Files
worldmonitor/scripts/seed-chokepoint-flows.mjs
Elie Habib 044598346e feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated (#3097)
* feat(seed-contract): PR 2a — runSeed envelope dual-write + 91 seeders migrated

Opt-in contract path in runSeed: when opts.declareRecords is provided, write
{_seed, data} envelope to the canonical key alongside legacy seed-meta:*
(dual-write). State machine: OK / OK_ZERO / RETRY with zeroIsValid opt.
declareRecords throws or returns non-integer → hard fail (contract violation).
extraKeys[*] support per-key declareRecords; each extra key writes its own
envelope. Legacy seeders (no declareRecords) entirely unchanged.

Migrated all 91 scripts/seed-*.mjs to contract mode. Each exports
declareRecords returning the canonical record count, and passes
schemaVersion: 1 + maxStaleMin (matched to api/health.js SEED_META, or 2.5x
interval where no registry entry exists). Contract conformance reports 84/86
seeders with full descriptor (2 pre-existing warnings).

Legacy seed-meta keys still written so unmigrated readers keep working;
follow-up slices flip health.js + readers to envelope-first.

Tests: 61/61 PR 1 tests still pass.

Next slices for PR 2:
- api/health.js registry collapse + 15 seed-bundle-*.mjs canonicalKey wiring
- reader migration (mcp, resilience, aviation, displacement, regional-snapshot)
- direct writers — ais-relay.cjs, consumer-prices-core publish.ts
- public-boundary stripSeedEnvelope + test migration

Plan: docs/plans/2026-04-14-002-fix-runseed-zero-record-lockout-plan.md

* fix(seed-contract): unwrap envelopes in internal cross-seed readers

After PR 2a enveloped 91 canonical keys as {_seed, data}, every script-side
reader that returned the raw parsed JSON started silently handing callers the
envelope instead of the bare payload. WoW baselines (bigmac, grocery-basket,
fear-greed) saw undefined .countries / .composite; seed-climate-anomalies saw
undefined .normals from climate:zone-normals:v1; seed-thermal-escalation saw
undefined .fireDetections from wildfire:fires:v1; seed-forecasts' ~40-key
pipeline batch returned envelopes for every input.

Fix: route every script-side reader through unwrapEnvelope(...).data. Legacy
bare-shape values pass through unchanged (unwrapEnvelope returns
{_seed: null, data: raw} for any non-envelope shape).

Changed:
- scripts/_seed-utils.mjs: import unwrapEnvelope; redisGet, readSeedSnapshot,
  verifySeedKey all unwrap. Exported new readCanonicalValue() helper for
  cross-seed consumers.
- 18 seed-*.mjs scripts with local redisGet-style helpers or inline fetch
  patched to unwrap via the envelope source module (subagent sweep).
- scripts/seed-forecasts.mjs pipeline batch: parse() unwraps each result.
- scripts/seed-energy-spine.mjs redisMget: unwraps each result.

Tests:
- tests/seed-utils-envelope-reads.test.mjs: 7 new cases covering envelope
  + legacy + null paths for readSeedSnapshot and verifySeedKey.
- Full seed suite: 67/67 pass (was 61, +6 new).

Addresses both of user's P1 findings on PR #3097.

* feat(seed-contract): envelope-aware reads in server + api helpers

Every RPC and public-boundary reader now automatically strips _seed from
contract-mode canonical keys. Legacy bare-shape values pass through unchanged
(unwrapEnvelope no-ops on non-envelope shapes).

Changed helpers (one-place fix — unblocks ~60 call sites):
- server/_shared/redis.ts: getRawJson, getCachedJson, getCachedJsonBatch
  unwrap by default. cachedFetchJson inherits via getCachedJson.
- api/_upstash-json.js: readJsonFromUpstash unwraps (covers api/mcp.ts
  tool responses + all its canonical-key reads).
- api/bootstrap.js: getCachedJsonBatch unwraps (public-boundary —
  clients never see envelope metadata).

Left intentionally unchanged:
- api/health.js / api/seed-health.js: read only seed-meta:* keys which
  remain bare-shape during dual-write. unwrapEnvelope already imported at
  the meta-read boundary (PR 1) as a defensive no-op.

Tests: 67/67 seed tests pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.

This is the blast-radius fix the PR #3097 review called out — external
readers that would otherwise see {_seed, data} after the writer side
migrated.

* fix(test): strip export keyword in vm.runInContext'd seed source

cross-source-signals-regulatory.test.mjs loads scripts/seed-cross-source-signals.mjs
via vm.runInContext, which cannot parse ESM `export` syntax. PR 2a added
`export function declareRecords` to every seeder, which broke this test's
static-analysis approach.

