Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Sylvain Zimmer
ddac6197e3 (buildpack) add PaaS deployment support, tested with Scalingo 2025-06-01 23:54:35 +02:00
440 changed files with 21465 additions and 37952 deletions

View File

@@ -34,4 +34,3 @@ db.sqlite3
# Frontend
node_modules
.next

23
.gitattributes vendored
View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
# Set the default behavior for all files
* text=auto eol=lf
# Binary files (should not be modified)
*.png binary
*.jpg binary
*.jpeg binary
*.gif binary
*.ico binary
*.mov binary
*.mp4 binary
*.mp3 binary
*.flv binary
*.fla binary
*.swf binary
*.gz binary
*.zip binary
*.7z binary
*.ttf binary
*.woff binary
*.woff2 binary
*.eot binary
*.pdf binary

6
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
<!---
Thanks for filing an issue 😄 ! Before you submit, please read the following:
Check the other issue templates if you are trying to submit a bug report, feature request, or question
Search open/closed issues before submitting since someone might have asked the same thing before!
-->

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ labels: ["bug", "triage"]
## Bug Report
**Before you file your issue**
- Check the other [issues](https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/issues) before filing your own
- If your report is related to the ([BlockNote](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote)) text editor, [file it on their repo](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/issues). If you're not sure whether your issue is with BlockNote or Docs, file it on our repo: if we support it, we'll backport it upstream ourselves 😊, otherwise we'll ask you to do so.
**Problematic behavior**
A clear and concise description of the behavior.

View File

@@ -1,22 +1,11 @@
## Purpose
Describe the purpose of this pull request.
Description...
## Proposal
- [ ] item 1...
- [ ] item 2...
Description...
## External contributions
Thank you for your contribution! 🎉
Please ensure the following items are checked before submitting your pull request:
- [ ] I have read and followed the [contributing guidelines](https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [ ] I have read and agreed to the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)
- [ ] I have signed off my commits with `git commit --signoff` (DCO compliance)
- [ ] I have signed my commits with my SSH or GPG key (`git commit -S`)
- [ ] My commit messages follow the required format: `<gitmoji>(type) title description`
- [ ] I have added a changelog entry under `## [Unreleased]` section (if noticeable change)
- [ ] I have added corresponding tests for new features or bug fixes (if applicable)
- [] item 1...
- [] item 2...

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ jobs:
install-dependencies:
uses: ./.github/workflows/dependencies.yml
with:
node_version: '22.x'
node_version: '20.x'
with-front-dependencies-installation: true
synchronize-with-crowdin:

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ jobs:
install-dependencies:
uses: ./.github/workflows/dependencies.yml
with:
node_version: '22.x'
node_version: '20.x'
with-front-dependencies-installation: true
with-build_mails: true
@@ -23,10 +23,9 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@v4
# Backend i18n
- name: Install Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
uses: actions/setup-python@v3
with:
python-version: "3.13.3"
cache: "pip"
- name: Upgrade pip and setuptools
run: pip install --upgrade pip setuptools
- name: Install development dependencies

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ on:
inputs:
node_version:
required: false
default: '22.x'
default: '20.x'
type: string
with-front-dependencies-installation:
type: boolean

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ jobs:
install-dependencies:
uses: ./.github/workflows/dependencies.yml
with:
node_version: '22.x'
node_version: '20.x'
with-front-dependencies-installation: true
test-front:
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: "22.x"
node-version: "20.x"
- name: Restore the frontend cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: "22.x"
node-version: "20.x"
- name: Restore the frontend cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: "22.x"
node-version: "20.x"
- name: Restore the frontend cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
@@ -80,13 +80,13 @@ jobs:
fail-on-cache-miss: true
- name: Set e2e env variables
run: cat env.d/development/common.e2e >> env.d/development/common.local
run: cat env.d/development/common.e2e.dist >> env.d/development/common.dist
- name: Install Playwright Browsers
run: cd src/frontend/apps/e2e && yarn install --frozen-lockfile && yarn install-playwright chromium
- name: Start Docker services
run: make bootstrap-e2e FLUSH_ARGS='--no-input'
run: make bootstrap FLUSH_ARGS='--no-input' cache=
- name: Run e2e tests
run: cd src/frontend/ && yarn e2e:test --project='chromium'
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
test-e2e-other-browser:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: test-e2e-chromium
timeout-minutes: 30
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: "22.x"
node-version: "20.x"
- name: Restore the frontend cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
@@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ jobs:
fail-on-cache-miss: true
- name: Set e2e env variables
run: cat env.d/development/common.e2e >> env.d/development/common.local
run: cat env.d/development/common.e2e.dist >> env.d/development/common.dist
- name: Install Playwright Browsers
run: cd src/frontend/apps/e2e && yarn install --frozen-lockfile && yarn install-playwright firefox webkit chromium
- name: Start Docker services
run: make bootstrap-e2e FLUSH_ARGS='--no-input'
run: make bootstrap FLUSH_ARGS='--no-input' cache=
- name: Run e2e tests
run: cd src/frontend/ && yarn e2e:test --project=firefox --project=webkit
@@ -136,54 +136,3 @@ jobs:
name: playwright-other-report
path: src/frontend/apps/e2e/report/
retention-days: 7
bundle-size-check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: install-dependencies
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
issues: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Detect relevant changes
id: changes
uses: dorny/paths-filter@v2
with:
filters: |
lock:
- 'src/frontend/**/yarn.lock'
app:
- 'src/frontend/apps/impress/**'
- name: Restore the frontend cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: "src/frontend/**/node_modules"
key: front-node_modules-${{ hashFiles('src/frontend/**/yarn.lock') }}
fail-on-cache-miss: true
- name: Setup Node.js
if: steps.changes.outputs.lock == 'true' || steps.changes.outputs.app == 'true'
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: "22.x"
- name: Check bundle size changes
if: steps.changes.outputs.lock == 'true' || steps.changes.outputs.app == 'true'
uses: preactjs/compressed-size-action@v2
with:
repo-token: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}"
build-script: "app:build"
pattern: "apps/impress/out/**/*.{css,js,html}"
exclude: "{**/*.map,**/node_modules/**}"
minimum-change-threshold: 500
compression: "gzip"
cwd: "./src/frontend"
show-total: true
strip-hash: "[-_.][a-f0-9]{8,}(?=\\.(?:js|css|html)$)"
omit-unchanged: true
install-script: "yarn install --frozen-lockfile"

View File

@@ -25,18 +25,14 @@ jobs:
- name: show
run: git log
- name: Enforce absence of print statements in code
if: always()
run: |
! git diff origin/${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}..HEAD -- . ':(exclude)**/impress.yml' | grep "print("
- name: Check absence of fixup commits
if: always()
run: |
! git log | grep 'fixup!'
- name: Install gitlint
if: always()
run: pip install --user requests gitlint
- name: Lint commit messages added to main
if: always()
run: ~/.local/bin/gitlint --commits origin/${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}..HEAD
check-changelog:
@@ -93,10 +89,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: Install Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
uses: actions/setup-python@v3
with:
python-version: "3.13.3"
cache: "pip"
- name: Upgrade pip and setuptools
run: pip install --upgrade pip setuptools
- name: Install development dependencies
@@ -189,10 +184,9 @@ jobs:
mc version enable impress/impress-media-storage"
- name: Install Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
uses: actions/setup-python@v3
with:
python-version: "3.13.3"
cache: "pip"
- name: Install development dependencies
run: pip install --user .[dev]

3
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ venv/
ENV/
env.bak/
venv.bak/
env.d/development/*.local
env.d/development/*
!env.d/development/*.dist
env.d/terraform
# npm

View File

@@ -8,133 +8,6 @@ and this project adheres to
## [Unreleased]
## [3.6.0] - 2025-09-04
### Added
- 👷(CI) add bundle size check job #1268
- ✨(frontend) use title first emoji as doc icon in tree #1289
### Changed
- ♻️(docs-app) Switch from Jest tests to Vitest #1269
- ♿(frontend) improve accessibility:
- 🌐(frontend) set html lang attribute dynamically #1248
- ♿(frontend) inject language attribute to pdf export #1235
- ♿(frontend) improve accessibility of search modal #1275
- ♿(frontend) add correct attributes to icons #1255
- 🎨(frontend) improve nav structure #1262
- ♿️(frontend) keyboard interaction with menu #1244
- ♿(frontend) improve header accessibility #1270
- ♿(frontend) improve accessibility for decorative images in editor #1282
- ♻️(backend) fallback to email identifier when no name #1298
- 🐛(backend) allow ASCII characters in user sub field #1295
- ⚡️(frontend) improve fallback width calculation #1333
### Fixed
- 🐛(makefile) Windows compatibility fix for Docker volume mounting #1263
- 🐛(minio) fix user permission error with Minio and Windows #1263
- 🐛(frontend) fix export when quote block and inline code #1319
- 🐛(frontend) fix base64 font #1324
- 🐛(backend) allow creator to delete subpages #1297
- 🐛(frontend) fix dnd conflict with tree and Blocknote #1328
- 🐛(frontend) fix display bug on homepage #1332
- 🐛link role update #1287
## [3.5.0] - 2025-07-31
### Added
- ✨(helm) Service Account support for K8s Resources in Helm Charts #780
- ✨(backend) allow masking documents from the list view #1172
- ✨(frontend) subdocs can manage link reach #1190
- ✨(frontend) add duplicate action to doc tree #1175
- ✨(frontend) Interlinking doc #904
- ✨(frontend) add multi columns support for editor #1219
### Changed
- ♻️(frontend) search on all docs if no children #1184
- ♻️(frontend) redirect to doc after duplicate #1175
- 🔧(project) change env.d system by using local files #1200
- ⚡️(frontend) improve tree stability #1207
- ⚡️(frontend) improve accessibility #1232
- 🛂(frontend) block drag n drop when not desktop #1239
### Fixed
- 🐛(service-worker) Fix useOffline Maximum update depth exceeded #1196
- 🐛(frontend) fix empty left panel after deleting root doc #1197
- 🐛(helm) charts generate invalid YAML for collaboration API / WS #890
- 🐛(frontend) 401 redirection overridden #1214
- 🐛(frontend) include root parent in search #1243
## [3.4.2] - 2025-07-18
### Changed
- ⚡️(docker) Optimize Dockerfile to use apk with --no-cache #743
### Fixed
- 🐛(backend) improve prompt to not use code blocks delimiter #1188
## [3.4.1] - 2025-07-15
### Fixed
- 🌐(frontend) keep simple tag during export #1154
- 🐛(back) manage can-edit endpoint without created room
in the ws #1152
- 🐛(frontend) fix action buttons not clickable #1162
- 🐛(frontend) fix crash share modal on grid options #1174
- 🐛(frontend) fix unfold subdocs not clickable at the bottom #1179
## [3.4.0] - 2025-07-09
### Added
- ✨(frontend) multi-pages #701
- ✨(frontend) Duplicate a doc #1078
- ✨Ask for access #1081
- ✨(frontend) add customization for translations #857
- ✨(backend) add ancestors links definitions to document abilities #846
- ✨(backend) include ancestors accesses on document accesses list view #846
- ✨(backend) add ancestors links reach and role to document API #846
- 📝(project) add troubleshoot doc #1066
- 📝(project) add system-requirement doc #1066
- 🔧(frontend) configure x-frame-options to DENY in nginx conf #1084
- ✨(backend) allow to disable checking unsafe mimetype on
attachment upload #1099
- ✨(doc) add documentation to install with compose #855
- ✨ Give priority to users connected to collaboration server
(aka no websocket feature) #1093
### Changed
- ♻️(backend) stop requiring owner for non-root documents #846
- ♻️(backend) simplify roles by ranking them and return only the max role #846
- 📌(yjs) stop pinning node to minor version on yjs docker image #1005
- 🧑‍💻(docker) add .next to .dockerignore #1055
- 🧑‍💻(docker) handle frontend development images with docker compose #1033
- 🧑‍💻(docker) add y-provider config to development environment #1057
- ⚡️(frontend) optimize document fetch error handling #1089
### Fixed
- 🐛(backend) fix link definition select options linked to ancestors #846
- 🐛(frontend) table of content disappearing #982
- 🐛(frontend) fix multiple EmojiPicker #1012
- 🐛(frontend) fix meta title #1017
- 🔧(git) set LF line endings for all text files #1032
- 📝(docs) minor fixes to docs/env.md
- ✨support `_FILE` environment variables for secrets #912
### Removed
- 🔥(frontend) remove Beta from logo #1095
## [3.3.0] - 2025-05-06
### Added
@@ -160,13 +33,13 @@ and this project adheres to
- ⬆️(docker) upgrade node images to alpine 3.21 #973
### Fixed
- 🐛(y-provider) increase JSON size limits for transcription conversion #989
### Removed
- 🔥(back) remove footer endpoint #948
## [3.2.1] - 2025-05-06
## Fixed
@@ -174,6 +47,7 @@ and this project adheres to
- 🐛(frontend) fix list copy paste #943
- 📝(doc) update contributing policy (commit signatures are now mandatory) #895
## [3.2.0] - 2025-05-05
## Added
@@ -184,7 +58,7 @@ and this project adheres to
- ✨(settings) Allow configuring PKCE for the SSO #886
- 🌐(i18n) activate chinese and spanish languages #884
- 🔧(backend) allow overwriting the data directory #893
- (backend) add `django-lasuite` dependency #839
- (backend) add `django-lasuite` dependency #839
- ✨(frontend) advanced table features #908
## Changed
@@ -235,6 +109,7 @@ and this project adheres to
- 🐛(backend) compute ancestor_links in get_abilities if needed #725
- 🔒️(back) restrict access to document accesses #801
## [2.6.0] - 2025-03-21
## Added
@@ -253,6 +128,7 @@ and this project adheres to
- 🔒️(back) throttle user list endpoint #636
- 🔒️(back) remove pagination and limit to 5 for user list endpoint #636
## [2.5.0] - 2025-03-18
## Added
@@ -275,14 +151,15 @@ and this project adheres to
## Fixed
- 🐛(frontend) SVG export #706
- 🐛(frontend) remove scroll listener table content #688
- 🐛(frontend) remove scroll listener table content #688
- 🔒️(back) restrict access to favorite_list endpoint #690
- 🐛(backend) refactor to fix filtering on children
and descendants views #695
- 🐛(backend) refactor to fix filtering on children
and descendants views #695
- 🐛(action) fix notify-argocd workflow #713
- 🚨(helm) fix helmfile lint #736
- 🚚(frontend) redirect to 401 page when 401 error #759
## [2.4.0] - 2025-03-06
## Added
@@ -297,6 +174,7 @@ and this project adheres to
- 🐛(frontend) fix collaboration error #684
## [2.3.0] - 2025-03-03
## Added
@@ -712,38 +590,33 @@ and this project adheres to
- ✨(frontend) Coming Soon page (#67)
- 🚀 Impress, project to manage your documents easily and collaboratively.
[unreleased]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/compare/v3.6.0...main
[v3.6.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.6.0
[v3.5.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.5.0
[v3.4.2]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.4.2
[v3.4.1]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.4.1
[v3.4.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.4.0
[v3.3.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.3.0
[v3.2.1]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.2.1
[v3.2.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.2.0
[v3.1.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.1.0
[v3.0.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v3.0.0
[v2.6.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.6.0
[v2.5.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.5.0
[v2.4.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.4.0
[v2.3.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.3.0
[v2.2.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.2.0
[v2.1.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.1.0
[v2.0.1]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.0.1
[v2.0.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v2.0.0
[v1.10.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.10.0
[v1.9.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.9.0
[v1.8.2]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.8.2
[v1.8.1]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.8.1
[v1.8.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.8.0
[v1.7.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.7.0
[v1.6.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.6.0
[1.5.1]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.5.1
[1.5.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.5.0
[1.4.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.4.0
[1.3.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.3.0
[1.2.1]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.2.1
[1.2.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.2.0
[1.1.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.1.0
[1.0.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v1.0.0
[0.1.0]: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/releases/v0.1.0
[unreleased]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/compare/v3.3.0...main
[v3.3.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v3.3.0
[v3.2.1]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v3.2.1
[v3.2.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v3.2.0
[v3.1.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v3.1.0
[v3.0.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v3.0.0
[v2.6.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.6.0
[v2.5.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.5.0
[v2.4.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.4.0
[v2.3.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.3.0
[v2.2.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.2.0
[v2.1.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.1.0
[v2.0.1]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.0.1
[v2.0.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v2.0.0
[v1.10.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.10.0
[v1.9.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.9.0
[v1.8.2]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.8.2
[v1.8.1]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.8.1
[v1.8.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.8.0
[v1.7.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.7.0
[v1.6.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.6.0
[1.5.1]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.5.1
[1.5.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.5.0
[1.4.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.4.0
[1.3.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.3.0
[1.2.1]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.2.1
[1.2.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.2.0
[1.1.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.1.0
[1.0.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v1.0.0
[0.1.0]: https://github.com/numerique-gouv/impress/releases/v0.1.0

