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de769ce8e1
* fix(api): unblock Pro API clients at edge + accept x-api-key alias Fixes #3146: Pro API subscriber getting 403 when calling from Railway. Two independent layers were blocking server-side callers: 1. Vercel Edge Middleware (middleware.ts) blocks any UA matching /bot|curl\/|python-requests|go-http|java\//, which killed every legitimate server-to-server API client before the gateway even saw the request. Add bypass: requests carrying an `x-worldmonitor-key` or `x-api-key` header that starts with `wm_` skip the UA gate. The prefix is a cheap client-side signal, not auth — downstream server/gateway.ts still hashes the key and validates against the Convex `userApiKeys` table + entitlement check. 2. Header name mismatch. Docs/gateway only accepted `X-WorldMonitor-Key`, but most API clients default to `x-api-key`. Accept both header names in: - api/_api-key.js (legacy static-key allowlist) - server/gateway.ts (user-issued Convex-backed keys) - server/_shared/premium-check.ts (isCallerPremium) Add `X-Api-Key` to CORS Allow-Headers in server/cors.ts and api/_cors.js so browser preflights succeed. Follow-up outside this PR (Cloudflare dashboard, not in repo): - Extend the "Allow api access with WM" custom WAF rule to also match `starts_with(http.request.headers["x-api-key"][0], "wm_")`, so CF Managed Rules don't block requests using the x-api-key header name. - Update the api-cors-preflight CF Worker's corsHeaders to include `X-Api-Key` (memory: cors-cloudflare-worker.md — Worker overrides repo CORS on api.worldmonitor.app). * fix(api): tighten middleware bypass shape + finish x-api-key alias coverage Addresses review findings on #3155: 1. middleware.ts bypass was too loose. "Starts with wm_" let any caller send X-Api-Key: wm_fake and skip the UA gate, shifting unauthenticated scraper load onto the gateway's Convex lookup. Tighten to the exact key format emitted by src/services/api-keys.ts:generateKey — `^wm_[a-f0-9]{40}$` (wm_ + 20 random bytes as hex). Still a cheap edge heuristic (no hash lookup in middleware), but raises spoofing from trivial prefix match to a specific 43-char shape. 2. Alias was incomplete on bespoke endpoints outside the shared gateway: - api/v2/shipping/route-intelligence.ts: async wm_ user-key fallback now reads X-Api-Key as well - api/v2/shipping/webhooks.ts: webhook ownership fingerprint now reads X-Api-Key as well (same key value → same SHA-256 → same ownerTag, so a user registering with either header can manage their webhook from the other) - api/widget-agent.ts: accept X-Api-Key in the auth read AND in the OPTIONS Allow-Headers list - api/chat-analyst.ts: add X-Api-Key to the OPTIONS Allow-Headers list (auth path goes through shared helpers already aliased)
48 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
48 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* CORS header generation -- TypeScript port of api/_cors.js.
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*
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* Identical ALLOWED_ORIGIN_PATTERNS and logic, with methods set
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* to 'GET, POST, OPTIONS' (sebuf routes support GET and POST).
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*/
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const PRODUCTION_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/^https:\/\/(.*\.)?worldmonitor\.app$/,
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/^https:\/\/worldmonitor-[a-z0-9-]+-elie-[a-z0-9]+\.vercel\.app$/,
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/^https?:\/\/tauri\.localhost(:\d+)?$/,
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/^https?:\/\/[a-z0-9-]+\.tauri\.localhost(:\d+)?$/i,
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/^tauri:\/\/localhost$/,
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/^asset:\/\/localhost$/,
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];
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const DEV_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/^https?:\/\/localhost(:\d+)?$/,
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/^https?:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1(:\d+)?$/,
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];
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const ALLOWED_ORIGIN_PATTERNS: RegExp[] =
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process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'
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? PRODUCTION_PATTERNS
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: [...PRODUCTION_PATTERNS, ...DEV_PATTERNS];
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export function isAllowedOrigin(origin: string): boolean {
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return Boolean(origin) && ALLOWED_ORIGIN_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(origin));
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}
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export function getCorsHeaders(req: Request): Record<string, string> {
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const origin = req.headers.get('origin') || '';
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const allowOrigin = isAllowedOrigin(origin) ? origin : 'https://worldmonitor.app';
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return {
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'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': allowOrigin,
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'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET, POST, OPTIONS',
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'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Content-Type, Authorization, X-WorldMonitor-Key, X-Api-Key, X-Widget-Key, X-Pro-Key',
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'Access-Control-Max-Age': '3600',
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'Vary': 'Origin',
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};
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}
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export function isDisallowedOrigin(req: Request): boolean {
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const origin = req.headers.get('origin');
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if (!origin) return false;
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return !isAllowedOrigin(origin);
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}
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