Fix: strip the `export` keyword from the declareRecords line in the
preprocessed source string so the function body still evaluates as a plain
declaration.

Full test:data suite: 5307/5307 pass. typecheck + typecheck:api clean.

* feat(seed-contract): consumer-prices publish.ts writes envelopes

Wrap the 5 canonical keys written by consumer-prices-core/src/jobs/publish.ts
(overview, movers:7d/30d, freshness, categories:7d/30d/90d, retailer-spread,
basket-series) in {_seed, data} envelopes. Legacy seed-meta:<key> writes
preserved for dual-write.

Inlined a buildEnvelope helper (10 lines) rather than taking a cross-package
dependency — consumer-prices-core is a standalone npm package. Documented the
four-file parity contract (mjs source, ts mirror, js edge mirror, this copy).

Contract fields: sourceVersion='consumer-prices-core-publish-v1', schemaVersion=1,
state='OK' (recordCount>0) or 'OK_ZERO' (legitimate zero).

Typecheck: no new errors in publish.ts.

* fix(seed-contract): 3 more server-side readers unwrap envelopes

Found during final audit:

- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_shared.ts: resilience score reader
  parsed cached GetResilienceScoreResponse raw. Contract-mode seed-resilience-scores
  now envelopes those keys.
- server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/get-resilience-ranking.ts: p05/p95
  interval lookup parsed raw from seed-resilience-scores' extra-key path.
- server/worldmonitor/infrastructure/v1/_shared.ts: mgetJson() used for
  count-source keys (wildfire:fires:v1, news:insights:v1) which are both
  contract-mode now.

All three now unwrap via server/_shared/seed-envelope. Legacy shapes pass
through unchanged.

Typecheck clean.

* feat(seed-contract): ais-relay.cjs direct writes produce envelopes

32 canonical-key write sites in scripts/ais-relay.cjs now produce {_seed, data}
envelopes. Inlined buildEnvelope() (CJS module can't require ESM source) +
envelopeWrite(key, data, ttlSeconds, meta) wrapper. Enveloped keys span market
bootstrap, aviation, cyber-threats, theater-posture, weather-alerts, economic
spending/fred/worldbank, tech-events, corridor-risk, usni-fleet, shipping-stress,
social:reddit, wsb-tickers, pizzint, product-catalog, chokepoint transits,
ucdp-events, satellites, oref.

Left bare (not seeded data keys): seed-meta:* (dual-write legacy),
classifyCacheKey LLM cache, notam:prev-closed-state internal state,
wm:notif:scan-dedup flags.

Updated tests/ucdp-seed-resilience.test.mjs regex to accept both upstashSet
(pre-contract) and envelopeWrite (post-contract) call patterns.

* feat(seed-contract): 15 bundle files add canonicalKey for envelope gate

54 bundle sections across 12 files now declare canonicalKey alongside the
existing seedMetaKey. _bundle-runner.mjs (from PR 1) prefers canonicalKey
when both are present — gates section runs on envelope._seed.fetchedAt
read directly from the data key, eliminating the meta-outlives-data class
of bugs.

Files touched:
- climate (5), derived-signals (2), ecb-eu (3), energy-sources (6),
  health (2), imf-extended (4), macro (10), market-backup (9),
  portwatch (4), relay-backup (2), resilience-recovery (5), static-ref (2)

Skipped (14 sections, 3 whole bundles): multi-key writers, dynamic
templated keys (displacement year-scoped), or non-runSeed orchestrators
(regional brief cron, resilience-scores' 222-country publish, validation/
benchmark scripts). These continue to use seedMetaKey or their own gate.

seedMetaKey preserved everywhere — dual-write. _bundle-runner.mjs falls
back to legacy when canonicalKey is absent.

All 15 bundles pass node --check. test:data: 5307/5307. typecheck:all: clean.

* fix(seed-contract): 4 PR #3097 review P1s — transform/declareRecords mismatches + envelope leaks

Addresses both P1 findings and the extra-key seed-meta leak surfaced in review:

1. runSeed helper-level invariant: seed-meta:* keys NEVER envelope.
   scripts/_seed-utils.mjs exports shouldEnvelopeKey(key) — returns false for
   any key starting with 'seed-meta:'. Both atomicPublish (canonical) and
   writeExtraKey (extras) gate the envelope wrap through this helper. Fixes
   seed-iea-oil-stocks' ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY silently getting enveloped,
   which broke health.js parsing the value as bare {fetchedAt, recordCount}.
   Also defends against any future manual writeExtraKey(..., envelopeMeta)
   call that happens to target a seed-meta:* key.

