* feat(mcp): add OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server for claude.ai connector Implements spec-compliant MCP authentication so claude.ai's remote connector (which requires OAuth Client ID + Secret, no custom headers) can authenticate. - public/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server: RFC 8414 discovery document - api/oauth/token.js: client_credentials grant, issues UUID Bearer token in Redis TTL 3600s - api/_oauth-token.js: resolveApiKeyFromBearer() looks up token in Redis - api/mcp.ts: 3-tier auth (Bearer OAuth first, then ?key=, then X-WorldMonitor-Key); switch to getPublicCorsHeaders; surface error messages in catch - vercel.json: rewrite /oauth/token, exclude oauth from SPA, CORS headers - tests: update SPA no-cache pattern Supersedes PR #2417. Usage: URL=worldmonitor.app/mcp, Client ID=worldmonitor, Client Secret=<API key> Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: fix markdown lint in OAuth plan (blank lines around lists) * fix(oauth): address all P1+P2 code review findings for MCP OAuth endpoint - Add per-IP rate limiting (10 req/min) to /oauth/token via Upstash slidingWindow - Return HTTP 401 + WWW-Authenticate header when Bearer token is invalid/expired - Add Cache-Control: no-store + Pragma: no-cache to token response (RFC 6749 §5.1) - Simplify _oauth-token.js to delegate to readJsonFromUpstash (removes duplicated Redis boilerplate) - Remove dead code from token.js: parseBasicAuth, JSON body path, clientId/issuedAt fields - Add Content-Type: application/json header for /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server - Remove response_types_supported (only applies to authorization endpoint, not client_credentials) Closes: todos 075, 076, 077, 078, 079 🤖 Generated with claude-sonnet-4-6 via Claude Code (https://claude.ai/claude-code) + Compound Engineering v2.40.0 Co-Authored-By: claude-sonnet-4-6 (200K context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(review): fresh review findings — todos 081-086, mark 075/077/078/079 complete * fix(mcp): remove ?key= URL param auth + mask internal errors - Remove ?key= query param auth path — API keys in URLs appear in Vercel/CF access logs, browser history, Referer headers. OAuth client_credentials (same PR) already covers clients that cannot set custom headers. Only two auth paths remain: Bearer OAuth and X-WorldMonitor-Key header. - Revert err.message disclosure: catch block was accidentally exposing internal service URLs/IPs via err.message. Restore original hardcoded string, add console.error for server-side visibility. Resolves: todos 081, 082 * fix(oauth): resolve all P2/P3 review findings (todos 076, 080, 083-086) - 076: no-credentials path in mcp.ts now returns HTTP 401 + WWW-Authenticate instead of rpcError (200) - 080: store key fingerprint (sha256 first 16 hex chars) in Redis, not plaintext key - 083: replace Array.includes() with timingSafeIncludes() (constant-time HMAC comparison) in token.js and mcp.ts - 084: resolveApiKeyFromBearer uses direct fetch that throws on Redis errors (500 not 401 on infra failure) - 085: token.js imports getClientIp, getPublicCorsHeaders, jsonResponse from shared helpers; removes local duplicates - 086: mcp.ts auth chain restructured to check Bearer header first, passes token string to resolveApiKeyFromBearer (eliminates double header read + unconditional await) * test(mcp): update auth test to expect HTTP 401 for missing credentials Align with todo 076 fix: no-credentials path now returns 401 + WWW-Authenticate instead of JSON-RPC 200 response. Also asserts WWW-Authenticate header presence. * chore: mark todos 076, 080, 083-086 complete * fix(mcp): harden OAuth error paths and fix rate limit cross-user collision - Wrap resolveApiKeyFromBearer() in try/catch in mcp.ts; Redis/network errors now return 503 + Retry-After: 5 instead of crashing the handler - Wrap storeToken() fetch in try/catch in oauth/token.js; network errors return false so the existing if (!stored) path returns 500 cleanly - Re-key token endpoint rate limit by sha256(clientSecret).slice(0,8) instead of IP; prevents cross-user 429s when callers share Anthropic's shared outbound IPs (Claude remote MCP connector) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7.8 KiB
title, type, status, date
| title | type | status | date |
|---|---|---|---|
| feat: MCP OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server (spec-compliant) | feat | active | 2026-03-28 |
feat: MCP OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server (spec-compliant)
Overview
Claude.ai's remote MCP connector only accepts OAuth credentials (Client ID + Client Secret) — no custom headers. The current X-WorldMonitor-Key header approach is therefore incompatible. This plan implements a minimal, spec-compliant OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server so claude.ai (and any other MCP client) can authenticate using standard OAuth client credentials.
Problem Statement
The MCP 2025-03-26 spec defines OAuth 2.0 as the standard auth mechanism for remote MCP servers. Claude.ai's connector UI exposes exactly three fields:
- MCP Server URL
- Client ID
- Client Secret
There is no header field, no API key field. If the server does not expose a proper /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server discovery document and a /oauth/token endpoint, the connector silently fails to authenticate. The current ?key= query param workaround (PR #2417) is non-standard and not discoverable by OAuth clients.
Proposed Solution
Implement the Client Credentials grant (RFC 6749 §4.4) — the correct grant type for machine-to-machine API access without user interaction:
claude.ai → GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
← { token_endpoint, grant_types_supported: ["client_credentials"] }
claude.ai → POST /api/oauth/token
grant_type=client_credentials
client_id=worldmonitor
client_secret=<user's API key>
← { access_token, token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }
claude.ai → POST /mcp
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
← MCP JSON-RPC response
The client_secret is the existing WorldMonitor API key. No new credential system needed — OAuth is just a wrapper around the existing key validation.