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ FROM python:3.13.3-alpine AS base
RUN python -m pip install --upgrade pip setuptools
# Upgrade system packages to install security updates
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache
RUN apk update && \
apk upgrade
# ---- Back-end builder image ----
FROM base AS back-builder
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ FROM base AS link-collector
ARG IMPRESS_STATIC_ROOT=/data/static
# Install pango & rdfind
RUN apk add --no-cache \
RUN apk add \
pango \
rdfind
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ FROM base AS core
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
# Install required system libs
RUN apk add --no-cache \
RUN apk add \
cairo \
file \
font-noto \
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ FROM core AS backend-development
USER root:root
# Install psql
RUN apk add --no-cache postgresql-client
RUN apk add postgresql-client
# Uninstall impress and re-install it in editable mode along with development
# dependencies

171
Makefile
View File

@@ -35,15 +35,10 @@ DB_PORT = 5432
# -- Docker
# Get the current user ID to use for docker run and docker exec commands
ifeq ($(OS),Windows_NT)
DOCKER_USER := 0:0 # run containers as root on Windows
else
DOCKER_UID := $(shell id -u)
DOCKER_GID := $(shell id -g)
DOCKER_USER := $(DOCKER_UID):$(DOCKER_GID)
endif
DOCKER_UID = $(shell id -u)
DOCKER_GID = $(shell id -g)
DOCKER_USER = $(DOCKER_UID):$(DOCKER_GID)
COMPOSE = DOCKER_USER=$(DOCKER_USER) docker compose
COMPOSE_E2E = DOCKER_USER=$(DOCKER_USER) docker compose -f compose.yml -f compose-e2e.yml
COMPOSE_EXEC = $(COMPOSE) exec
COMPOSE_EXEC_APP = $(COMPOSE_EXEC) app-dev
COMPOSE_RUN = $(COMPOSE) run --rm
@@ -52,7 +47,7 @@ COMPOSE_RUN_CROWDIN = $(COMPOSE_RUN) crowdin crowdin
# -- Backend
MANAGE = $(COMPOSE_RUN_APP) python manage.py
MAIL_YARN = $(COMPOSE_RUN) -w //app/src/mail node yarn
MAIL_YARN = $(COMPOSE_RUN) -w /app/src/mail node yarn
# -- Frontend
PATH_FRONT = ./src/frontend
@@ -71,111 +66,30 @@ data/static:
# -- Project
create-env-local-files: ## create env.local files in env.d/development
create-env-local-files:
@touch env.d/development/crowdin.local
@touch env.d/development/common.local
@touch env.d/development/postgresql.local
@touch env.d/development/kc_postgresql.local
.PHONY: create-env-local-files
create-env-files: ## Copy the dist env files to env files
create-env-files: \
env.d/development/common \
env.d/development/crowdin \
env.d/development/postgresql \
env.d/development/kc_postgresql
.PHONY: create-env-files
pre-bootstrap: \
bootstrap: ## Prepare Docker images for the project
bootstrap: \
data/media \
data/static \
create-env-local-files
.PHONY: pre-bootstrap
post-bootstrap: \
create-env-files \
build \
migrate \
demo \
back-i18n-compile \
mails-install \
mails-build
.PHONY: post-bootstrap
pre-beautiful-bootstrap: ## Display a welcome message before bootstrap
ifeq ($(OS),Windows_NT)
@echo ""
@echo "================================================================================"
@echo ""
@echo " Welcome to Docs - Collaborative Text Editing from La Suite!"
@echo ""
@echo " This will set up your development environment with:"
@echo " - Docker containers for all services"
@echo " - Database migrations and static files"
@echo " - Frontend dependencies and build"
@echo " - Environment configuration files"
@echo ""
@echo " Services will be available at:"
@echo " - Frontend: http://localhost:3000"
@echo " - API: http://localhost:8071"
@echo " - Admin: http://localhost:8071/admin"
@echo ""
@echo "================================================================================"
@echo ""
@echo "Starting bootstrap process..."
else
@echo "$(BOLD)"
@echo "╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"
@echo "║ ║"
@echo "║ 🚀 Welcome to Docs - Collaborative Text Editing from La Suite ! 🚀 ║"
@echo "║ ║"
@echo "║ This will set up your development environment with : ║"
@echo "║ • Docker containers for all services ║"
@echo "║ • Database migrations and static files ║"
@echo "║ • Frontend dependencies and build ║"
@echo "║ • Environment configuration files ║"
@echo "║ ║"
@echo "║ Services will be available at: ║"
@echo "║ • Frontend: http://localhost:3000 ║"
@echo "║ • API: http://localhost:8071 ║"
@echo "║ • Admin: http://localhost:8071/admin ║"
@echo "║ ║"
@echo "╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝"
@echo "$(RESET)"
@echo "$(GREEN)Starting bootstrap process...$(RESET)"
endif
@echo ""
.PHONY: pre-beautiful-bootstrap
post-beautiful-bootstrap: ## Display a success message after bootstrap
@echo ""
ifeq ($(OS),Windows_NT)
@echo "Bootstrap completed successfully!"
@echo ""
@echo "Next steps:"
@echo " - Visit http://localhost:3000 to access the application"
@echo " - Run 'make help' to see all available commands"
else
@echo "$(GREEN)🎉 Bootstrap completed successfully!$(RESET)"
@echo ""
@echo "$(BOLD)Next steps:$(RESET)"
@echo " • Visit http://localhost:3000 to access the application"
@echo " • Run 'make help' to see all available commands"
endif
@echo ""
.PHONY: post-beautiful-bootstrap
bootstrap: ## Prepare the project for local development
bootstrap: \
pre-beautiful-bootstrap \
pre-bootstrap \
build \
post-bootstrap \
run \
post-beautiful-bootstrap
mails-build \
run
.PHONY: bootstrap
bootstrap-e2e: ## Prepare Docker production images to be used for e2e tests
bootstrap-e2e: \
pre-bootstrap \
build-e2e \
post-bootstrap \
run-e2e
.PHONY: bootstrap-e2e
# -- Docker/compose
build: cache ?=
build: cache ?= --no-cache
build: ## build the project containers
@$(MAKE) build-backend cache=$(cache)
@$(MAKE) build-yjs-provider cache=$(cache)
@@ -189,23 +103,16 @@ build-backend: ## build the app-dev container
build-yjs-provider: cache ?=
build-yjs-provider: ## build the y-provider container
@$(COMPOSE) build y-provider-development $(cache)
@$(COMPOSE) build y-provider $(cache)
.PHONY: build-yjs-provider
build-frontend: cache ?=
build-frontend: ## build the frontend container
@$(COMPOSE) build frontend-development $(cache)
@$(COMPOSE) build frontend $(cache)
.PHONY: build-frontend
build-e2e: cache ?=
build-e2e: ## build the e2e container
@$(MAKE) build-backend cache=$(cache)
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) build frontend $(cache)
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) build y-provider $(cache)
.PHONY: build-e2e
down: ## stop and remove containers, networks, images, and volumes
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) down
@$(COMPOSE) down
.PHONY: down
logs: ## display app-dev logs (follow mode)
@@ -214,30 +121,22 @@ logs: ## display app-dev logs (follow mode)
run-backend: ## Start only the backend application and all needed services
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d celery-dev
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d y-provider-development
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d y-provider
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d nginx
.PHONY: run-backend
run: ## start the wsgi (production) and development server
run:
@$(MAKE) run-backend
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d frontend-development
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d frontend
.PHONY: run
run-e2e: ## start the e2e server
run-e2e:
@$(MAKE) run-backend
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) stop y-provider-development
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) up --force-recreate -d frontend
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) up --force-recreate -d y-provider
.PHONY: run-e2e
status: ## an alias for "docker compose ps"
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) ps
@$(COMPOSE) ps
.PHONY: status
stop: ## stop the development server using Docker
@$(COMPOSE_E2E) stop
@$(COMPOSE) stop
.PHONY: stop
# -- Backend
@@ -326,6 +225,20 @@ resetdb: ## flush database and create a superuser "admin"
@${MAKE} superuser
.PHONY: resetdb
env.d/development/common:
cp -n env.d/development/common.dist env.d/development/common
env.d/development/postgresql:
cp -n env.d/development/postgresql.dist env.d/development/postgresql
env.d/development/kc_postgresql:
cp -n env.d/development/kc_postgresql.dist env.d/development/kc_postgresql
# -- Internationalization
env.d/development/crowdin:
cp -n env.d/development/crowdin.dist env.d/development/crowdin
crowdin-download: ## Download translated message from crowdin
@$(COMPOSE_RUN_CROWDIN) download -c crowdin/config.yml
.PHONY: crowdin-download
@@ -402,14 +315,10 @@ frontend-lint: ## run the frontend linter
.PHONY: frontend-lint
run-frontend-development: ## Run the frontend in development mode
@$(COMPOSE) stop frontend-development
@$(COMPOSE) stop frontend
cd $(PATH_FRONT_IMPRESS) && yarn dev
.PHONY: run-frontend-development
frontend-test: ## Run the frontend tests
cd $(PATH_FRONT_IMPRESS) && yarn test
.PHONY: frontend-test
frontend-i18n-extract: ## Extract the frontend translation inside a json to be used for crowdin
cd $(PATH_FRONT) && yarn i18n:extract
.PHONY: frontend-i18n-extract

2
Procfile Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
web: bin/buildpack_start.sh
postdeploy: python manage.py migrate

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
<img alt="GitHub commit activity" src="https://img.shields.io/github/commit-activity/m/suitenumerique/docs"/>
<img alt="GitHub closed issues" src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-closed/suitenumerique/docs"/>
<a href="https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/blob/main/LICENSE">
<img alt="MIT License" src="https://img.shields.io/github/license/suitenumerique/docs"/>
<img alt="GitHub closed issues" src="https://img.shields.io/github/license/suitenumerique/docs"/>
</a>
</p>
<p align="center">
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Docs, where your notes can become knowledge through live collaboration.
## Why use Docs ❓
Docs is a collaborative text editor designed to address common challenges in knowledge building and sharing.
It offers a scalable and secure alternative to tools such as Google Docs, Notion (without the dbs), Outline, or Confluence.
### Write
* 😌 Get simple, accessible online editing for your team.
* 💅 Create clean documents with beautiful formatting options.
@@ -49,24 +51,13 @@ Docs is a collaborative text editor designed to address common challenges in kno
* 📚 Turn your team's collaborative work into organized knowledge with Subpages.
### Self-host
🚀 Docs is easy to install on your own servers
#### 🚀 Docs is easy to install on your own servers
We use Kubernetes for our [production instance](https://docs.numerique.gouv.fr/) but also support Docker Compose. The community contributed a couple other methods (Nix, YunoHost etc.) check out the [docs](/docs/installation/README.md) to get detailed instructions and examples.
Available methods: Helm chart, Nix package
#### 🌍 Known instances
We hope to see many more, here is an incomplete list of public Docs instances (urls listed in alphabetical order). Feel free to make a PR to add ones that are not listed below🙏
| | | |
| --- | --- | ------- |
| Url | Org | Public |
| docs.numerique.gouv.fr | DINUM | French public agents working for the central administration and the extended public sphere. ProConnect is required to login in or sign up|
| docs.suite.anct.gouv.fr | ANCT | French public agents working for the territorial administration and the extended public sphere. ProConnect is required to login in or sign up|
| notes.demo.opendesk.eu | ZenDiS | Demo instance of OpenDesk. Request access to get credentials |
| notes.liiib.re | lasuite.coop | Free and open demo to all. Content and accounts are reset after one month |
| docs.federated.nexus | federated.nexus | Public instance, but you have to [sign up for a Federated Nexus account](https://federated.nexus/register/). |
In the works: Docker Compose, YunoHost
#### ⚠️ Advanced features
For some advanced features (ex: Export as PDF) Docs relies on XL packages from BlockNote. These are licenced under GPL and are not MIT compatible. You can perfectly use Docs without these packages by setting the environment variable `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` to true. That way you'll build an image of the application without the features that are not MIT compatible. Read the [environment variables documentation](/docs/env.md) for more information.
⚠️ For some advanced features (ex: Export as PDF) Docs relies on XL packages from BlockNote. These are licenced under AGPL-3.0 and are not MIT compatible. You can perfectly use Docs without these packages by setting the environment variable `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` to true. That way you'll build an image of the application without the features that are not MIT compatible. Read the [environment variables documentation](/docs/docs/env.md) for more information.
## Getting started 🔧
@@ -102,11 +93,11 @@ The easiest way to start working on the project is to use [GNU Make](https://www
$ make bootstrap FLUSH_ARGS='--no-input'
```
This command builds the `app-dev` and `frontend-dev` containers, installs dependencies, performs database migrations and compiles translations. It's a good idea to use this command each time you are pulling code from the project repository to avoid dependency-related or migration-related issues.
This command builds the `app` container, installs dependencies, performs database migrations and compiles translations. It's a good idea to use this command each time you are pulling code from the project repository to avoid dependency-related or migration-related issues.
Your Docker services should now be up and running 🎉
You can access the project by going to <http://localhost:3000>.
You can access to the project by going to <http://localhost:3000>.
You will be prompted to log in. The default credentials are:
@@ -115,7 +106,7 @@ username: impress
password: impress
```
📝 Note that if you need to run them afterwards, you can use the eponymous Make rule:
📝 Note that if you need to run them afterwards, you can use the eponym Make rule:
```shellscript
$ make run
@@ -141,12 +132,6 @@ To start all the services, except the frontend container, you can use the follow
$ make run-backend
```
To execute frontend tests & linting only
```shellscript
$ make frontend-test
$ make frontend-lint
```
**Adding content**
You can create a basic demo site by running this command:
@@ -177,15 +162,15 @@ $ make superuser
We'd love to hear your thoughts, and hear about your experiments, so come and say hi on [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#docs-official:matrix.org).
## Roadmap 💡
## Roadmap
Want to know where the project is headed? [🗺️ Checkout our roadmap](https://github.com/orgs/numerique-gouv/projects/13/views/11)
## License 📝
## Licence 📝
This work is released under the MIT License (see [LICENSE](https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/blob/main/LICENSE)).
While Docs is a public-driven initiative, our license choice is an invitation for private sector actors to use, sell and contribute to the project.
While Docs is a public-driven initiative, our licence choice is an invitation for private sector actors to use, sell and contribute to the project.
## Contributing 🙌

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ the following command inside your docker container:
## [3.3.0] - 2025-05-22
⚠️ For some advanced features (ex: Export as PDF) Docs relies on XL packages from BlockNote. These are licenced under AGPL-3.0 and are not MIT compatible. You can perfectly use Docs without these packages by setting the environment variable `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` to true. That way you'll build an image of the application without the features that are not MIT compatible. Read the [environment variables documentation](/docs/env.md) for more information.
⚠️ For some advanced features (ex: Export as PDF) Docs relies on XL packages from BlockNote. These are licenced under AGPL-3.0 and are not MIT compatible. You can perfectly use Docs without these packages by setting the environment variable `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` to true. That way you'll build an image of the application without the features that are not MIT compatible. Read the [environment variables documentation](/docs/docs/env.md) for more information.
The footer is now configurable from a customization file. To override the default one, you can
use the `THEME_CUSTOMIZATION_FILE_PATH` environment variable to point to your customization file.