2. seed-token-panels canonical + extras fixed.
   publishTransform returns data.defi (the defi panel itself, shape {tokens}).
   Old declareRecords counted data.defi.tokens + data.ai.tokens + data.other.tokens
   on the transformed payload → 0 → RETRY path → canonical market:defi-tokens:v1
   never wrote, and because runSeed returned before the extraKeys loop,
   market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 stayed stale too.
   New: declareRecords counts data.tokens on the transformed shape. AI_KEY +
   OTHER_KEY extras reuse the same function (transforms return structurally
   identical panels). Added isMain guard so test imports don't fire runSeed.

3. api/product-catalog.js cached reader unwraps envelope.
   ais-relay.cjs now envelopes product-catalog:v2 via envelopeWrite(). The
   edge reader did raw JSON.parse(result) and returned {_seed, data} to
   clients, breaking the cached path. Fix: import unwrapEnvelope from
   ./_seed-envelope.js, apply after JSON.parse. One site — :238-241 is
   downstream of getFromCache(), so the single reader fix covers both.

4. Regression lock tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs (11 cases):
   - shouldEnvelopeKey invariant: seed-meta:* false, canonical true
   - Token-panels declareRecords works on transformed shape (canonical + both extras)
   - Explicit repro of pre-fix buggy signature returning 0 — guards against revert
   - resolveRecordCount accepts 0, rejects non-integer
   - Product-catalog envelope unwrap returns bare shape; legacy passes through

Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5318/5318 pass (was 5307 — 11 new regressions)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check on every modified script

iea-oil-stocks canonical declareRecords was NOT broken (user confirmed during
review — buildIndex preserves .members); only its ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY
was affected, now covered generically by commit 1's helper invariant.

* fix(seed-contract): seed-token-panels validateFn also runs on post-transform shape

Review finding: fixing declareRecords wasn't sufficient — atomicPublish() runs
validateFn(publishData) on the transformed payload too. seed-token-panels'
validate() checked data.defi/.ai/.other on the transformed {tokens} shape,
returned false, and runSeed took the early skipped-write branch (before even
reaching the declareRecords RETRY logic). Net effect: same as before the
declareRecords fix — canonical + both extras stayed stale.

Fix: validate() now checks the canonical defi panel directly (Array.isArray
(data?.tokens) && has at least one t.price > 0). AI/OTHER panels are validated
implicitly by their own extraKey declareRecords on write.

Audited the other 9 seeders with publishTransform (bls-series, bis-extended,
bis-data, gdelt-intel, trade-flows, iea-oil-stocks, jodi-gas, sanctions-pressure,
forecasts): all validateFn's correctly target the post-transform shape. Only
token-panels regressed.

Added 4 regression tests (tests/seed-contract-transform-regressions.test.mjs):
- validate accepts transformed panel with priced tokens
- validate rejects all-zero-price tokens
- validate rejects empty/missing tokens
- Explicit pre-fix repro (buggy old signature fails on transformed shape)

Verification:
- npm run test:data → 5322/5322 pass (was 5318; +4 new)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
- node --check clean

* feat(seed-contract): add /api/seed-contract-probe validation endpoint

Single machine-readable gate for 'is PR #3097 working in production'.
Replaces the curl/jq ritual with one authenticated edge call that returns
HTTP 200 ok:true or 503 + failing check list.

What it validates:
- 8 canonical keys have {_seed, data} envelopes with required data fields
  and minRecords floors (fsi-eu, zone-normals, 3 token panels + minRecords
  guard against token-panels RETRY regression, product-catalog, wildfire,
  earthquakes).
- 2 seed-meta:* keys remain BARE (shouldEnvelopeKey invariant; guards
  against iea-oil-stocks ANALYSIS_META_EXTRA_KEY-class regressions).
- /api/product-catalog + /api/bootstrap responses contain no '_seed' leak.

Auth: x-probe-secret header must match RELAY_SHARED_SECRET (reuses existing
Vercel↔Railway internal trust boundary).

Probe logic is exported (checkProbe, checkPublicBoundary, DEFAULT_PROBES) for
hermetic testing. tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs covers every branch:
envelope pass/fail on field/records/shape, bare pass/fail on shape/field,
missing/malformed JSON, Redis non-2xx, boundary seed-leak detection,
DEFAULT_PROBES sanity (seed-meta invariant present, token-panels minRecords
guard present).

Usage:
  curl -H "x-probe-secret: $RELAY_SHARED_SECRET" \
       https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/seed-contract-probe

PR 3 will extend the probe with a stricter mode that asserts seed-meta:*
keys are GONE (not just bare) once legacy dual-write is removed.

Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 15/15 pass
- npm run test:data → 5338/5338 (was 5322; +16 new incl. conformance)
- npm run typecheck:all → clean

* fix(seed-contract): tighten probe — minRecords on AI/OTHER + cache-path source header

Review P2 findings: the probe's stated guards were weaker than advertised.

1. market:ai-tokens:v1 + market:other-tokens:v1 probes claimed to guard the
   token-panels extra-key RETRY regression but only checked shape='envelope'
   + dataHas:['tokens']. If an extra-key declareRecords regressed to 0, both
   probes would still pass because checkProbe() only inspects _seed.recordCount
   when minRecords is set. Now both enforce minRecords: 1.

2. /api/product-catalog boundary check only asserted no '_seed' leak — which
   is also true for the static fallback path. A broken cached reader
   (getFromCache returning null or throwing) could serve fallback silently
   and still pass this probe. Now:
   - api/product-catalog.js emits X-Product-Catalog-Source: cache|dodo|fallback
     on the response (the json() helper gained an optional source param wired
     to each of the three branches).
   - checkPublicBoundary declaratively requires that header's value match
     'cache' for /api/product-catalog, so a fallback-serve fails the probe
     with reason 'source:fallback!=cache' or 'source:missing!=cache'.

Test updates (tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs):
- Boundary check reworked to use a BOUNDARY_CHECKS config with optional
  requireSourceHeader per endpoint.
- New cases: served-from-cache passes, served-from-fallback fails with source
  mismatch, missing header fails, seed-leak still takes precedence, bad
  status fails.
- Token-panels sanity test now asserts minRecords≥1 on all 3 panels.

Verification:
- tests/seed-contract-probe.test.mjs → 17/17 pass (was 15, +2 net)
- npm run test:data → 5340/5340
- npm run typecheck:all → clean
2026-04-15 09:16:27 +04:00