Technical Approach
New files
public/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (static JSON, served by Vercel as-is):
{
"issuer": "https://worldmonitor.app",
"token_endpoint": "https://worldmonitor.app/api/oauth/token",
"grant_types_supported": ["client_credentials"],
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"],
"response_types_supported": ["token"],
"scopes_supported": ["mcp"]
}
api/oauth/token.js (Vercel Edge function):
- Parses
grant_type,client_id,client_secretfrom POST body (form-encoded or JSON) - Also supports HTTP Basic auth (
Authorization: Basic base64(client_id:client_secret)) - Validates
client_secretagainstWORLDMONITOR_VALID_KEYSenv var (same logic as_api-key.js) - On success: generates opaque token (
crypto.randomUUID()), stores in Upstash Redis with keyoauth:token:<uuid>→{ apiKey, clientId, issuedAt }, TTL 3600s - Returns:
{ access_token, token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 } - On failure: returns RFC 6749 error:
{ error: "invalid_client" }with HTTP 401
api/_oauth-token.js (shared helper, importable by api/mcp.ts):
resolveApiKeyFromBearer(req)— extractsAuthorization: Bearer <token>, looks upoauth:token:<token>in Redis, returns the stored API key or null- Used by
mcp.tsin its auth chain
Modified files
api/mcp.ts — extend auth to check Bearer token before falling back to direct key:
1. Extract Bearer token from Authorization header
2. If Bearer: resolveApiKeyFromBearer(token) → apiKey
3. If no Bearer: existing ?key= / X-WorldMonitor-Key logic
4. Proceed with apiKey as before
vercel.json:
- Add rewrite:
{ "source": "/oauth/token", "destination": "/api/oauth/token" }(canonical URL without/api/prefix, cleaner for discovery doc) - Add CORS headers entry for
/api/oauth/token(allow*,Content-Type, Authorization) - Update discovery doc to use
/oauth/token(no/api/prefix)
public/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server — already in excluded list in SPA regex.
Auth chain in mcp.ts after change
Request arrives →
1. Bearer token present? → Redis lookup → apiKey (or 401 if not found/expired)
2. ?key= param? → direct key validate
3. X-WorldMonitor-Key header? → direct key validate
4. None → 401
Acceptance Criteria
GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-serverreturns valid RFC 8414 JSON withtoken_endpointPOST /oauth/tokenwith validclient_secret(= any key inWORLDMONITOR_VALID_KEYS) returns{ access_token, token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }POST /oauth/tokenwith invalidclient_secretreturns{ error: "invalid_client" }+ HTTP 401POST /mcpwithAuthorization: Bearer <valid_access_token>returns MCP tools list (not 401)POST /mcpwithAuthorization: Bearer <expired_or_unknown_token>returns 401POST /mcpwith directX-WorldMonitor-Keystill works (backward compat)POST /mcpwith?key=query param still works (backward compat)- Token expires after 3600s (Redis TTL enforced)
- CORS: token endpoint and discovery doc return
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * - Claude.ai connector connects successfully using Client ID + Client Secret fields
Implementation Order
- Add static
public/.well-known/oauth-authorization-serverJSON file - Add
api/oauth/token.js(token issuance) - Add
api/_oauth-token.js(Bearer resolution helper) - Update
api/mcp.tsauth chain (import + Bearer check) - Update
vercel.json(rewrite/oauth/token→/api/oauth/token, CORS headers) - Test end-to-end with curl before claude.ai
Curl Test Sequence
# 1. Discovery
curl https://worldmonitor.app/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
# 2. Get token
curl -X POST https://worldmonitor.app/oauth/token \
-d "grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=worldmonitor&client_secret=YOUR_API_KEY"
# 3. Use token with MCP
curl -X POST https://worldmonitor.app/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <access_token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"test","version":"1.0"}}}'
Dependencies & Risks
- Upstash Redis — already used for rate limiting and cache; no new dep needed
- Token storage — Redis keys
oauth:token:<uuid>with 3600s TTL. Tokens are opaque UUIDs, no JWT complexity - Client ID semantics — The Client ID field in claude.ai is just a label; the real auth is
client_secret. We accept any non-empty string forclient_id - CORS on discovery doc — static file served from
public/, Vercel handles it withCache-Controlfrom the static headers rules;ACAO: *needed — add to vercel.json headers for/.well-known/(.*) - No PKCE needed — Client Credentials grant is machine-to-machine, no browser redirect, no PKCE required
- Token refresh — Not needed; claude.ai will re-fetch a token when it gets 401.
expires_in: 3600is standard and claude.ai handles re-auth automatically
Out of Scope
- Authorization Code flow (not needed for claude.ai connector)
- Refresh tokens (not needed; client re-authenticates with client_secret)
- Per-scope permissions (MCP server already gates on API key validity)
- JWT tokens (opaque tokens simpler, sufficient, and avoids key management)
- User-facing OAuth consent screens
Sources & References
- MCP Spec 2025-03-26 — Authorization
- RFC 6749 §4.4 — Client Credentials Grant
- RFC 8414 — OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata
- Current MCP implementation:
api/mcp.ts - API key validation:
api/_api-key.js - Redis client:
api/_upstash-json.js