = new Map();
for (const result of results) {
if (result.status !== 'fulfilled') {
console.log(` [RADIATION] ${result.reason?.message ?? result.reason}`);
continue;
}
if (!result.value) continue;
const group = grouped.get(result.value.anchorId) || [];
group.push(result.value);
grouped.set(result.value.anchorId, group);
}
const observations = [...grouped.values()].map((group) => finalizeObservationGroup(group));
return summarizeObservations(observations);
}
function validate(data) {
return Array.isArray(data?.observations) && data.observations.length > 0;
}
export function declareRecords(data) {
return Array.isArray(data?.observations) ? data.observations.length : 0;
}
runSeed('radiation', 'observations', CANONICAL_KEY, fetchRadiationWatch, {
validateFn: validate,
ttlSeconds: CACHE_TTL,
sourceVersion: 'epa-radnet-safecast-merge-v1',
recordCount: (data) => data?.observations?.length ?? 0,
declareRecords,
schemaVersion: 1,
maxStaleMin: 30,
}).catch((err) => {
console.error('FATAL:', err.message || err);
process.exit(1);
});