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ REPO_DIR="$(cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )/.." && pwd)"
UNSET_USER=0
TERRAFORM_DIRECTORY="./env.d/terraform"
COMPOSE_FILE="${REPO_DIR}/compose.yml"
COMPOSE_FILE="${REPO_DIR}/docker-compose.yml"
# _set_user: set (or unset) default user id used to run docker commands
@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ function _set_user() {
# options: docker compose command options
# ARGS : docker compose command arguments
function _docker_compose() {
# Set DOCKER_USER for Windows compatibility with MinIO
if [[ "$OSTYPE" == "msys" || "$OSTYPE" == "cygwin" || -n "${WSL_DISTRO_NAME:-}" ]]; then
export DOCKER_USER="0:0"
fi
echo "🐳(compose) file: '${COMPOSE_FILE}'"
docker compose \

15
bin/buildpack_postcompile.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -o errexit # always exit on error
set -o pipefail # don't ignore exit codes when piping output
echo "-----> Running post-compile script"
rm -rf docker docs env.d gitlint src/frontend/apps/e2e
rm -rf src/frontend/apps
rm -rf src/frontend/packages
# Remove some of the larger packages required by the frontend only
rm -rf src/frontend/node_modules/@next src/frontend/node_modules/next src/frontend/node_modules/react-icons src/frontend/node_modules/@gouvfr-lasuite
# du -ch | sort -rh | head -n 100

15
bin/buildpack_postfrontend.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -o errexit # always exit on error
set -o pipefail # don't ignore exit codes when piping output
echo "-----> Running post-frontend script"
# Move the frontend build to the nginx root and clean up
mkdir -p build/
mv src/frontend/apps/impress/out build/frontend-out
mv src/backend/* ./
mv src/nginx/* ./
echo "3.13" > .python-version

18
bin/buildpack_start.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Start the Django backend server
gunicorn -b :8000 impress.wsgi:application --log-file - &
# Start the Y provider service
cd src/frontend/servers/y-provider && PORT=4444 ../../.scalingo/node/bin/node dist/start-server.js &
# Start the Nginx server
bin/run &
# if the current shell is killed, also terminate all its children
trap "pkill SIGTERM -P $$" SIGTERM
# wait for a single child to finish,
wait -n
# then kill all the other tasks
pkill -P $$

View File

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
services:
frontend:
user: "${DOCKER_USER:-1000}"
build:
context: .
dockerfile: ./src/frontend/Dockerfile
target: frontend-production
args:
API_ORIGIN: "http://localhost:8071"
PUBLISH_AS_MIT: "false"
SW_DEACTIVATED: "true"
image: impress:frontend-production
ports:
- "3000:3000"
y-provider:
user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
build:
context: .
dockerfile: ./src/frontend/servers/y-provider/Dockerfile
target: y-provider
image: impress:y-provider-production
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- env.d/development/common
- env.d/development/common.local
ports:
- "4444:4444"

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ services:
retries: 300
env_file:
- env.d/development/postgresql
- env.d/development/postgresql.local
ports:
- "15432:5432"
@@ -67,9 +66,7 @@ services:
- DJANGO_CONFIGURATION=Development
env_file:
- env.d/development/common
- env.d/development/common.local
- env.d/development/postgresql
- env.d/development/postgresql.local
ports:
- "8071:8000"
volumes:
@@ -94,15 +91,47 @@ services:
- DJANGO_CONFIGURATION=Development
env_file:
- env.d/development/common
- env.d/development/common.local
- env.d/development/postgresql
- env.d/development/postgresql.local
volumes:
- ./src/backend:/app
- ./data/static:/data/static
depends_on:
- app-dev
app:
build:
context: .
target: backend-production
args:
DOCKER_USER: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
image: impress:backend-production
environment:
- DJANGO_CONFIGURATION=Demo
env_file:
- env.d/development/common
- env.d/development/postgresql
depends_on:
postgresql:
condition: service_healthy
restart: true
redis:
condition: service_started
minio:
condition: service_started
celery:
user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
image: impress:backend-production
command: ["celery", "-A", "impress.celery_app", "worker", "-l", "INFO"]
environment:
- DJANGO_CONFIGURATION=Demo
env_file:
- env.d/development/common
- env.d/development/postgresql
depends_on:
- app
nginx:
image: nginx:1.25
ports:
@@ -112,25 +141,23 @@ services:
depends_on:
app-dev:
condition: service_started
y-provider:
condition: service_started
keycloak:
condition: service_healthy
restart: true
frontend-development:
frontend:
user: "${DOCKER_USER:-1000}"
build:
context: .
dockerfile: ./src/frontend/Dockerfile
target: impress-dev
target: frontend-production
args:
API_ORIGIN: "http://localhost:8071"
PUBLISH_AS_MIT: "false"
SW_DEACTIVATED: "true"
image: impress:frontend-development
volumes:
- ./src/frontend:/home/frontend
- /home/frontend/node_modules
- /home/frontend/apps/impress/node_modules
ports:
- "3000:3000"
@@ -140,35 +167,28 @@ services:
- ".:/app"
env_file:
- env.d/development/crowdin
- env.d/development/crowdin.local
user: "${DOCKER_USER:-1000}"
working_dir: /app
node:
image: node:22
image: node:18
user: "${DOCKER_USER:-1000}"
environment:
HOME: /tmp
volumes:
- ".:/app"
y-provider-development:
y-provider:
user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
build:
context: .
dockerfile: ./src/frontend/servers/y-provider/Dockerfile
target: y-provider-development
image: impress:y-provider-development
target: y-provider
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- env.d/development/common
- env.d/development/common.local
ports:
- "4444:4444"
volumes:
- ./src/frontend/:/home/frontend
- /home/frontend/node_modules
- /home/frontend/servers/y-provider/node_modules
kc_postgresql:
image: postgres:14.3
@@ -181,7 +201,6 @@ services:
- "5433:5432"
env_file:
- env.d/development/kc_postgresql
- env.d/development/kc_postgresql.local
keycloak:
image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:20.0.1

View File

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
},
{
"username": "user-e2e-chromium",
"email": "user@chromium.test",
"email": "user@chromium.e2e",
"firstName": "E2E",
"lastName": "Chromium",
"enabled": true,
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
},
{
"username": "user-e2e-webkit",
"email": "user@webkit.test",
"email": "user@webkit.e2e",
"firstName": "E2E",
"lastName": "Webkit",
"enabled": true,
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
},
{
"username": "user-e2e-firefox",
"email": "user@firefox.test",
"email": "user@firefox.e2e",
"firstName": "E2E",
"lastName": "Firefox",
"enabled": true,

View File

@@ -6,103 +6,102 @@ Here we describe all environment variables that can be set for the docs applicat
These are the environment variables you can set for the `impress-backend` container.
| Option | Description | default |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AI_ALLOW_REACH_FROM | Users that can use AI must be this level. options are "public", "authenticated", "restricted" | authenticated |
| AI_API_KEY | AI key to be used for AI Base url | |
| AI_BASE_URL | OpenAI compatible AI base url | |
| AI_FEATURE_ENABLED | Enable AI options | false |
| AI_MODEL | AI Model to use | |
| ALLOW_LOGOUT_GET_METHOD | Allow get logout method | true |
| API_USERS_LIST_LIMIT | Limit on API users | 5 |
| API_USERS_LIST_THROTTLE_RATE_BURST | Throttle rate for api on burst | 30/minute |
| API_USERS_LIST_THROTTLE_RATE_SUSTAINED | Throttle rate for api | 180/hour |
| AWS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID | Access id for s3 endpoint | |
| AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL | S3 endpoint | |
| AWS_S3_REGION_NAME | Region name for s3 endpoint | |
| AWS_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY | Access key for s3 endpoint | |
| AWS_STORAGE_BUCKET_NAME | Bucket name for s3 endpoint | impress-media-storage |
| CACHES_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT | Cache default timeout | 30 |
| CACHES_KEY_PREFIX | The prefix used to every cache keys. | docs |
| COLLABORATION_API_URL | Collaboration api host | |
| COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET | Collaboration api secret | |
| COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY | Users not connected to the collaboration server cannot edit | false |
| COLLABORATION_WS_URL | Collaboration websocket url | |
| CONVERSION_API_CONTENT_FIELD | Conversion api content field | content |
| CONVERSION_API_ENDPOINT | Conversion API endpoint | convert |
| CONVERSION_API_SECURE | Require secure conversion api | false |
| CONVERSION_API_TIMEOUT | Conversion api timeout | 30 |
| CRISP_WEBSITE_ID | Crisp website id for support | |
| DB_ENGINE | Engine to use for database connections | django.db.backends.postgresql_psycopg2 |
| DB_HOST | Host of the database | localhost |
| DB_NAME | Name of the database | impress |
| DB_PASSWORD | Password to authenticate with | pass |
| DB_PORT | Port of the database | 5432 |
| DB_USER | User to authenticate with | dinum |
| DJANGO_ALLOWED_HOSTS | Allowed hosts | [] |
| DJANGO_CELERY_BROKER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS | Celery broker transport options | {} |
| DJANGO_CELERY_BROKER_URL | Celery broker url | redis://redis:6379/0 |
| DJANGO_CORS_ALLOW_ALL_ORIGINS | Allow all CORS origins | false |
| DJANGO_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN_REGEXES | List of origins allowed for CORS using regulair expressions | [] |
| DJANGO_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS | List of origins allowed for CORS | [] |
| DJANGO_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS | CSRF trusted origins | [] |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_BACKEND | Email backend library | django.core.mail.backends.smtp.EmailBackend |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_BRAND_NAME | Brand name for email | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_FROM | Email address used as sender | from@example.com |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST | Hostname of email | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD | Password to authenticate with on the email host | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_USER | User to authenticate with on the email host | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_LOGO_IMG | Logo for the email | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_PORT | Port used to connect to email host | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_SSL | Use ssl for email host connection | false |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_TLS | Use tls for email host connection | false |
| DJANGO_SECRET_KEY | Secret key | |
| DJANGO_SERVER_TO_SERVER_API_TOKENS | | [] |
| DOCUMENT_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE | Maximum size of document in bytes | 10485760 |
| FRONTEND_CSS_URL | To add a external css file to the app | |
| FRONTEND_HOMEPAGE_FEATURE_ENABLED | Frontend feature flag to display the homepage | false |
| FRONTEND_THEME | Frontend theme to use | |
| LANGUAGE_CODE | Default language | en-us |
| LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_APP | Application logging level. options are "DEBUG", "INFO", "WARN", "ERROR", "CRITICAL" | INFO |
| LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_ROOT | Default logging level. options are "DEBUG", "INFO", "WARN", "ERROR", "CRITICAL" | INFO |
| LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL | Login redirect url | |
| LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL_FAILURE | Login redirect url on failure | |
| LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL | Logout redirect url | |
| MALWARE_DETECTION_BACKEND | The malware detection backend use from the django-lasuite package | lasuite.malware_detection.backends.dummy.DummyBackend |
| MALWARE_DETECTION_PARAMETERS | A dict containing all the parameters to initiate the malware detection backend | {"callback_path": "core.malware_detection.malware_detection_callback",} |
| MEDIA_BASE_URL | | |
| NO_WEBSOCKET_CACHE_TIMEOUT | Cache used to store current editor session key when only users without websocket are editing a document | 120 |
| OIDC_ALLOW_DUPLICATE_EMAILS | Allow duplicate emails | false |
| OIDC_AUTH_REQUEST_EXTRA_PARAMS | OIDC extra auth parameters | {} |
| OIDC_CREATE_USER | Create used on OIDC | false |
| OIDC_FALLBACK_TO_EMAIL_FOR_IDENTIFICATION | Fallback to email for identification | true |
| OIDC_OP_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT | Authorization endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT | JWKS endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT | Logout endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_TOKEN_ENDPOINT | Token endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_USER_ENDPOINT | User endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS | Allowed hosts for OIDC redirect url | [] |
| OIDC_REDIRECT_REQUIRE_HTTPS | Require https for OIDC redirect url | false |
| OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID | Client id used for OIDC | impress |
| OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET | Client secret used for OIDC | |
| OIDC_RP_SCOPES | Scopes requested for OIDC | openid email |
| OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO | verification algorithm used OIDC tokens | RS256 |
| OIDC_STORE_ID_TOKEN | Store OIDC token | true |
| OIDC_USE_NONCE | Use nonce for OIDC | true |
| OIDC_USERINFO_FULLNAME_FIELDS | OIDC token claims to create full name | ["first_name", "last_name"] |
| OIDC_USERINFO_SHORTNAME_FIELD | OIDC token claims to create shortname | first_name |
| POSTHOG_KEY | Posthog key for analytics | |
| REDIS_URL | Cache url | redis://redis:6379/1 |
| SENTRY_DSN | Sentry host | |
| SESSION_COOKIE_AGE | duration of the cookie session | 60*60*12 |
| SPECTACULAR_SETTINGS_ENABLE_DJANGO_DEPLOY_CHECK | | false |
| STORAGES_STATICFILES_BACKEND | | whitenoise.storage.CompressedManifestStaticFilesStorage |
| THEME_CUSTOMIZATION_CACHE_TIMEOUT | Cache duration for the customization settings | 86400 |
| THEME_CUSTOMIZATION_FILE_PATH | Full path to the file customizing the theme. An example is provided in src/backend/impress/configuration/theme/default.json | BASE_DIR/impress/configuration/theme/default.json |
| TRASHBIN_CUTOFF_DAYS | Trashbin cutoff | 30 |
| USER_OIDC_ESSENTIAL_CLAIMS | Essential claims in OIDC token | [] |
| Y_PROVIDER_API_BASE_URL | Y Provider url | |
| Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY | Y provider API key | |
| Option | Description | default |
| ----------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------- |
| DJANGO_ALLOWED_HOSTS | allowed hosts | [] |
| DJANGO_SECRET_KEY | secret key | |
| DJANGO_SERVER_TO_SERVER_API_TOKENS | | [] |
| DB_ENGINE | engine to use for database connections | django.db.backends.postgresql_psycopg2 |
| DB_NAME | name of the database | impress |
| DB_USER | user to authenticate with | dinum |
| DB_PASSWORD | password to authenticate with | pass |
| DB_HOST | host of the database | localhost |
| DB_PORT | port of the database | 5432 |
| MEDIA_BASE_URL | | |
| STORAGES_STATICFILES_BACKEND | | whitenoise.storage.CompressedManifestStaticFilesStorage |
| AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL | S3 endpoint | |
| AWS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID | access id for s3 endpoint | |
| AWS_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY | access key for s3 endpoint | |
| AWS_S3_REGION_NAME | region name for s3 endpoint | |
| AWS_STORAGE_BUCKET_NAME | bucket name for s3 endpoint | impress-media-storage |
| DOCUMENT_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE | maximum size of document in bytes | 10485760 |
| LANGUAGE_CODE | default language | en-us |
| API_USERS_LIST_THROTTLE_RATE_SUSTAINED | throttle rate for api | 180/hour |
| API_USERS_LIST_THROTTLE_RATE_BURST | throttle rate for api on burst | 30/minute |
| SPECTACULAR_SETTINGS_ENABLE_DJANGO_DEPLOY_CHECK | | false |
| TRASHBIN_CUTOFF_DAYS | trashbin cutoff | 30 |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_BACKEND | email backend library | django.core.mail.backends.smtp.EmailBackend |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_BRAND_NAME | brand name for email | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST | host name of email | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_USER | user to authenticate with on the email host | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD | password to authenticate with on the email host | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_LOGO_IMG | logo for the email | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_PORT | port used to connect to email host | |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_TLS | use tls for email host connection | false |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_SSL | use sstl for email host connection | false |
| DJANGO_EMAIL_FROM | email address used as sender | from@example.com |
| DJANGO_CORS_ALLOW_ALL_ORIGINS | allow all CORS origins | true |
| DJANGO_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS | list of origins allowed for CORS | [] |
| DJANGO_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN_REGEXES | list of origins allowed for CORS using regulair expressions | [] |
| SENTRY_DSN | sentry host | |
| COLLABORATION_API_URL | collaboration api host | |
| COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET | collaboration api secret | |
| COLLABORATION_WS_URL | collaboration websocket url | |
| COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY | Users not connected to the collaboration server cannot edit | false |
| FRONTEND_CSS_URL | To add a external css file to the app | |
| FRONTEND_HOMEPAGE_FEATURE_ENABLED | frontend feature flag to display the homepage | false |
| FRONTEND_THEME | frontend theme to use | |
| POSTHOG_KEY | posthog key for analytics | |
| CRISP_WEBSITE_ID | crisp website id for support | |
| DJANGO_CELERY_BROKER_URL | celery broker url | redis://redis:6379/0 |
| DJANGO_CELERY_BROKER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS | celery broker transport options | {} |
| SESSION_COOKIE_AGE | duration of the cookie session | 60*60*12 |
| OIDC_CREATE_USER | create used on OIDC | false |
| OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO | verification algorithm used OIDC tokens | RS256 |
| OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID | client id used for OIDC | impress |
| OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET | client secret used for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT | JWKS endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT | Authorization endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_TOKEN_ENDPOINT | Token endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_USER_ENDPOINT | User endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT | Logout endpoint for OIDC | |
| OIDC_AUTH_REQUEST_EXTRA_PARAMS | OIDC extra auth parameters | {} |
| OIDC_RP_SCOPES | scopes requested for OIDC | openid email |
| LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL | login redirect url | |
| LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL_FAILURE | login redirect url on failure | |
| LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL | logout redirect url | |
| OIDC_USE_NONCE | use nonce for OIDC | true |
| OIDC_REDIRECT_REQUIRE_HTTPS | Require https for OIDC redirect url | false |
| OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS | Allowed hosts for OIDC redirect url | [] |
| OIDC_STORE_ID_TOKEN | Store OIDC token | true |
| OIDC_FALLBACK_TO_EMAIL_FOR_IDENTIFICATION | faillback to email for identification | true |
| OIDC_ALLOW_DUPLICATE_EMAILS | Allow duplicate emails | false |
| USER_OIDC_ESSENTIAL_CLAIMS | essential claims in OIDC token | [] |
| OIDC_USERINFO_FULLNAME_FIELDS | OIDC token claims to create full name | ["first_name", "last_name"] |
| OIDC_USERINFO_SHORTNAME_FIELD | OIDC token claims to create shortname | first_name |
| ALLOW_LOGOUT_GET_METHOD | Allow get logout method | true |
| AI_API_KEY | AI key to be used for AI Base url | |
| AI_BASE_URL | OpenAI compatible AI base url | |
| AI_MODEL | AI Model to use | |
| AI_ALLOW_REACH_FROM | Users that can use AI must be this level. options are "public", "authenticated", "restricted" | authenticated |
| AI_FEATURE_ENABLED | Enable AI options | false |
| Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY | Y provider API key | |
| Y_PROVIDER_API_BASE_URL | Y Provider url | |
| CONVERSION_API_ENDPOINT | Conversion API endpoint | convert-markdown |
| CONVERSION_API_CONTENT_FIELD | Conversion api content field | content |
| CONVERSION_API_TIMEOUT | Conversion api timeout | 30 |
| CONVERSION_API_SECURE | Require secure conversion api | false |
| LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_ROOT | default logging level. options are "DEBUG", "INFO", "WARN", "ERROR", "CRITICAL" | INFO |
| LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_APP | application logging level. options are "DEBUG", "INFO", "WARN", "ERROR", "CRITICAL" | INFO |
| API_USERS_LIST_LIMIT | Limit on API users | 5 |
| DJANGO_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS | CSRF trusted origins | [] |
| REDIS_URL | cache url | redis://redis:6379/1 |
| CACHES_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT | cache default timeout | 30 |
| CACHES_KEY_PREFIX | The prefix used to every cache keys. | docs |
| MALWARE_DETECTION_BACKEND | The malware detection backend use from the django-lasuite package | lasuite.malware_detection.backends.dummy.DummyBackend |
| MALWARE_DETECTION_PARAMETERS | A dict containing all the parameters to initiate the malware detection backend | {"callback_path": "core.malware_detection.malware_detection_callback",} |
| THEME_CUSTOMIZATION_FILE_PATH | full path to the file customizing the theme. An example is provided in src/backend/impress/configuration/theme/default.json | BASE_DIR/impress/configuration/theme/default.json |
| THEME_CUSTOMIZATION_CACHE_TIMEOUT | Cache duration for the customization settings | 86400 |
## impress-frontend image
@@ -135,11 +134,10 @@ NODE_ENV=production NEXT_PUBLIC_PUBLISH_AS_MIT=false yarn build
| PUBLISH_AS_MIT | Removes packages whose licences are incompatible with the MIT licence (see below) | true |
Packages with licences incompatible with the MIT licence:
* `xl-docx-exporter`: [GPL](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/blob/main/packages/xl-docx-exporter/LICENSE),
* `xl-pdf-exporter`: [GPL](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/blob/main/packages/xl-pdf-exporter/LICENSE),
* `xl-multi-column`: [GPL](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/blob/main/packages/xl-multi-column/LICENSE).
* `xl-docx-exporter`: [AGPL-3.0](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/blob/main/packages/xl-docx-exporter/LICENSE),
* `xl-pdf-exporter`: [AGPL-3.0](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/blob/main/packages/xl-pdf-exporter/LICENSE)
In `.env.development`, `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` is set to `false`, allowing developers to test Docs with all its features.
⚠️ If you run Docs in production with `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` set to `false` make sure you fulfill your BlockNote licensing or [subscription](https://www.blocknotejs.org/about#partner-with-us) obligations.
⚠️ If you run Docs in production with `PUBLISH_AS_MIT` set to `false` make sure you fulfill your [BlockNote licensing](https://github.com/TypeCellOS/BlockNote/blob/main/packages/xl-pdf-exporter/LICENSE) or [subscription](https://www.blocknotejs.org/about#partner-with-us) obligations.

