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* feat(auth): user-facing API key management (create / list / revoke) Adds full-stack API key management so authenticated users can create, list, and revoke their own API keys from the Settings UI. Backend: - Convex `userApiKeys` table with SHA-256 key hash storage - Mutations: createApiKey, listApiKeys, revokeApiKey - Internal query validateKeyByHash + touchKeyLastUsed for gateway - HTTP endpoints: /api/api-keys (CRUD) + /api/internal-validate-api-key - Gateway middleware validates user-owned keys via Convex + Redis cache Frontend: - New "API Keys" tab in UnifiedSettings (visible when signed in) - Create form with copy-on-creation banner (key shown once) - List with prefix display, timestamps, and revoke action - Client-side key generation + hashing (plaintext never sent to DB) Closes #3116 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-keys): address PR review — cache invalidation, prefix validation, revoked-key guard - Invalidate Redis cache on key revocation so gateway rejects revoked keys immediately instead of waiting for 5-min TTL expiry (P1) - Enforce `wm_` prefix format with regex instead of loose length check (P2) - Skip `touchKeyLastUsed` for revoked keys to preserve clean audit trail (P2) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-keys): address consolidated PR review (P0–P3) P0: gate createApiKey on pro entitlement (tier >= 1); isCallerPremium now verifies key-owner tier instead of treating existence as premium. P1: wire wm_ user keys into the domain gateway auth path with async Convex-backed validation; user keys go through entitlement checks (only admin keys bypass). Lower cache TTL 300s → 60s and await revocation cache-bust instead of fire-and-forget. P2: remove dead HTTP create/list/revoke path from convex/http.ts; switch to cachedFetchJson (stampede protection, env-prefixed keys, standard NEG_SENTINEL); add tenancy check on cache-invalidation endpoint via new /api/internal-get-key-owner route; add 22 Convex tests covering tier gate, per-user limit, duplicate hash, ownership revoke guard, getKeyOwner, and touchKeyLastUsed debounce. P3: tighten keyPrefix regex to exactly 5 hex chars; debounce touchKeyLastUsed (5 min); surface PRO_REQUIRED in UI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-keys): gate on apiAccess (not tier), wire wm_ keys through edge routes, harden error paths - Gate API key creation/validation on features.apiAccess instead of tier >= 1. Pro (tier 1, apiAccess=false) can no longer mint keys — only API_STARTER+. - Wire wm_ user keys through standalone edge routes (shipping/route-intelligence, shipping/webhooks) that were short-circuiting on validateApiKey before async Convex validation could run. - Restore fail-soft behavior in validateUserApiKey: transient Convex/network errors degrade to unauthorized instead of bubbling a 500. - Fail-closed on cache invalidation endpoint: ownership check errors now return 503 instead of silently proceeding (surfaces Convex outages in logs). - Tests updated: positive paths use api_starter (apiAccess=true), new test locks Pro-without-API-access rejection. 23 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(webhooks): remove wm_ user key fallback from shipping webhooks Webhook ownership is keyed to SHA-256(apiKey) via callerFingerprint(), not to the user. With user-owned keys (up to 5 per user), this causes cross-key blindness (webhooks invisible when calling with a different key) and revoke-orphaning (revoking the creating key makes the webhook permanently unmanageable). User keys remain supported on the read-only route-intelligence endpoint. Webhook ownership migration to userId will follow in a separate PR. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elie Habib <elie.habib@gmail.com>
84 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
84 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Validates user-owned API keys by hashing the provided key and looking up
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* the hash in Convex via the internal HTTP action.
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*
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* Uses cachedFetchJson for Redis caching with in-flight coalescing and
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* environment-partitioned keys (no raw=true — keys are prefixed by deploy).
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*/
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import { cachedFetchJson, deleteRedisKey } from './redis';
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interface UserKeyResult {
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userId: string;
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keyId: string;
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name: string;
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}
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const CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60; // 1 min — short to limit staleness on revocation
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const NEG_TTL_SECONDS = 60; // negative cache: avoid hammering Convex with invalid keys
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const CACHE_KEY_PREFIX = 'user-api-key:';
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/** SHA-256 hex digest (Web Crypto API — works in Edge Runtime). */
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async function sha256Hex(input: string): Promise<string> {
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const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(input));
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return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf), (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
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}
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/**
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* Validate a user-owned API key.
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*
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* Returns the userId and key metadata if valid, or null if invalid/revoked.
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* Uses cachedFetchJson for Redis caching with request coalescing and
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* standard NEG_SENTINEL for negative results.
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*/
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export async function validateUserApiKey(key: string): Promise<UserKeyResult | null> {
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if (!key || !key.startsWith('wm_')) return null;
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const keyHash = await sha256Hex(key);
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const cacheKey = `${CACHE_KEY_PREFIX}${keyHash}`;
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try {
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return await cachedFetchJson<UserKeyResult>(
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cacheKey,
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CACHE_TTL_SECONDS,
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() => fetchFromConvex(keyHash),
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NEG_TTL_SECONDS,
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);
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} catch (err) {
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// Fail-soft: transient Convex/network errors degrade to unauthorized
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// rather than bubbling a 500 through the gateway or isCallerPremium.
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console.warn('[user-api-key] validateUserApiKey failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
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return null;
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}
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}
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/** Fetch key validation from Convex internal endpoint. */
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async function fetchFromConvex(keyHash: string): Promise<UserKeyResult | null> {
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const convexSiteUrl = process.env.CONVEX_SITE_URL;
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const convexSharedSecret = process.env.CONVEX_SERVER_SHARED_SECRET;
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if (!convexSiteUrl || !convexSharedSecret) return null;
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const resp = await fetch(`${convexSiteUrl}/api/internal-validate-api-key`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'User-Agent': 'worldmonitor-gateway/1.0',
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'x-convex-shared-secret': convexSharedSecret,
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},
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body: JSON.stringify({ keyHash }),
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signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3_000),
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});
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if (!resp.ok) return null;
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return resp.json() as Promise<UserKeyResult | null>;
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}
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/**
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* Delete the Redis cache entry for a specific API key hash.
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* Called after revocation to ensure the key cannot be used during the TTL window.
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* Uses prefixed keys (no raw=true) matching the cache writes above.
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*/
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export async function invalidateApiKeyCache(keyHash: string): Promise<void> {
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await deleteRedisKey(`${CACHE_KEY_PREFIX}${keyHash}`);
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}
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