169 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
import { loadEnvFile, runSeed, getRedisCredentials } from './_seed-utils.mjs';
import { unwrapEnvelope } from './_seed-envelope-source.mjs';
loadEnvFile(import.meta.url);
export const CANONICAL_KEY = 'energy:chokepoint-flows:v1';
const PORTWATCH_KEY = 'supply_chain:portwatch:v1';
const BASELINES_KEY = 'energy:chokepoint-baselines:v1';
const DISRUPTIONS_KEY = 'portwatch:disruptions:active:v1';
const TTL = 259_200; // 3d — upstream seeder runs every 6h
const HAZARD_RADIUS_KM = 500;
// 7 chokepoints with EIA baseline mb/d figures + coordinates for hazard matching
const CHOKEPOINT_MAP = [
{ canonicalId: 'hormuz_strait', baselineId: 'hormuz', lat: 26.56, lon: 56.25 },
{ canonicalId: 'malacca_strait', baselineId: 'malacca', lat: 2.5, lon: 101.5 },
{ canonicalId: 'suez', baselineId: 'suez', lat: 30.45, lon: 32.35 },
{ canonicalId: 'bab_el_mandeb', baselineId: 'babelm', lat: 12.58, lon: 43.33 },
{ canonicalId: 'bosphorus', baselineId: 'turkish', lat: 41.12, lon: 29.05 },
{ canonicalId: 'dover_strait', baselineId: 'danish', lat: 51.05, lon: 1.45 },
{ canonicalId: 'panama', baselineId: 'panama', lat: 9.08, lon: -79.68 },
];
function haversineKm(lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2) {
const R = 6371;
const toRad = d => d * Math.PI / 180;
const dLat = toRad(lat2 - lat1);
const dLon = toRad(lon2 - lon1);
const a = Math.sin(dLat / 2) ** 2 + Math.cos(toRad(lat1)) * Math.cos(toRad(lat2)) * Math.sin(dLon / 2) ** 2;
return R * 2 * Math.atan2(Math.sqrt(a), Math.sqrt(1 - a));
}
function findNearestHazard(events, cpLat, cpLon) {
if (!Array.isArray(events)) return null;
let best = null;
let bestDist = HAZARD_RADIUS_KM;
for (const ev of events) {
if (ev.alertLevel !== 'RED' && ev.alertLevel !== 'ORANGE') continue;
if (!ev.active) continue;
if (!Number.isFinite(ev.lat) || !Number.isFinite(ev.lon)) continue;
const dist = haversineKm(cpLat, cpLon, ev.lat, ev.lon);
if (dist < bestDist) { bestDist = dist; best = ev; }
}
return best;
}
async function redisGet(url, token, key) {
const resp = await fetch(`${url}/get/${encodeURIComponent(key)}`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
if (!resp.ok) return null;
const data = await resp.json();
return data.result ? unwrapEnvelope(JSON.parse(data.result)).data : null;
}
function avg(arr) {
if (!arr.length) return 0;
return arr.reduce((s, v) => s + v, 0) / arr.length;
}
export async function fetchAll() {
const { url, token } = getRedisCredentials();
const [portwatch, baselines, disruptions] = await Promise.all([
redisGet(url, token, PORTWATCH_KEY),
redisGet(url, token, BASELINES_KEY),
redisGet(url, token, DISRUPTIONS_KEY).catch(() => null), // optional — absent until PR 4 deploys
]);
if (!portwatch || typeof portwatch !== 'object' || Object.keys(portwatch).length === 0) {
throw new Error('PortWatch data unavailable (supply_chain:portwatch:v1 absent or empty) — retrying in 20 min');
}
const result = {};
for (const cp of CHOKEPOINT_MAP) {
const pw = portwatch[cp.canonicalId];
if (!pw?.history?.length) continue;
const baseline = baselines?.chokepoints?.find(b => b.id === cp.baselineId);
if (!baseline?.mbd) continue;
const history = [...pw.history].sort((a, b) => a.date.localeCompare(b.date));
// Require at least 40 days of data to compute a meaningful baseline
if (history.length < 40) continue;
const last7 = history.slice(-7);
const prev90 = history.slice(-97, -7); // days [-97..-7], up to 90 days
if (last7.length < 3 || prev90.length < 20) continue;
// Prefer DWT (capTanker) when the baseline window has majority DWT coverage.
// Decision is based on the 90-day baseline, NOT the recent window — zero
// recent capTanker is the disruption signal, not a reason to abandon DWT.
// Majority guard: partial DWT roll-out (1-2 days non-zero) should not
// activate DWT mode and pull down the baseline average via zero-filled gaps.
const dwtBaselineDays = prev90.filter(d => (d.capTanker ?? 0) > 0).length;
const useDwt = dwtBaselineDays >= Math.ceil(prev90.length / 2);
const current7d = useDwt
? avg(last7.map(d => d.capTanker ?? 0))
: avg(last7.map(d => d.tanker ?? 0));
const baseline90d = useDwt
? avg(prev90.map(d => d.capTanker ?? 0))
: avg(prev90.map(d => d.tanker ?? 0));
// Skip if baseline is too thin to be meaningful
if (baseline90d < (useDwt ? 1 : 0.5)) continue;
const flowRatio = Math.min(1.5, Math.max(0, current7d / baseline90d));
const currentMbd = Math.round(baseline.mbd * flowRatio * 10) / 10;
// Disrupted = each of last 3 individual days has day_ratio < 0.85
const last3 = history.slice(-3);
const disrupted = last3.length === 3 && last3.every(d => {
const dayVal = useDwt ? (d.capTanker ?? 0) : (d.tanker ?? 0);
return baseline90d > 0 && (dayVal / baseline90d) < 0.85;
});
const hazard = findNearestHazard(disruptions?.events, cp.lat, cp.lon);
result[cp.canonicalId] = {
currentMbd,
baselineMbd: baseline.mbd,
flowRatio: Math.round(flowRatio * 1000) / 1000,
disrupted,
source: useDwt ? 'portwatch-dwt' : 'portwatch-counts',
hazardAlertLevel: hazard?.alertLevel ?? null,
hazardAlertName: hazard?.eventName ?? null,
};
}
if (Object.keys(result).length === 0) {
console.warn('[ChokepointFlows] No flow estimates computed — PortWatch and baselines data may be insufficient');
}
return result;
}
export function validateFn(data) {
return data && typeof data === 'object' && Object.keys(data).length >= 3;
}
const isMain = process.argv[1]?.endsWith('seed-chokepoint-flows.mjs');
export function declareRecords(data) {
return data && typeof data === "object" ? Object.keys(data).length : 0;
}
if (isMain) {
runSeed('energy', 'chokepoint-flows', CANONICAL_KEY, fetchAll, {
validateFn,
ttlSeconds: TTL,
sourceVersion: 'portwatch-eia-flows-v1',
recordCount: (data) => Object.keys(data).length,
declareRecords,
schemaVersion: 1,
maxStaleMin: 720,
}).catch((err) => {
const cause = err.cause ? ` (cause: ${err.cause.message || err.cause.code || err.cause})` : '';
console.error('FATAL:', (err.message || err) + cause);
process.exit(1);
});
}