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
services:
postgresql:
image: postgres:16
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -d $${POSTGRES_DB} -U $${POSTGRES_USER}"]
interval: 1s
timeout: 2s
retries: 300
env_file:
- env.d/postgresql
- env.d/common
environment:
- PGDATA=/var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata
volumes:
- ./data/databases/backend:/var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata
redis:
image: redis:8
backend:
image: lasuite/impress-backend:latest
user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
restart: always
environment:
- DJANGO_CONFIGURATION=Production
env_file:
- env.d/common
- env.d/backend
- env.d/yprovider
- env.d/postgresql
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python", "manage.py", "check"]
interval: 15s
timeout: 30s
retries: 20
start_period: 10s
depends_on:
postgresql:
condition: service_healthy
restart: true
redis:
condition: service_started
y-provider:
image: lasuite/impress-y-provider:latest
user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
env_file:
- env.d/common
- env.d/yprovider
frontend:
image: lasuite/impress-frontend:latest
user: "101"
entrypoint:
- /docker-entrypoint.sh
command: ["nginx", "-g", "daemon off;"]
env_file:
- env.d/common
# Uncomment and set your values if using our nginx proxy example
#environment:
# - VIRTUAL_HOST=${DOCS_HOST} # used by nginx proxy
# - VIRTUAL_PORT=8083 # used by nginx proxy
# - LETSENCRYPT_HOST=${DOCS_HOST} # used by lets encrypt to generate TLS certificate
volumes:
- ./default.conf.template:/etc/nginx/templates/docs.conf.template
depends_on:
backend:
condition: service_healthy
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
# networks:
# - proxy-tier
# - default
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
#networks:
# proxy-tier:
# external: true

View File

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
# Deploy and Configure Keycloak for Docs
## Installation
> \[!CAUTION\]
> We provide those instructions as an example, for production environments, you should follow the [official documentation](https://www.keycloak.org/documentation).
### Step 1: Prepare your working environment:
```bash
mkdir keycloak
curl -o keycloak/compose.yaml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/docs/examples/compose/keycloak/compose.yaml
curl -o keycloak/env.d/kc_postgresql https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/env.d/production.dist/kc_postgresql
curl -o keycloak/env.d/keycloak https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/env.d/production.dist/keycloak
```
### Step 2:. Update `env.d/` files
The following variables need to be updated with your own values, others can be left as is:
```env
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<generate postgres password>
KC_HOSTNAME=https://id.yourdomain.tld # Change with your own URL
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<generate your password>
```
### Step 3: Expose keycloak instance on https
> \[!NOTE\]
> You can skip this section if you already have your own setup.
To access your Keycloak instance on the public network, it needs to be exposed on a domain with SSL termination. You can use our [example with nginx proxy and Let's Encrypt companion](../nginx-proxy/README.md) for automated creation/renewal of certificates using [acme.sh](http://acme.sh).
If following our example, uncomment the environment and network sections in compose file and update it with your values.
```yaml
version: '3'
services:
keycloak:
...
# Uncomment and set your values if using our nginx proxy example
# environment:
# - VIRTUAL_HOST=id.yourdomain.tld # used by nginx proxy
# - VIRTUAL_PORT=8080 # used by nginx proxy
# - LETSENCRYPT_HOST=id.yourdomain.tld # used by lets encrypt to generate TLS certificate
...
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
# networks:
# - proxy-tier
# - default
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
#networks:
# proxy-tier:
# external: true
```
### Step 4: Start the service
```bash
`docker compose up -d`
```
Your keycloak instance is now available on https://doc.yourdomain.tld
## Creating an OIDC Client for Docs Application
### Step 1: Create a New Realm
1. Log in to the Keycloak administration console.
2. Navigate to the realm tab and click on the "Create realm" button.
3. Enter the name of the realm - `docs`.
4. Click "Create".
#### Step 2: Create a New Client
1. Navigate to the "Clients" tab.
2. Click on the "Create client" button.
3. Enter the client ID - e.g. `docs`.
4. Enable "Client authentication" option.
6. Set the "Valid redirect URIs" to the URL of your docs application suffixed with `/*` - e.g., "https://docs.example.com/*".
1. Set the "Web Origins" to the URL of your docs application - e.g. `https://docs.example.com`.
1. Click "Save".
#### Step 3: Get Client Credentials
1. Go to the "Credentials" tab.
2. Copy the client ID (`docs` in this example) and the client secret.

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
services:
kc_postgresql:
image: postgres:16
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -d $${POSTGRES_DB} -U $${POSTGRES_USER}"]
interval: 1s
timeout: 2s
retries: 300
env_file:
- env.d/kc_postgresql
volumes:
- ./data/keycloak:/var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata
keycloak:
image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.1.3
command: ["start"]
env_file:
- env.d/kc_postgresql
- env.d/keycloak
# Uncomment and set your values if using our nginx proxy example
# environment:
# - VIRTUAL_HOST=id.yourdomain.tld # used by nginx proxy
# - VIRTUAL_PORT=8080 # used by nginx proxy
# - LETSENCRYPT_HOST=id.yourdomain.tld # used by lets encrypt to generate TLS certificate
depends_on:
kc_postgresql:
condition: service_healthy
restart: true
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
# networks:
# - proxy-tier
# - default
#
#networks:
# proxy-tier:
# external: true

View File

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
# Deploy and Configure Minio for Docs
## Installation
> \[!CAUTION\]
> We provide those instructions as an example, it should not be run in production. For production environments, deploy MinIO [in a Multi-Node Multi-Drive (Distributed)](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/operations/install-deploy-manage/deploy-minio-multi-node-multi-drive.html#minio-mnmd) topology
### Step 1: Prepare your working environment:
```bash
mkdir minio
curl -o minio/compose.yaml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/docs/examples/compose/minio/compose.yaml
```
### Step 2:. Update compose file with your own values
```yaml
version: '3'
services:
minio:
...
environment:
- MINIO_ROOT_USER=<Set minio root username>
- MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=<Set minio root password>
```
### Step 3: Expose MinIO instance
#### Option 1: Internal network
You may not need to expose your MinIO instance to the public if only services hosted on the same private network need to access to your MinIO instance.
You should create a docker network that will be shared between those services
```bash
docker network create storage-tier
```
#### Option 2: Public network
If you want to expose your MinIO instance to the public, it needs to be exposed on a domain with SSL termination. You can use our [example](../nginx-proxy/README.md) with an nginx proxy and Let's Encrypt companion for automated creation/renewal of Let's Encrypt certificates using [acme.sh](http://acme.sh).
If following our example, uncomment the environment and network sections in compose file and update it with your values.
```yaml
version: '3'
services:
docs:
...
minio:
...
environment:
...
# - VIRTUAL_HOST=storage.yourdomain.tld # used by nginx proxy
# - VIRTUAL_PORT=9000 # used by nginx proxy
# - LETSENCRYPT_HOST=storage.yourdomain.tld # used by lets encrypt to generate TLS certificate
...
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
# networks:
# - proxy-tier
# - default
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
#networks:
# proxy-tier:
# external: true
```
In this example we are only exposing MinIO API service. Follow the official documentation to configure Minio WebUI.
### Step 4: Start the service
```bash
`docker compose up -d`
```
Your minio instance is now available on https://storage.yourdomain.tld
## Creating a user and bucket for your Docs instance
### Installing mc
Follow the [official documentation](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/reference/minio-mc.html#install-mc) to install mc
### Step 1: Configure `mc` to connect to your MinIO Server with your root user
```shellscript
mc alias set minio <MINIO_SERVER_URL> <MINIO_ROOT_USER> <MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD>
```
Replace the values with those you have set in the previous steps
### Step 2: Create a new bucket with versioning enabled
```shellscript
mc mb --with-versioning minio/<your-bucket-name>
```
Replace `your-bucket-name` with the desired name for your bucket e.g. `docs-media-storage`
### Additional notes:
For increased security you should create a dedicated user with `readwrite` access to the Bucket. In the following example we will use MinIO root user.

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
services:
minio:
image: minio/minio
environment:
- MINIO_ROOT_USER=<set minio root username>
- MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=<set minio root password>
# Uncomment and set your values if using our nginx proxy example
# - VIRTUAL_HOST=storage.yourdomain.tld # used by nginx proxy
# - VIRTUAL_PORT=9000 # used by nginx proxy
# - LETSENCRYPT_HOST=storage.yourdomain.tld # used by lets encrypt to generate TLS certificate
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "mc", "ready", "local"]
interval: 1s
timeout: 20s
retries: 300
entrypoint: ""
command: minio server /data
volumes:
- ./data/minio:/data
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
# networks:
# - proxy-tier
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
#networks:
# proxy-tier:
# external: true

View File

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
# Nginx proxy with automatic SSL certificates
> \[!CAUTION\]
> We provide those instructions as an example, for extended development or production environments, you should follow the [official documentation](https://github.com/nginx-proxy/acme-companion/tree/main/docs).
Nginx-proxy sets up a container running nginx and docker-gen. docker-gen generates reverse proxy configs for nginx and reloads nginx when containers are started and stopped.
Acme-companion is a lightweight companion container for nginx-proxy. It handles the automated creation, renewal and use of SSL certificates for proxied Docker containers through the ACME protocol.
## Installation
### Step 1: Prepare your working environment:
```bash
mkdir nginx-proxy
curl -o nginx-proxy/compose.yaml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/docs/examples/compose/nginx-proxy/compose.yaml
```
### Step 2: Edit `DEFAULT_EMAIL` in the compose file.
Albeit optional, it is recommended to provide a valid default email address through the `DEFAULT_EMAIL` environment variable, so that Let's Encrypt can warn you about expiring certificates and allow you to recover your account.
### Step 3: Create docker network
Containers need share the same network for auto-discovery.
```bash
docker network create proxy-tier
```
### Step 4: Start service
```bash
docker compose up -d
```
## Usage
Once both nginx-proxy and acme-companion containers are up and running, start any container you want proxied with environment variables `VIRTUAL_HOST` and `LETSENCRYPT_HOST` both set to the domain(s) your proxied container is going to use.

