Files
worldmonitor/middleware.ts
Elie Habib 408d5d3374 security: harden IPC, gate DevTools, isolate external windows, exempt /api/version (#348)
* security: harden IPC commands, gate DevTools, and isolate external windows

- Remove devtools from default Tauri features; gate behind opt-in
  Cargo feature so production builds never expose DevTools
- Add IPC origin validation (require_trusted_window) to 9 sensitive
  commands: get_secret, get_all_secrets, set_secret, delete_secret,
  get_local_api_token, read/write/delete_cache_entry, fetch_polymarket
- Isolate youtube-login window into restricted capability (core:window
  only) — prevents external-origin webview from invoking app commands
- Add 5-minute TTL to cached sidecar auth token in fetch patch closure
- Document renderer trust boundary threat model in runtime.ts

* docs: add contributors, security acknowledgments, and desktop security policy

- Add Contributors section to README with all 16 GitHub contributors
- Add Security Acknowledgments crediting Cody Richard for 3 disclosures
- Update SECURITY.md with desktop runtime security model (Tauri IPC
  origin validation, DevTools gating, sidecar auth, capability isolation,
  fetch patch trust boundary)
- Add Tauri-specific items to security report scope
- Correct API key storage description to cover both web and desktop

* fix: exempt /api/version from bot-blocking middleware

The desktop update check and sidecar requests were getting 403'd by the
middleware's bot UA filter (curl/) and short UA check.
2026-02-25 06:14:16 +00:00

64 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Vercel Edge Middleware — blocks bot/crawler traffic from API routes.
* Runs on /api/* paths only (configured via matcher below).
* Social preview bots are allowed on /api/story and /api/og-story.
*/
const BOT_UA =
/bot|crawl|spider|slurp|archiver|wget|curl\/|python-requests|scrapy|httpclient|go-http|java\/|libwww|perl|ruby|php\/|ahrefsbot|semrushbot|mj12bot|dotbot|baiduspider|yandexbot|sogou|bytespider|petalbot|gptbot|claudebot|ccbot/i;
const SOCIAL_PREVIEW_UA =
/twitterbot|facebookexternalhit|linkedinbot|slackbot|telegrambot|whatsapp|discordbot|redditbot/i;
const SOCIAL_PREVIEW_PATHS = new Set(['/api/story', '/api/og-story']);
// Public endpoints that should never be bot-blocked (version check, etc.)
const PUBLIC_API_PATHS = new Set(['/api/version']);
// Slack uses Slack-ImgProxy to fetch OG images — distinct from Slackbot
const SOCIAL_IMAGE_UA =
/Slack-ImgProxy|Slackbot|twitterbot|facebookexternalhit|linkedinbot|telegrambot|whatsapp|discordbot|redditbot/i;
export default function middleware(request: Request) {
const ua = request.headers.get('user-agent') ?? '';
const url = new URL(request.url);
const path = url.pathname;
// Allow social preview/image bots on OG image assets (bypasses Vercel Attack Challenge)
if (path.startsWith('/favico/') || path.endsWith('.png')) {
if (SOCIAL_IMAGE_UA.test(ua)) {
return;
}
}
// Allow social preview bots on exact OG routes only
if (SOCIAL_PREVIEW_UA.test(ua) && SOCIAL_PREVIEW_PATHS.has(path)) {
return;
}
// Public endpoints bypass all bot filtering
if (PUBLIC_API_PATHS.has(path)) {
return;
}
// Block bots from all API routes
if (BOT_UA.test(ua)) {
return new Response('{"error":"Forbidden"}', {
status: 403,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
// No user-agent or suspiciously short — likely a script
if (!ua || ua.length < 10) {
return new Response('{"error":"Forbidden"}', {
status: 403,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
}
export const config = {
matcher: ['/api/:path*', '/favico/:path*'],
};