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
services:
nginx-proxy:
image: nginxproxy/nginx-proxy
container_name: nginx-proxy
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- html:/usr/share/nginx/html
- certs:/etc/nginx/certs:ro
- /var/run/docker.sock:/tmp/docker.sock:ro
networks:
- proxy-tier
acme-companion:
image: nginxproxy/acme-companion
container_name: nginx-proxy-acme
environment:
- DEFAULT_EMAIL=mail@yourdomain.tld
volumes_from:
- nginx-proxy
volumes:
- certs:/etc/nginx/certs:rw
- acme:/etc/acme.sh
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
networks:
- proxy-tier
networks:
proxy-tier:
external: true
volumes:
html:
certs:
acme:

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ backend:
OIDC_OP_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/auth
OIDC_OP_TOKEN_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/token
OIDC_OP_USER_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/logout
OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/session/end
OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID: impress
OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET: ThisIsAnExampleKeyForDevPurposeOnly
OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO: RS256
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ backend:
DB_USER: dinum
DB_PASSWORD: pass
DB_PORT: 5432
POSTGRES_DB: impress
POSTGRES_USER: dinum
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: pass
REDIS_URL: redis://default:pass@redis-master:6379/1
AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL: http://minio.impress.svc.cluster.local:9000
AWS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID: root
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ backend:
# Extra volume to manage our local custom CA and avoid to set ssl_verify: false
extraVolumeMounts:
- name: certs
mountPath: /usr/local/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certifi/cacert.pem
mountPath: /usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/certifi/cacert.pem
subPath: cacert.pem
# Extra volume to manage our local custom CA and avoid to set ssl_verify: false
@@ -118,22 +121,6 @@ yProvider:
COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN: https://impress.127.0.0.1.nip.io
COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET: my-secret
Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY: my-secret
COLLABORATION_BACKEND_BASE_URL: https://impress.127.0.0.1.nip.io
NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/cacert.pem
# Mount the certificate so yProvider can establish tls with the backend
extraVolumeMounts:
- name: certs
mountPath: /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/cacert.pem
subPath: cacert.pem
extraVolumes:
- name: certs
configMap:
name: certifi
items:
- key: cacert.pem
path: cacert.pem
posthog:
ingress:
@@ -148,6 +135,9 @@ ingress:
ingressCollaborationWS:
enabled: true
host: impress.127.0.0.1.nip.io
annotations:
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-url: https://impress.127.0.0.1.nip.io/api/v1.0/documents/collaboration-auth/
ingressCollaborationApi:
enabled: true

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ extraDeploy:
},
{
"username": "user-e2e-chromium",
"email": "user@chromium.test",
"email": "user@chromium.e2e",
"firstName": "E2E",
"lastName": "Chromium",
"enabled": "true",
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ extraDeploy:
},
{
"username": "user-e2e-webkit",
"email": "user@webkit.test",
"email": "user@webkit.e2e",
"firstName": "E2E",
"lastName": "Webkit",
"enabled": "true",
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ extraDeploy:
},
{
"username": "user-e2e-firefox",
"email": "user@firefox.test",
"email": "user@firefox.e2e",
"firstName": "E2E",
"lastName": "Firefox",
"enabled": "true",

View File

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol
OIDC_OP_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/auth
OIDC_OP_TOKEN_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/token
OIDC_OP_USER_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/logout
OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT: https://keycloak.127.0.0.1.nip.io/realms/impress/protocol/openid-connect/session/end
OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID: impress
OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET: ThisIsAnExampleKeyForDevPurposeOnly
OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO: RS256
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@ DB_NAME: impress
DB_USER: dinum
DB_PASSWORD: pass
DB_PORT: 5432
POSTGRES_DB: impress
POSTGRES_USER: dinum
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: pass
```
### Find s3 bucket connection values

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# Installation
If you want to install Docs you've come to the right place.
Here are a bunch of resources to help you install the project.
## Kubernetes
We (Docs maintainers) are only using the Kubernetes deployment method in production. We can only provide advanced support for this method.
Please follow the instructions laid out [here](/docs/installation/kubernetes.md).
## Docker Compose
We are aware that not everyone has Kubernetes Cluster laying around 😆.
We also provide [Docker images](https://hub.docker.com/u/lasuite?page=1&search=impress) that you can deploy using Compose.
Please follow the instructions [here](/docs/installation/compose.md).
⚠️ Please keep in mind that we do not use it ourselves in production. Let us know in the issues if you run into troubles, we'll try to help.
## Other ways to install Docs
Community members have contributed several other ways to install Docs. While we owe them a big thanks 🙏, please keep in mind we (Docs maintainers) can't provide support on these installation methods as we don't use them ourselves and there are two many options out there for us to keep track of. Of course you can contact the contributors and the broader community for assistance.
Here is the list of other methods in alphabetical order:
- Coop-Cloud: [code](https://git.coopcloud.tech/coop-cloud/lasuite-docs)
- Nix: [Packages](https://search.nixos.org/packages?channel=unstable&query=lasuite-docs), ⚠️ unstable
- Podman: [code][https://codeberg.org/philo/lasuite-docs-podman], ⚠️ experimental
- YunoHost: [code](https://github.com/YunoHost-Apps/lasuite-docs_ynh), [app store](https://apps.yunohost.org/app/lasuite-docs)
Feel free to make a PR to add ones that are not listed above 🙏
## Cloud providers
Some cloud providers are making it easy to deploy Docs on their infrastructure.
Here is the list in alphabetical order:
- Clever Cloud 🇫🇷 : [market place][https://www.clever-cloud.com/product/docs/], [technical doc](https://www.clever.cloud/developers/guides/docs/#deploy-docs)
Feel free to make a PR to add ones that are not listed above 🙏

View File

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
# Installation with docker compose
We provide a sample configuration for running Docs using Docker Compose. Please note that this configuration is experimental, and the official way to deploy Docs in production is to use [k8s](../installation/kubernetes.md)
## Requirements
- A modern version of Docker and its Compose plugin.
- A domain name and DNS configured to your server.
- An Identity Provider that supports OpenID Connect protocol - we provide [an example to deploy Keycloak](../examples/compose/keycloak/README.md).
- An Object Storage that implements S3 API - we provide [an example to deploy Minio](../examples/compose/minio/README.md).
- A Postgresql database - we provide [an example in the compose file](../examples/compose/compose.yaml).
- A Redis database - we provide [an example in the compose file](../examples/compose/compose.yaml).
## Software Requirements
Ensure you have Docker Compose(v2) installed on your host server. Follow the official guidelines for a reliable setup:
Docker Compose is included with Docker Engine:
- **Docker Engine:** We suggest adhering to the instructions provided by Docker
for [installing Docker Engine](https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/).
For older versions of Docker Engine that do not include Docker Compose:
- **Docker Compose:** Install it as per the [official documentation](https://docs.docker.com/compose/install/).
> [!NOTE]
> `docker-compose` may not be supported. You are advised to use `docker compose` instead.
## Step 1: Prepare your working environment:
```bash
mkdir -p docs/env.d
cd docs
curl -o compose.yaml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/docs/examples/compose/compose.yaml
curl -o env.d/common https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/env.d/production.dist/common
curl -o env.d/backend https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/env.d/production.dist/backend
curl -o env.d/yprovider https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/env.d/production.dist/yprovider
curl -o env.d/postgresql https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/env.d/production.dist/postgresql
```
If you are using the sample nginx-proxy configuration:
```bash
curl -o default.conf.template https://raw.githubusercontent.com/suitenumerique/docs/refs/heads/main/docker/files/production/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf.template
```
## Step 2: Configuration
Docs configuration is achieved through environment variables. We provide a [detailed description of all variables](../env.md).
In this example, we assume the following services:
- OIDC provider on https://id.yourdomain.tld
- Object Storage on https://storage.yourdomain.tld
- Docs on https://docs.yourdomain.tld
- Bucket name is docs-media-storage
**Set your own values in `env.d/common`**
### OIDC
Authentication in Docs is managed through Open ID Connect protocol. A functional Identity Provider implementing this protocol is required.
For guidance, refer to our [Keycloak deployment example](../examples/compose/keycloak/README.md).
If using Keycloak as your Identity Provider, set `OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID` and `OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET` variables with those of the OIDC client created for Docs. By default we have set `docs` as the realm name, if you have named your realm differently, update the value `REALM_NAME` in `env.d/common`
For others OIDC providers, update the variables in `env.d/backend`.
### Object Storage
Files and media are stored in an Object Store that supports the S3 API.
For guidance, refer to our [Minio deployment example](../examples/compose/minio/README.md).
Set `AWS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID` and `AWS_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` with the credentials of a user with `readwrite` access to the bucket created for Docs.
### Postgresql
Docs uses PostgreSQL as its database. Although an external PostgreSQL can be used, our example provides a deployment method.
If you are using the example provided, you need to generate a secure key for `DB_PASSWORD` and set it in `env.d/postgresql`.
If you are using an external service or not using our default values, you should update the variables in `env.d/postgresql`
### Redis
Docs uses Redis for caching. While an external Redis can be used, our example provides a deployment method.
If you are using an external service, you need to set `REDIS_URL` environment variable in `env.d/backend`.
### Y Provider
The Y provider service enables collaboration through websockets.
Generates a secure key for `Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY` and `COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET` in ``env.d/yprovider``.
### Docs
The Docs backend is built on the Django Framework.
Generates a secure key for `DJANGO_SECRET_KEY` in `env.d/backend`.
### Logging
Update the following variables in `env.d/backend` if you want to change the logging levels:
```env
LOGGING_LEVEL_HANDLERS_CONSOLE=DEBUG
LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_ROOT=DEBUG
LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_APP=DEBUG
```
### Mail
The following environment variables are required in `env.d/backend` for the mail service to send invitations :
```env
DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST=<smtp host>
DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_USER=<smtp user>
DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD=<smtp password>
DJANGO_EMAIL_PORT=<smtp port>
DJANGO_EMAIL_FROM=<your email address>
#DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_TLS=true # A flag to enable or disable TLS for email sending.
#DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_SSL=true # A flag to enable or disable SSL for email sending.
DJANGO_EMAIL_BRAND_NAME=<brand name used in email templates> # e.g. "La Suite Numérique"
DJANGO_EMAIL_LOGO_IMG=<logo image to use in email templates.> # e.g. "https://docs.yourdomain.tld/assets/logo-suite-numerique.png"
```
### AI
Built-in AI actions let users generate, summarize, translate, and correct content.
AI is disabled by default. To enable it, the following environment variables must be set in in `env.d/backend`:
```env
AI_FEATURE_ENABLED=true # is false by default
AI_BASE_URL=https://openaiendpoint.com
AI_API_KEY=<API key>
AI_MODEL=<model used> e.g. llama
```
### Frontend theme
You can [customize your Docs instance](../theming.md) with your own theme and custom css.
The following environment variables must be set in `env.d/backend`:
```env
FRONTEND_THEME=default # name of your theme built with cuningham
FRONTEND_CSS_URL=https://storage.yourdomain.tld/themes/custom.css # custom css
```
## Step 3: Reverse proxy and SSL/TLS
> [!WARNING]
> In a production environment, configure SSL/TLS termination to run your instance on https.
If you have your own certificates and proxy setup, you can skip this part.
You can follow our [nginx proxy example](../examples/compose/nginx-proxy/README.md) with automatic generation and renewal of certificate with Let's Encrypt.
You will need to uncomment the environment and network sections in compose file and update it with your values.
```yaml
frontend:
...
# Uncomment and set your values if using our nginx proxy example
#environment:
# - VIRTUAL_HOST=${DOCS_HOST} # used by nginx proxy
# - VIRTUAL_PORT=8083 # used by nginx proxy
# - LETSENCRYPT_HOST=${DOCS_HOST} # used by lets encrypt to generate TLS certificate
...
# Uncomment if using our nginx proxy example
# networks:
# - proxy-tier
#
#networks:
# proxy-tier:
# external: true
```
## Step 4: Start Docs
You are ready to start your Docs application !
```bash
docker compose up -d
```
> [!NOTE]
> Version of the images are set to latest, you should pin it to the desired version to avoid unwanted upgrades when pulling latest image.
## Step 5: Run the database migration and create Django admin user
```bash
docker compose run --rm backend python manage.py migrate
docker compose run --rm backend python manage.py createsuperuser --email <admin email> --password <admin password>
```
Replace `<admin email>` with the email of your admin user and generate a secure password.
Your docs instance is now available on the domain you defined, https://docs.yourdomain.tld.
THe admin interface is available on https://docs.yourdomain.tld/admin with the admin user you just created.
## How to upgrade your Docs application
Before running an upgrade you must check the [Upgrade document](../../UPGRADE.md) for specific procedures that might be needed.
You can also check the [Changelog](../../CHANGELOG.md) for brief summary of the changes.
### Step 1: Edit the images tag with the desired version
### Step 2: Pull the images
```bash
docker compose pull
```
### Step 3: Restart your containers
```bash
docker compose restart
```
### Step 4: Run the database migration
Your database schema may need to be updated, run:
```bash
docker compose run --rm backend python manage.py migrate
```

View File

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
# La Suite Docs System & Requirements (2025-06)
## 1. Quick-Reference Matrix (single VM / laptop)
| Scenario | RAM | vCPU | SSD | Notes |
| ------------------------- | ----- | ---- | ------- | ------------------------- |
| **Solo dev** | 8 GB | 4 | 15 GB | Hot-reload + one IDE |
| **Team QA** | 16 GB | 6 | 30 GB | Runs integration tests |
| **Prod ≤ 100 live users** | 32 GB | 8 + | 50 GB + | Scale linearly above this |
Memory is the first bottleneck; CPU matters only when Celery or the Next.js build is saturated.
> **Note:** Memory consumption varies by operating system. Windows tends to be more memory-hungry than Linux, so consider adding 10-20% extra RAM when running on Windows compared to Linux-based systems.
## 2. Development Environment Memory Requirements
| Service | Typical use | Rationale / source |
| ------------------------ | ----------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| PostgreSQL | **1 2 GB** | `shared_buffers` starting point ≈ 25% RAM ([postgresql.org][1]) |
| Keycloak | **≈ 1.3 GB** | 70% of limit for heap + ~300 MB non-heap ([keycloak.org][2]) |
| Redis | **≤ 256 MB** | Empty instance ≈ 3 MB; budget 256 MB to allow small datasets ([stackoverflow.com][3]) |
| MinIO | **2 GB (dev) / 32 GB (prod)**| Pre-allocates 12 GiB; docs recommend 32 GB per host for ≤ 100 Ti storage ([min.io][4]) |
| Django API (+ Celery) | **0.8 1.5 GB** | Empirical in-house metrics |
| Next.js frontend | **0.5 1 GB** | Dev build chain |
| Y-Provider (y-websocket) | **< 200 MB** | Large 40 MB YDoc called “big” in community thread ([discuss.yjs.dev][5]) |
| Nginx | **< 100 MB** | Static reverse-proxy footprint |
[1]: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.1/runtime-config-resource.html "PostgreSQL: Documentation: 9.1: Resource Consumption"
[2]: https://www.keycloak.org/high-availability/concepts-memory-and-cpu-sizing "Concepts for sizing CPU and memory resources - Keycloak"
[3]: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/45233052/memory-footprint-for-redis-empty-instance "Memory footprint for Redis empty instance - Stack Overflow"
[4]: https://min.io/docs/minio/kubernetes/upstream/operations/checklists/hardware.html "Hardware Checklist — MinIO Object Storage for Kubernetes"
[5]: https://discuss.yjs.dev/t/understanding-memory-requirements-for-production-usage/198 "Understanding memory requirements for production usage - Yjs Community"
> **Rule of thumb:** add 2 GB for OS/overhead, then sum only the rows you actually run.
## 3. Production Environment Memory Requirements
Production deployments differ significantly from development environments. The table below shows typical memory usage for production services:
| Service | Typical use | Rationale / notes |
| ------------------------ | ----------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| PostgreSQL | **2 8 GB** | Higher `shared_buffers` and connection pooling for concurrent users |
| OIDC Provider (optional) | **Variable** | Any OIDC-compatible provider (Keycloak, Auth0, Azure AD, etc.) - external or self-hosted |
| Redis | **256 MB 2 GB** | Session storage and caching; scales with active user sessions |
| Object Storage (optional)| **External or self-hosted** | Can use AWS S3, Azure Blob, Google Cloud Storage, or self-hosted MinIO |
| Django API (+ Celery) | **1 3 GB** | Production workloads with background tasks and higher concurrency |
| Static Files (Nginx) | **< 200 MB** | Serves Next.js build output and static assets; no development overhead |
| Y-Provider (y-websocket) | **200 MB 1 GB** | Scales with concurrent document editing sessions |
| Nginx (Load Balancer) | **< 200 MB** | Reverse proxy, SSL termination, static file serving |
### Production Architecture Notes
- **Frontend**: Uses pre-built Next.js static assets served by Nginx (no Node.js runtime needed)
- **Authentication**: Any OIDC-compatible provider can be used instead of self-hosted Keycloak
- **Object Storage**: External services (S3, Azure Blob) or self-hosted solutions (MinIO) are both viable
- **Database**: Consider PostgreSQL clustering or managed database services for high availability
- **Scaling**: Horizontal scaling is recommended for Django API and Y-Provider services
### Minimal Production Setup (Core Services Only)
| Service | Memory | Notes |
| ------------------------ | --------- | --------------------------------------- |
| PostgreSQL | **2 GB** | Core database |
| Django API (+ Celery) | **1.5 GB**| Backend services |
| Y-Provider | **200 MB**| Real-time collaboration |
| Nginx | **100 MB**| Static files + reverse proxy |
| Redis | **256 MB**| Session storage |
| **Total (without auth/storage)** | **≈ 4 GB** | External OIDC + object storage assumed |
## 4. Recommended Software Versions
| Tool | Minimum |
| ----------------------- | ------- |
| Docker Engine / Desktop | 24.0 |
| Docker Compose | v2 |
| Git | 2.40 |
| **Node.js** | 22+ |
| **Python** | 3.13+ |
| GNU Make | 4.4 |
| Kind | 0.22 |
| Helm | 3.14 |
| kubectl | 1.29 |
| mkcert | 1.4 |
## 5. Ports (dev defaults)
| Port | Service |
| --------- | --------------------- |
| 3000 | Next.js |
| 8071 | Django |
| 4444 | Y-Provider |
| 8080 | Keycloak |
| 8083 | Nginx proxy |
| 9000/9001 | MinIO |
| 15432 | PostgreSQL (main) |
| 5433 | PostgreSQL (Keycloak) |
| 1081 | MailCatcher |
## 6. Sizing Guidelines
**RAM** start at 8 GB dev / 16 GB staging / 32 GB prod. Postgres and Keycloak are the first to OOM; scale them first.
> **OS considerations:** Windows systems typically require 10-20% more RAM than Linux due to higher OS overhead. Docker Desktop on Windows also uses additional memory compared to native Linux Docker.
**CPU** budget one vCPU per busy container until Celery or Next.js builds saturate.
**Disk** SSD; add 10 GB extra for the Docker layer cache.
**MinIO** for demos, mount a local folder instead of running MinIO to save 2 GB+ of RAM.

View File

@@ -53,18 +53,4 @@ Below is a visual example of a configured footer ⬇️:
![Footer Configuration Example](./assets/footer-configurable.png)
----
# **Custom Translations** 📝
The translations can be partially overridden from the theme customization file.
### Settings 🔧
```shellscript
THEME_CUSTOMIZATION_FILE_PATH=<path>
```
### Example of JSON
The json must follow some rules: https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/blob/main/src/helm/env.d/dev/configuration/theme/demo.json

View File

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
# Troubleshooting Guide
## Line Ending Issues on Windows (LF/CRLF)
### Problem Description
This project uses **LF (Line Feed: `\n`) line endings** exclusively. Windows users may encounter issues because:
- **Windows** defaults to CRLF (Carriage Return + Line Feed: `\r\n`) for line endings
- **This project** uses LF line endings for consistency across all platforms
- **Git** may automatically convert line endings, causing conflicts or build failures
### Common Symptoms
- Git shows files as modified even when no changes were made
- Error messages like "warning: LF will be replaced by CRLF"
- Build failures or linting errors due to line ending mismatches
### Solutions for Windows Users
#### Configure Git to Preserve LF (Recommended)
Configure Git to NOT convert line endings and preserve LF:
```bash
git config core.autocrlf false
git config core.eol lf
```
This tells Git to:
- Never convert line endings automatically
- Always use LF for line endings in working directory
#### Fix Existing Repository with Wrong Line Endings
If you already have CRLF line endings in your local repository, the **best approach** is to configure Git properly and clone the project again:
1. **Configure Git first**:
```bash
git config --global core.autocrlf false
git config --global core.eol lf
```
2. **Clone the project fresh** (recommended):
```bash
# Navigate to parent directory
cd ..
# Remove current repository (backup your changes first!)
rm -rf docs
# Clone again with correct line endings
git clone git@github.com:suitenumerique/docs.git
```
**Alternative**: If you have uncommitted changes and cannot re-clone:
1. **Backup your changes**:
```bash
git add .
git commit -m "Save changes before fixing line endings"
```
2. **Remove all files from Git's index**:
```bash
git rm --cached -r .
```
3. **Reset Git configuration** (if not done globally):
```bash
git config core.autocrlf false
git config core.eol lf
```
4. **Re-add all files** (Git will use LF line endings):
```bash
git add .
```
5. **Commit the changes**:
```bash
git commit -m "✏️(project) Fix line endings to LF"
```
## Frontend File Watching Issues on Windows
### Problem Description
Windows users may experience issues with file watching in the frontend-development container. This typically happens because:
- **Docker on Windows** has known limitations with file change detection
- **Node.js file watchers** may not detect changes properly on Windows filesystem
- **Hot reloading** fails to trigger when files are modified
### Common Symptoms
- Changes to frontend code aren't detected automatically
- Hot module replacement doesn't work as expected
- Need to manually restart the frontend container after code changes
- Console shows no reaction when saving files
### Solution: Enable WATCHPACK_POLLING
Add the `WATCHPACK_POLLING=true` environment variable to the frontend-development service in your local environment:
1. **Modify the `compose.yml` file** by adding the environment variable to the frontend-development service:
```yaml
frontend-development:
user: "${DOCKER_USER:-1000}"
build:
context: .
dockerfile: ./src/frontend/Dockerfile
target: impress-dev
args:
API_ORIGIN: "http://localhost:8071"
PUBLISH_AS_MIT: "false"
SW_DEACTIVATED: "true"
image: impress:frontend-development
environment:
- WATCHPACK_POLLING=true # Add this line for Windows users
volumes:
- ./src/frontend:/home/frontend
- /home/frontend/node_modules
- /home/frontend/apps/impress/node_modules
ports:
- "3000:3000"
```
2. **Restart your containers**:
```bash
make run
```
### Why This Works
- `WATCHPACK_POLLING=true` forces the file watcher to use polling instead of filesystem events
- Polling periodically checks for file changes rather than relying on OS-level file events
- This is more reliable on Windows but slightly increases CPU usage
- Changes to your frontend code should now be detected properly, enabling hot reloading
### Note
This setting is primarily needed for Windows users. Linux and macOS users typically don't need this setting as file watching works correctly by default on those platforms.

View File

@@ -56,13 +56,8 @@ AI_API_KEY=password
AI_MODEL=llama
# Collaboration
COLLABORATION_API_URL=http://y-provider-development:4444/collaboration/api/
COLLABORATION_API_URL=http://y-provider:4444/collaboration/api/
COLLABORATION_BACKEND_BASE_URL=http://app-dev:8000
COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN=http://localhost:3000
COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET=my-secret
COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY=true
COLLABORATION_WS_URL=ws://localhost:4444/collaboration/ws/
DJANGO_SERVER_TO_SERVER_API_TOKENS=server-api-token
Y_PROVIDER_API_BASE_URL=http://y-provider-development:4444/api/
Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY=yprovider-api-key

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# For the CI job test-e2e
BURST_THROTTLE_RATES="200/minute"
COLLABORATION_API_URL=http://y-provider:4444/collaboration/api/
DJANGO_SERVER_TO_SERVER_API_TOKENS=test-e2e
SUSTAINED_THROTTLE_RATES="200/hour"
Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY=yprovider-api-key
Y_PROVIDER_API_BASE_URL=http://y-provider:4444/api/

View File

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
## Django
DJANGO_ALLOWED_HOSTS=${DOCS_HOST}
DJANGO_SECRET_KEY=<generate a random key>
DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE=impress.settings
DJANGO_CONFIGURATION=Production
# Logging
# Set to DEBUG level for dev only
LOGGING_LEVEL_HANDLERS_CONSOLE=ERROR
LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_ROOT=INFO
LOGGING_LEVEL_LOGGERS_APP=INFO
# Python
PYTHONPATH=/app
# Mail
DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST=<smtp host>
DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_USER=<smtp user>
DJANGO_EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD=<smtp password>
DJANGO_EMAIL_PORT=<smtp port>
DJANGO_EMAIL_FROM=<your email address>
#DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_TLS=true # A flag to enable or disable TLS for email sending.
#DJANGO_EMAIL_USE_SSL=true # A flag to enable or disable SSL for email sending.
DJANGO_EMAIL_BRAND_NAME="La Suite Numérique"
DJANGO_EMAIL_LOGO_IMG="https://${DOCS_HOST}/assets/logo-suite-numerique.png"
# Media
AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL=https://${S3_HOST}
AWS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<s3 access key>
AWS_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<s3 secret key>
AWS_STORAGE_BUCKET_NAME=${BUCKET_NAME}
MEDIA_BASE_URL=https://${DOCS_HOST}
# OIDC
OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT=https://${KEYCLOAK_HOST}/realms/${REALM_NAME}/protocol/openid-connect/certs
OIDC_OP_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT=https://${KEYCLOAK_HOST}/realms/${REALM_NAME}/protocol/openid-connect/auth
OIDC_OP_TOKEN_ENDPOINT=https://${KEYCLOAK_HOST}/realms/${REALM_NAME}/protocol/openid-connect/token
OIDC_OP_USER_ENDPOINT=https://${KEYCLOAK_HOST}/realms/${REALM_NAME}/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
OIDC_OP_LOGOUT_ENDPOINT=https://${KEYCLOAK_HOST}/realms/${REALM_NAME}/protocol/openid-connect/logout
OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID=<client_id>
OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET=<client secret>
OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO=RS256
OIDC_RP_SCOPES="openid email"
#OIDC_USERINFO_SHORTNAME_FIELD
#OIDC_USERINFO_FULLNAME_FIELDS
LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL=https://${DOCS_HOST}
LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL_FAILURE=https://${DOCS_HOST}
LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL=https://${DOCS_HOST}
OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS=["https://${DOCS_HOST}"]
# AI
#AI_FEATURE_ENABLED=true # is false by default
#AI_BASE_URL=https://openaiendpoint.com
#AI_API_KEY=<API key>
#AI_MODEL=<model used> e.g. llama
# Frontend
#FRONTEND_THEME=mytheme
#FRONTEND_CSS_URL=https://storage.yourdomain.tld/themes/custom.css
#FRONTEND_FOOTER_FEATURE_ENABLED=true
#FRONTEND_URL_JSON_FOOTER=https://docs.domain.tld/contents/footer-demo.json

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
DOCS_HOST=docs.domain.tld
KEYCLOAK_HOST=id.domain.tld
S3_HOST=storage.domain.tld
BACKEND_HOST=backend
FRONTEND_HOST=frontend
YPROVIDER_HOST=y-provider
BUCKET_NAME=docs-media-storage
REALM_NAME=docs
#COLLABORATION_WS_URL=wss://${DOCS_HOST}/collaboration/ws/

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# Postgresql db container configuration
POSTGRES_DB=keycloak
POSTGRES_USER=keycloak
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<generate postgres password>
PGDATA=/var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata
# Keycloak postgresql configuration
KC_DB=postgres
KC_DB_SCHEMA=public
KC_DB_HOST=postgresql
KC_DB_NAME=${POSTGRES_DB}
KC_DB_USER=${POSTGRES_USER}
KC_DB_PASSWORD=${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# Keycloak admin user
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<generate your password>
# Keycloak configuration
KC_HOSTNAME=https://id.yourdomain.tld # Change with your own URL
KC_PROXY_HEADERS=xforwarded # in this example we are running behind an nginx proxy
KC_HTTP_ENABLED=true # in this example we are running behind an nginx proxy

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# App database configuration
DB_HOST=postgresql
DB_NAME=docs
DB_USER=docs
DB_PASSWORD=<generate a secure password>
DB_PORT=5432
# Postgresql db container configuration
POSTGRES_DB=docs
POSTGRES_USER=docs
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD}

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
Y_PROVIDER_API_BASE_URL=http://${YPROVIDER_HOST}:4444/api/
Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY=<generate a random key>
COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET=<generate a random key>
COLLABORATION_SERVER_ORIGIN=https://${DOCS_HOST}
COLLABORATION_API_URL=https://${DOCS_HOST}/collaboration/api/
COLLABORATION_BACKEND_BASE_URL=https://${DOCS_HOST}
COLLABORATION_LOGGING=true

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
{
"extends": ["github>numerique-gouv/renovate-configuration"],
"dependencyDashboard": true,
"labels": ["dependencies", "noChangeLog", "automated"],
"schedule": ["before 7am on monday"],
"prCreation": "not-pending",
"rebaseWhen": "conflicted",
"updateNotScheduled": false,
"labels": ["dependencies", "noChangeLog"],
"packageRules": [
{
"enabled": false,
@@ -13,6 +9,12 @@
"matchManagers": ["pep621"],
"matchPackageNames": []
},
{
"groupName": "allowed django versions",
"matchManagers": ["pep621"],
"matchPackageNames": ["Django"],
"allowedVersions": "<5.2"
},
{
"groupName": "allowed redis versions",
"matchManagers": ["pep621"],
@@ -26,7 +28,6 @@
"matchPackageNames": [
"@hocuspocus/provider",
"@hocuspocus/server",
"docx",
"eslint",
"fetch-mock",
"node",

View File

@@ -60,9 +60,6 @@ class ListDocumentFilter(DocumentFilter):
is_creator_me = django_filters.BooleanFilter(
method="filter_is_creator_me", label=_("Creator is me")
)
is_masked = django_filters.BooleanFilter(
method="filter_is_masked", label=_("Masked")
)
is_favorite = django_filters.BooleanFilter(
method="filter_is_favorite", label=_("Favorite")
)
@@ -109,22 +106,3 @@ class ListDocumentFilter(DocumentFilter):
return queryset
return queryset.filter(is_favorite=bool(value))
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def filter_is_masked(self, queryset, name, value):
"""
Filter documents based on whether they are masked by the current user.
Example:
- /api/v1.0/documents/?is_masked=true
→ Filters documents marked as masked by the logged-in user
- /api/v1.0/documents/?is_masked=false
→ Filters documents not marked as masked by the logged-in user
"""
user = self.request.user
if not user.is_authenticated:
return queryset
queryset_method = queryset.filter if bool(value) else queryset.exclude
return queryset_method(link_traces__user=user, link_traces__is_masked=True)

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from django.http import Http404
from rest_framework import permissions
from core import choices
from core.models import DocumentAccess, RoleChoices, get_trashbin_cutoff
ACTION_FOR_METHOD_TO_PERMISSION = {
@@ -97,27 +96,26 @@ class CanCreateInvitationPermission(permissions.BasePermission):
).exists()
class ResourceWithAccessPermission(permissions.BasePermission):
"""A permission class for templates and invitations."""
class AccessPermission(permissions.BasePermission):
"""Permission class for access objects."""
def has_permission(self, request, view):
"""check create permission for templates."""
return request.user.is_authenticated or view.action != "create"
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
"""Check permission for a given object."""
abilities = obj.get_abilities(request.user)
action = view.action
try:
action = ACTION_FOR_METHOD_TO_PERMISSION[view.action][request.method]
except KeyError:
pass
return abilities.get(action, False)
class DocumentPermission(permissions.BasePermission):
class DocumentAccessPermission(AccessPermission):
"""Subclass to handle soft deletion specificities."""
def has_permission(self, request, view):
"""check create permission for documents."""
return request.user.is_authenticated or view.action != "create"
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
"""
Return a 404 on deleted documents
@@ -129,45 +127,10 @@ class DocumentPermission(permissions.BasePermission):
) and deleted_at < get_trashbin_cutoff():
raise Http404
abilities = obj.get_abilities(request.user)
action = view.action
try:
action = ACTION_FOR_METHOD_TO_PERMISSION[view.action][request.method]
except KeyError:
pass
has_permission = abilities.get(action, False)
# Compute permission first to ensure the "user_roles" attribute is set
has_permission = super().has_object_permission(request, view, obj)
if obj.ancestors_deleted_at and not RoleChoices.OWNER in obj.user_roles:
raise Http404
return has_permission
class ResourceAccessPermission(IsAuthenticated):
"""Permission class for document access objects."""
def has_permission(self, request, view):
"""check create permission for accesses in documents tree."""
if super().has_permission(request, view) is False:
return False
if view.action == "create":
role = getattr(view, view.resource_field_name).get_role(request.user)
if role not in choices.PRIVILEGED_ROLES:
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"You are not allowed to manage accesses for this resource."
)
return True
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
"""Check permission for a given object."""
abilities = obj.get_abilities(request.user)
requested_role = request.data.get("role")
if requested_role and requested_role not in abilities.get("set_role_to", []):
return False
action = view.action
return abilities.get(action, False)

View File

@@ -7,13 +7,12 @@ from base64 import b64decode
from django.conf import settings
from django.db.models import Q
from django.utils.functional import lazy
from django.utils.text import slugify
from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _
import magic
from rest_framework import serializers
from rest_framework import exceptions, serializers
from core import choices, enums, models, utils, validators
from core import enums, models, utils
from core.services.ai_services import AI_ACTIONS
from core.services.converter_services import (
ConversionError,
@@ -33,54 +32,134 @@ class UserSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
class UserLightSerializer(UserSerializer):
"""Serialize users with limited fields."""
full_name = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
short_name = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
id = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
email = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
def get_id(self, _user):
"""Return always None. Here to have the same fields than in UserSerializer."""
return None
def get_email(self, _user):
"""Return always None. Here to have the same fields than in UserSerializer."""
return None
class Meta:
model = models.User
fields = ["full_name", "short_name"]
read_only_fields = ["full_name", "short_name"]
def get_full_name(self, instance):
"""Return the full name of the user."""
if not instance.full_name:
email = instance.email.split("@")[0]
return slugify(email)
return instance.full_name
def get_short_name(self, instance):
"""Return the short name of the user."""
if not instance.short_name:
email = instance.email.split("@")[0]
return slugify(email)
return instance.short_name
fields = ["id", "email", "full_name", "short_name"]
read_only_fields = ["id", "email", "full_name", "short_name"]
class TemplateAccessSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
class BaseAccessSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"""Serialize template accesses."""
abilities = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
def update(self, instance, validated_data):
"""Make "user" field is readonly but only on update."""
validated_data.pop("user", None)
return super().update(instance, validated_data)
def get_abilities(self, access) -> dict:
"""Return abilities of the logged-in user on the instance."""
request = self.context.get("request")
if request:
return access.get_abilities(request.user)
return {}
def validate(self, attrs):
"""
Check access rights specific to writing (create/update)
"""
request = self.context.get("request")
user = getattr(request, "user", None)
role = attrs.get("role")
# Update
if self.instance:
can_set_role_to = self.instance.get_abilities(user)["set_role_to"]
if role and role not in can_set_role_to:
message = (
f"You are only allowed to set role to {', '.join(can_set_role_to)}"
if can_set_role_to
else "You are not allowed to set this role for this template."
)
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(message)
# Create
else:
try:
resource_id = self.context["resource_id"]
except KeyError as exc:
raise exceptions.ValidationError(
"You must set a resource ID in kwargs to create a new access."
) from exc
if not self.Meta.model.objects.filter( # pylint: disable=no-member
Q(user=user) | Q(team__in=user.teams),
role__in=[models.RoleChoices.OWNER, models.RoleChoices.ADMIN],
**{self.Meta.resource_field_name: resource_id}, # pylint: disable=no-member
).exists():
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"You are not allowed to manage accesses for this resource."
)
if (
role == models.RoleChoices.OWNER
and not self.Meta.model.objects.filter( # pylint: disable=no-member
Q(user=user) | Q(team__in=user.teams),
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
**{self.Meta.resource_field_name: resource_id}, # pylint: disable=no-member
).exists()
):
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"Only owners of a resource can assign other users as owners."
)
# pylint: disable=no-member
attrs[f"{self.Meta.resource_field_name}_id"] = self.context["resource_id"]
return attrs
class DocumentAccessSerializer(BaseAccessSerializer):
"""Serialize document accesses."""
user_id = serializers.PrimaryKeyRelatedField(
queryset=models.User.objects.all(),
write_only=True,
source="user",
required=False,
allow_null=True,
)
user = UserSerializer(read_only=True)
class Meta:
model = models.DocumentAccess
resource_field_name = "document"
fields = ["id", "user", "user_id", "team", "role", "abilities"]
read_only_fields = ["id", "abilities"]
class DocumentAccessLightSerializer(DocumentAccessSerializer):
"""Serialize document accesses with limited fields."""
user = UserLightSerializer(read_only=True)
class Meta:
model = models.DocumentAccess
fields = ["id", "user", "team", "role", "abilities"]
read_only_fields = ["id", "team", "role", "abilities"]
class TemplateAccessSerializer(BaseAccessSerializer):
"""Serialize template accesses."""
class Meta:
model = models.TemplateAccess
resource_field_name = "template"
fields = ["id", "user", "team", "role", "abilities"]
read_only_fields = ["id", "abilities"]
def get_abilities(self, instance) -> dict:
"""Return abilities of the logged-in user on the instance."""
request = self.context.get("request")
if request:
return instance.get_abilities(request.user)
return {}
def update(self, instance, validated_data):
"""Make "user" field is readonly but only on update."""
validated_data.pop("user", None)
return super().update(instance, validated_data)
class ListDocumentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"""Serialize documents with limited fields for display in lists."""
@@ -88,7 +167,7 @@ class ListDocumentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
is_favorite = serializers.BooleanField(read_only=True)
nb_accesses_ancestors = serializers.IntegerField(read_only=True)
nb_accesses_direct = serializers.IntegerField(read_only=True)
user_role = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
user_roles = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
abilities = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
class Meta:
@@ -96,10 +175,6 @@ class ListDocumentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
fields = [
"id",
"abilities",
"ancestors_link_reach",
"ancestors_link_role",
"computed_link_reach",
"computed_link_role",
"created_at",
"creator",
"depth",
@@ -113,15 +188,11 @@ class ListDocumentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"path",
"title",
"updated_at",
"user_role",
"user_roles",
]
read_only_fields = [
"id",
"abilities",
"ancestors_link_reach",
"ancestors_link_role",
"computed_link_reach",
"computed_link_role",
"created_at",
"creator",
"depth",
@@ -134,62 +205,46 @@ class ListDocumentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"numchild",
"path",
"updated_at",
"user_role",
"user_roles",
]
def to_representation(self, instance):
"""Precompute once per instance"""
paths_links_mapping = self.context.get("paths_links_mapping")
if paths_links_mapping is not None:
links = paths_links_mapping.get(instance.path[: -instance.steplen], [])
instance.ancestors_link_definition = choices.get_equivalent_link_definition(
links
)
return super().to_representation(instance)
def get_abilities(self, instance) -> dict:
def get_abilities(self, document) -> dict:
"""Return abilities of the logged-in user on the instance."""
request = self.context.get("request")
if not request:
return {}
return instance.get_abilities(request.user)
if request:
paths_links_mapping = self.context.get("paths_links_mapping", None)
# Retrieve ancestor links from paths_links_mapping (if provided)
ancestors_links = (
paths_links_mapping.get(document.path[: -document.steplen])
if paths_links_mapping
else None
)
return document.get_abilities(request.user, ancestors_links=ancestors_links)
def get_user_role(self, instance):
return {}
def get_user_roles(self, document):
"""
Return roles of the logged-in user for the current document,
taking into account ancestors.
"""
request = self.context.get("request")
return instance.get_role(request.user) if request else None
class DocumentLightSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"""Minial document serializer for nesting in document accesses."""
class Meta:
model = models.Document
fields = ["id", "path", "depth"]
read_only_fields = ["id", "path", "depth"]
if request:
return document.get_roles(request.user)
return []
class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
"""Serialize documents with all fields for display in detail views."""
content = serializers.CharField(required=False)
websocket = serializers.BooleanField(required=False, write_only=True)
class Meta:
model = models.Document
fields = [
"id",
"abilities",
"ancestors_link_reach",
"ancestors_link_role",
"computed_link_reach",
"computed_link_role",
"content",
"created_at",
"creator",
@@ -204,16 +259,11 @@ class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
"path",
"title",
"updated_at",
"user_role",
"websocket",
"user_roles",
]
read_only_fields = [
"id",
"abilities",
"ancestors_link_reach",
"ancestors_link_role",
"computed_link_reach",
"computed_link_role",
"created_at",
"creator",
"depth",
@@ -225,7 +275,7 @@ class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
"numchild",
"path",
"updated_at",
"user_role",
"user_roles",
]
def get_fields(self):
@@ -311,99 +361,6 @@ class DocumentSerializer(ListDocumentSerializer):
return super().save(**kwargs)
class DocumentAccessSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"""Serialize document accesses."""
document = DocumentLightSerializer(read_only=True)
user_id = serializers.PrimaryKeyRelatedField(
queryset=models.User.objects.all(),
write_only=True,
source="user",
required=False,
allow_null=True,
)
user = UserSerializer(read_only=True)
team = serializers.CharField(required=False, allow_blank=True)
abilities = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
max_ancestors_role = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
max_role = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
class Meta:
model = models.DocumentAccess
resource_field_name = "document"
fields = [
"id",
"document",
"user",
"user_id",
"team",
"role",
"abilities",
"max_ancestors_role",
"max_role",
]
read_only_fields = [
"id",
"document",
"abilities",
"max_ancestors_role",
"max_role",
]
def get_abilities(self, instance) -> dict:
"""Return abilities of the logged-in user on the instance."""
request = self.context.get("request")
if request:
return instance.get_abilities(request.user)
return {}
def get_max_ancestors_role(self, instance):
"""Return max_ancestors_role if annotated; else None."""
return getattr(instance, "max_ancestors_role", None)
def get_max_role(self, instance):
"""Return max_ancestors_role if annotated; else None."""
return choices.RoleChoices.max(
getattr(instance, "max_ancestors_role", None),
instance.role,
)
def update(self, instance, validated_data):
"""Make "user" field readonly but only on update."""
validated_data.pop("team", None)
validated_data.pop("user", None)
return super().update(instance, validated_data)
class DocumentAccessLightSerializer(DocumentAccessSerializer):
"""Serialize document accesses with limited fields."""
user = UserLightSerializer(read_only=True)
class Meta:
model = models.DocumentAccess
resource_field_name = "document"
fields = [
"id",
"document",
"user",
"team",
"role",
"abilities",
"max_ancestors_role",
"max_role",
]
read_only_fields = [
"id",
"document",
"team",
"role",
"abilities",
"max_ancestors_role",
"max_role",
]
class ServerCreateDocumentSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
"""
Serializer for creating a document from a server-to-server request.
@@ -422,7 +379,7 @@ class ServerCreateDocumentSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
content = serializers.CharField(required=True)
# User
sub = serializers.CharField(
required=True, validators=[validators.sub_validator], max_length=255
required=True, validators=[models.User.sub_validator], max_length=255
)
email = serializers.EmailField(required=True)
language = serializers.ChoiceField(
@@ -451,7 +408,9 @@ class ServerCreateDocumentSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
language = user.language or language
try:
document_content = YdocConverter().convert(validated_data["content"])
document_content = YdocConverter().convert_markdown(
validated_data["content"]
)
except ConversionError as err:
raise serializers.ValidationError(
{"content": ["Could not convert content"]}
@@ -558,17 +517,16 @@ class FileUploadSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
mime = magic.Magic(mime=True)
magic_mime_type = mime.from_buffer(file.read(1024))
file.seek(0) # Reset file pointer to the beginning after reading
self.context["is_unsafe"] = False
if settings.DOCUMENT_ATTACHMENT_CHECK_UNSAFE_MIME_TYPES_ENABLED:
self.context["is_unsafe"] = (
magic_mime_type in settings.DOCUMENT_UNSAFE_MIME_TYPES
)
extension_mime_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file.name)
self.context["is_unsafe"] = (
magic_mime_type in settings.DOCUMENT_UNSAFE_MIME_TYPES
)
# Try guessing a coherent extension from the mimetype
if extension_mime_type != magic_mime_type:
self.context["is_unsafe"] = True
extension_mime_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file.name)
# Try guessing a coherent extension from the mimetype
if extension_mime_type != magic_mime_type:
self.context["is_unsafe"] = True
guessed_ext = mimetypes.guess_extension(magic_mime_type)
# Missing extensions or extensions longer than 5 characters (it's as long as an extension
@@ -706,50 +664,6 @@ class InvitationSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
return role
class RoleSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
"""Serializer validating role choices."""
role = serializers.ChoiceField(
choices=models.RoleChoices.choices, required=False, allow_null=True
)
class DocumentAskForAccessCreateSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
"""Serializer for creating a document ask for access."""
role = serializers.ChoiceField(
choices=models.RoleChoices.choices,
required=False,
default=models.RoleChoices.READER,
)
class DocumentAskForAccessSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
"""Serializer for document ask for access model"""
abilities = serializers.SerializerMethodField(read_only=True)
user = UserSerializer(read_only=True)
class Meta:
model = models.DocumentAskForAccess
fields = [
"id",
"document",
"user",
"role",
"created_at",
"abilities",
]
read_only_fields = ["id", "document", "user", "role", "created_at", "abilities"]
def get_abilities(self, invitation) -> dict:
"""Return abilities of the logged-in user on the instance."""
request = self.context.get("request")
if request:
return invitation.get_abilities(request.user)
return {}
class VersionFilterSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
"""Validate version filters applied to the list endpoint."""

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
"""Declare and configure choices for Docs' core application."""
from django.db.models import TextChoices
from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _
class PriorityTextChoices(TextChoices):
"""
This class inherits from Django's TextChoices and provides a method to get the priority
of a given value based on its position in the class.
"""
@classmethod
def get_priority(cls, role):
"""Returns the priority of the given role based on its order in the class."""
members = list(cls.__members__.values())
return members.index(role) + 1 if role in members else 0
@classmethod
def max(cls, *roles):
"""
Return the highest-priority role among the given roles, using get_priority().
If no valid roles are provided, returns None.
"""
valid_roles = [role for role in roles if cls.get_priority(role) is not None]
if not valid_roles:
return None
return max(valid_roles, key=cls.get_priority)
class LinkRoleChoices(PriorityTextChoices):
"""Defines the possible roles a link can offer on a document."""
READER = "reader", _("Reader") # Can read
EDITOR = "editor", _("Editor") # Can read and edit
class RoleChoices(PriorityTextChoices):
"""Defines the possible roles a user can have in a resource."""
READER = "reader", _("Reader") # Can read
EDITOR = "editor", _("Editor") # Can read and edit
ADMIN = "administrator", _("Administrator") # Can read, edit, delete and share
OWNER = "owner", _("Owner")
PRIVILEGED_ROLES = [RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.OWNER]
class LinkReachChoices(PriorityTextChoices):
"""Defines types of access for links"""
RESTRICTED = (
"restricted",
_("Restricted"),
) # Only users with a specific access can read/edit the document
AUTHENTICATED = (
"authenticated",
_("Authenticated"),
) # Any authenticated user can access the document
PUBLIC = "public", _("Public") # Even anonymous users can access the document
@classmethod
def get_select_options(cls, link_reach, link_role):
"""
Determines the valid select options for link reach and link role depending on the
ancestors' link reach/role given as arguments.
Returns:
Dictionary mapping possible reach levels to their corresponding possible roles.
"""
return {
reach: [
role
for role in LinkRoleChoices.values
if LinkRoleChoices.get_priority(role)
>= LinkRoleChoices.get_priority(link_role)
]
if reach != cls.RESTRICTED
else None
for reach in cls.values
if LinkReachChoices.get_priority(reach)
>= LinkReachChoices.get_priority(link_reach)
}
def get_equivalent_link_definition(ancestors_links):
"""
Return the (reach, role) pair with:
1. Highest reach
2. Highest role among links having that reach
"""
if not ancestors_links:
return {"link_reach": None, "link_role": None}
# 1) Find the highest reach
max_reach = max(
ancestors_links,
key=lambda link: LinkReachChoices.get_priority(link["link_reach"]),
)["link_reach"]
# 2) Among those, find the highest role (ignore role if RESTRICTED)
if max_reach == LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED:
max_role = None
else:
max_role = max(
(
link["link_role"]
for link in ancestors_links
if link["link_reach"] == max_reach
),
key=LinkRoleChoices.get_priority,
)
return {"link_reach": max_reach, "link_role": max_role}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
# ruff: noqa: S311
"""
Core application factories
"""
@@ -34,8 +35,6 @@ class UserFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
class Meta:
model = models.User
# Skip postgeneration save, no save is made in the postgeneration methods.
skip_postgeneration_save = True
sub = factory.Sequence(lambda n: f"user{n!s}")
email = factory.Faker("email")
@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ class DocumentFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
"""Add link traces to document from a given list of users."""
if create and extracted:
for item in extracted:
models.LinkTrace.objects.update_or_create(document=self, user=item)
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=self, user=item)
@factory.post_generation
def favorited_by(self, create, extracted, **kwargs):
@@ -159,15 +158,6 @@ class DocumentFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
for item in extracted:
models.DocumentFavorite.objects.create(document=self, user=item)
@factory.post_generation
def masked_by(self, create, extracted, **kwargs):
"""Mark document as masked by a list of users."""
if create and extracted:
for item in extracted:
models.LinkTrace.objects.update_or_create(
document=self, user=item, defaults={"is_masked": True}
)
class UserDocumentAccessFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
"""Create fake document user accesses for testing."""
@@ -191,17 +181,6 @@ class TeamDocumentAccessFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
role = factory.fuzzy.FuzzyChoice([r[0] for r in models.RoleChoices.choices])
class DocumentAskForAccessFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
"""Create fake document ask for access for testing."""
class Meta:
model = models.DocumentAskForAccess
document = factory.SubFactory(DocumentFactory)
user = factory.SubFactory(UserFactory)
role = factory.fuzzy.FuzzyChoice([r[0] for r in models.RoleChoices.choices])
class TemplateFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):
"""A factory to create templates"""

View File

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
"""Force session creation for all requests."""
class ForceSessionMiddleware:
"""
Force session creation for unauthenticated users.
Must be used after Authentication middleware.
"""
def __init__(self, get_response):
"""Initialize the middleware."""
self.get_response = get_response
def __call__(self, request):
"""Force session creation for unauthenticated users."""
if not request.user.is_authenticated and request.session.session_key is None:
request.session.create()
response = self.get_response(request)
return response

View File

@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ class Migration(migrations.Migration):
migrations.AddConstraint(
model_name="documentaccess",
constraint=models.CheckConstraint(
condition=models.Q(
check=models.Q(
models.Q(("team", ""), ("user__isnull", False)),
models.Q(("team__gt", ""), ("user__isnull", True)),
_connector="OR",
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ class Migration(migrations.Migration):
migrations.AddConstraint(
model_name="templateaccess",
constraint=models.CheckConstraint(
condition=models.Q(
check=models.Q(
models.Q(("team", ""), ("user__isnull", False)),
models.Q(("team__gt", ""), ("user__isnull", True)),
_connector="OR",

View File

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
# Generated by Django 5.2.3 on 2025-06-18 10:02
import uuid
import django.db.models.deletion
from django.conf import settings
from django.db import migrations, models
class Migration(migrations.Migration):
dependencies = [
("core", "0021_activate_unaccent_extension"),
]
operations = [
migrations.CreateModel(
name="DocumentAskForAccess",
fields=[
(
"id",
models.UUIDField(
default=uuid.uuid4,
editable=False,
help_text="primary key for the record as UUID",
primary_key=True,
serialize=False,
verbose_name="id",
),
),
(
"created_at",
models.DateTimeField(
auto_now_add=True,
help_text="date and time at which a record was created",
verbose_name="created on",
),
),
(
"updated_at",
models.DateTimeField(
auto_now=True,
help_text="date and time at which a record was last updated",
verbose_name="updated on",
),
),
(
"role",
models.CharField(
choices=[
("reader", "Reader"),
("editor", "Editor"),
("administrator", "Administrator"),
("owner", "Owner"),
],
default="reader",
max_length=20,
),
),
(
"document",
models.ForeignKey(
on_delete=django.db.models.deletion.CASCADE,
related_name="ask_for_accesses",
to="core.document",
),
),
(
"user",
models.ForeignKey(
on_delete=django.db.models.deletion.CASCADE,
related_name="ask_for_accesses",
to=settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,
),
),
],
options={
"verbose_name": "Document ask for access",
"verbose_name_plural": "Document ask for accesses",
"db_table": "impress_document_ask_for_access",
"constraints": [
models.UniqueConstraint(
fields=("user", "document"),
name="unique_document_ask_for_access_user",
violation_error_message="This user has already asked for access to this document.",
)
],
},
),
]

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Generated by Django 5.1.7 on 2025-03-14 14:03
from django.db import migrations, models
class Migration(migrations.Migration):
dependencies = [
("core", "0022_alter_user_language_documentaskforaccess"),
]
operations = [
migrations.AddField(
model_name="document",
name="has_deleted_children",
field=models.BooleanField(default=False),
),
]

View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
# Generated by Django 5.2.3 on 2025-07-13 08:22
from django.db import migrations, models
import core.validators
class Migration(migrations.Migration):
dependencies = [
("core", "0023_remove_document_is_public_and_more"),
]
operations = [
migrations.AddField(
model_name="linktrace",
name="is_masked",
field=models.BooleanField(default=False),
),
migrations.AlterField(
model_name="user",
name="language",
field=models.CharField(
blank=True,
choices=[
("en-us", "English"),
("fr-fr", "Français"),
("de-de", "Deutsch"),
("nl-nl", "Nederlands"),
("es-es", "Español"),
],
default=None,
help_text="The language in which the user wants to see the interface.",
max_length=10,
null=True,
verbose_name="language",
),
),
migrations.AlterField(
model_name="user",
name="sub",
field=models.CharField(
blank=True,
help_text="Required. 255 characters or fewer. ASCII characters only.",
max_length=255,
null=True,
unique=True,
validators=[core.validators.sub_validator],
verbose_name="sub",
),
),
]

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Declare and configure the models for the impress core application
import hashlib
import smtplib
import uuid
from collections import defaultdict
from datetime import timedelta
from logging import getLogger
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ from django.contrib.auth import models as auth_models
from django.contrib.auth.base_user import AbstractBaseUser
from django.contrib.postgres.fields import ArrayField
from django.contrib.sites.models import Site
from django.core import mail
from django.core import mail, validators
from django.core.cache import cache
from django.core.files.base import ContentFile
from django.core.files.storage import default_storage
@@ -32,15 +33,6 @@ from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError
from timezone_field import TimeZoneField
from treebeard.mp_tree import MP_Node, MP_NodeManager, MP_NodeQuerySet
from .choices import (
PRIVILEGED_ROLES,
LinkReachChoices,
LinkRoleChoices,
RoleChoices,
get_equivalent_link_definition,
)
from .validators import sub_validator
logger = getLogger(__name__)
@@ -58,6 +50,88 @@ def get_trashbin_cutoff():
return timezone.now() - timedelta(days=settings.TRASHBIN_CUTOFF_DAYS)
class LinkRoleChoices(models.TextChoices):
"""Defines the possible roles a link can offer on a document."""
READER = "reader", _("Reader") # Can read
EDITOR = "editor", _("Editor") # Can read and edit
class RoleChoices(models.TextChoices):
"""Defines the possible roles a user can have in a resource."""
READER = "reader", _("Reader") # Can read
EDITOR = "editor", _("Editor") # Can read and edit
ADMIN = "administrator", _("Administrator") # Can read, edit, delete and share
OWNER = "owner", _("Owner")
PRIVILEGED_ROLES = [RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.OWNER]
class LinkReachChoices(models.TextChoices):
"""Defines types of access for links"""
RESTRICTED = (
"restricted",
_("Restricted"),
) # Only users with a specific access can read/edit the document
AUTHENTICATED = (
"authenticated",
_("Authenticated"),
) # Any authenticated user can access the document
PUBLIC = "public", _("Public") # Even anonymous users can access the document
@classmethod
def get_select_options(cls, ancestors_links):
"""
Determines the valid select options for link reach and link role depending on the
list of ancestors' link reach/role.
Args:
ancestors_links: List of dictionaries, each with 'link_reach' and 'link_role' keys
representing the reach and role of ancestors links.
Returns:
Dictionary mapping possible reach levels to their corresponding possible roles.
"""
# If no ancestors, return all options
if not ancestors_links:
return dict.fromkeys(cls.values, LinkRoleChoices.values)
# Initialize result with all possible reaches and role options as sets
result = {reach: set(LinkRoleChoices.values) for reach in cls.values}
# Group roles by reach level
reach_roles = defaultdict(set)
for link in ancestors_links:
reach_roles[link["link_reach"]].add(link["link_role"])
# Apply constraints based on ancestor links
if LinkRoleChoices.EDITOR in reach_roles[cls.RESTRICTED]:
result[cls.RESTRICTED].discard(LinkRoleChoices.READER)
if LinkRoleChoices.EDITOR in reach_roles[cls.AUTHENTICATED]:
result[cls.AUTHENTICATED].discard(LinkRoleChoices.READER)
result.pop(cls.RESTRICTED, None)
elif LinkRoleChoices.READER in reach_roles[cls.AUTHENTICATED]:
result[cls.RESTRICTED].discard(LinkRoleChoices.READER)
if LinkRoleChoices.EDITOR in reach_roles[cls.PUBLIC]:
result[cls.PUBLIC].discard(LinkRoleChoices.READER)
result.pop(cls.AUTHENTICATED, None)
result.pop(cls.RESTRICTED, None)
elif LinkRoleChoices.READER in reach_roles[cls.PUBLIC]:
result[cls.AUTHENTICATED].discard(LinkRoleChoices.READER)
result.get(cls.RESTRICTED, set()).discard(LinkRoleChoices.READER)
# Convert roles sets to lists while maintaining the order from LinkRoleChoices
for reach, roles in result.items():
result[reach] = [role for role in LinkRoleChoices.values if role in roles]
return result
class DuplicateEmailError(Exception):
"""Raised when an email is already associated with a pre-existing user."""
@@ -137,12 +211,22 @@ class UserManager(auth_models.UserManager):
class User(AbstractBaseUser, BaseModel, auth_models.PermissionsMixin):
"""User model to work with OIDC only authentication."""
sub_validator = validators.RegexValidator(
regex=r"^[\w.@+-:]+\Z",
message=_(
"Enter a valid sub. This value may contain only letters, "
"numbers, and @/./+/-/_/: characters."
),
)
sub = models.CharField(
_("sub"),
help_text=_("Required. 255 characters or fewer. ASCII characters only."),
help_text=_(
"Required. 255 characters or fewer. Letters, numbers, and @/./+/-/_/: characters only."
),
max_length=255,
validators=[sub_validator],
unique=True,
validators=[sub_validator],
blank=True,
null=True,
)
@@ -280,6 +364,69 @@ class BaseAccess(BaseModel):
class Meta:
abstract = True
def _get_roles(self, resource, user):
"""
Get the roles a user has on a resource.
"""
roles = []
if user.is_authenticated:
teams = user.teams
try:
roles = self.user_roles or []
except AttributeError:
try:
roles = resource.accesses.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=teams),
).values_list("role", flat=True)
except (self._meta.model.DoesNotExist, IndexError):
roles = []
return roles
def _get_abilities(self, resource, user):
"""
Compute and return abilities for a given user taking into account
the current state of the object.
"""
roles = self._get_roles(resource, user)
is_owner_or_admin = bool(
set(roles).intersection({RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN})
)
if self.role == RoleChoices.OWNER:
can_delete = (
RoleChoices.OWNER in roles
and resource.accesses.filter(role=RoleChoices.OWNER).count() > 1
)
set_role_to = (
[RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.READER]
if can_delete
else []
)
else:
can_delete = is_owner_or_admin
set_role_to = []
if RoleChoices.OWNER in roles:
set_role_to.append(RoleChoices.OWNER)
if is_owner_or_admin:
set_role_to.extend(
[RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.READER]
)
# Remove the current role as we don't want to propose it as an option
try:
set_role_to.remove(self.role)
except ValueError:
pass
return {
"destroy": can_delete,
"update": bool(set_role_to),
"partial_update": bool(set_role_to),
"retrieve": bool(roles),
"set_role_to": set_role_to,
}
class DocumentQuerySet(MP_NodeQuerySet):
"""
@@ -305,41 +452,6 @@ class DocumentQuerySet(MP_NodeQuerySet):
return self.filter(link_reach=LinkReachChoices.PUBLIC)
def annotate_is_favorite(self, user):
"""
Annotate document queryset with the favorite status for the current user.
"""
if user.is_authenticated:
favorite_exists_subquery = DocumentFavorite.objects.filter(
document_id=models.OuterRef("pk"), user=user
)
return self.annotate(is_favorite=models.Exists(favorite_exists_subquery))
return self.annotate(is_favorite=models.Value(False))
def annotate_user_roles(self, user):
"""
Annotate document queryset with the roles of the current user
on the document or its ancestors.
"""
output_field = ArrayField(base_field=models.CharField())
if user.is_authenticated:
user_roles_subquery = DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=user.teams),
document__path=Left(models.OuterRef("path"), Length("document__path")),
).values_list("role", flat=True)
return self.annotate(
user_roles=models.Func(
user_roles_subquery, function="ARRAY", output_field=output_field
)
)
return self.annotate(
user_roles=models.Value([], output_field=output_field),
)
class DocumentManager(MP_NodeManager.from_queryset(DocumentQuerySet)):
"""
@@ -352,7 +464,6 @@ class DocumentManager(MP_NodeManager.from_queryset(DocumentQuerySet)):
return self._queryset_class(self.model).order_by("path")
# pylint: disable=too-many-public-methods
class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
"""Pad document carrying the content."""
@@ -375,7 +486,6 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
)
deleted_at = models.DateTimeField(null=True, blank=True)
ancestors_deleted_at = models.DateTimeField(null=True, blank=True)
has_deleted_children = models.BooleanField(default=False)
duplicated_from = models.ForeignKey(
"self",
on_delete=models.SET_NULL,
@@ -410,7 +520,7 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
verbose_name_plural = _("Documents")
constraints = [
models.CheckConstraint(
condition=(
check=(
models.Q(deleted_at__isnull=True)
| models.Q(deleted_at=models.F("ancestors_deleted_at"))
),
@@ -421,12 +531,6 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
def __str__(self):
return str(self.title) if self.title else str(_("Untitled Document"))
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
"""Initialize cache property."""
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self._ancestors_link_definition = None
self._computed_link_definition = None
def save(self, *args, **kwargs):
"""Write content to object storage only if _content has changed."""
super().save(*args, **kwargs)
@@ -457,12 +561,6 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
content_file = ContentFile(bytes_content)
default_storage.save(file_key, content_file)
def is_leaf(self):
"""
:returns: True if the node is has no children
"""
return not self.has_deleted_children and self.numchild == 0
@property
def key_base(self):
"""Key base of the location where the document is stored in object storage."""
@@ -620,22 +718,38 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
cache_key = document.get_nb_accesses_cache_key()
cache.delete(cache_key)
def get_role(self, user):
def get_roles(self, user):
"""Return the roles a user has on a document."""
if not user.is_authenticated:
return None
return []
try:
roles = self.user_roles or []
except AttributeError:
roles = DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=user.teams),
document__path=Left(models.Value(self.path), Length("document__path")),
).values_list("role", flat=True)
try:
roles = DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=user.teams),
document__path=Left(
models.Value(self.path), Length("document__path")
),
).values_list("role", flat=True)
except (models.ObjectDoesNotExist, IndexError):
roles = []
return roles
return RoleChoices.max(*roles)
def get_links_definitions(self, ancestors_links):
"""Get links reach/role definitions for the current document and its ancestors."""
def compute_ancestors_links_paths_mapping(self):
links_definitions = defaultdict(set)
links_definitions[self.link_reach].add(self.link_role)
# Merge ancestor link definitions
for ancestor in ancestors_links:
links_definitions[ancestor["link_reach"]].add(ancestor["link_role"])
return dict(links_definitions) # Convert defaultdict back to a normal dict
def compute_ancestors_links(self, user):
"""
Compute the ancestors links for the current document up to the highest readable ancestor.
"""
@@ -644,121 +758,64 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
.filter(ancestors_deleted_at__isnull=True)
.order_by("path")
)
highest_readable = ancestors.readable_per_se(user).only("depth").first()
if highest_readable is None:
return []
ancestors_links = []
paths_links_mapping = {}
for ancestor in ancestors:
for ancestor in ancestors.filter(depth__gte=highest_readable.depth):
ancestors_links.append(
{"link_reach": ancestor.link_reach, "link_role": ancestor.link_role}
)
paths_links_mapping[ancestor.path] = ancestors_links.copy()
return paths_links_mapping
ancestors_links = paths_links_mapping.get(self.path[: -self.steplen], [])
@property
def link_definition(self):
"""Returns link reach/role as a definition in dictionary format."""
return {"link_reach": self.link_reach, "link_role": self.link_role}
return ancestors_links
@property
def ancestors_link_definition(self):
"""Link definition equivalent to all document's ancestors."""
if getattr(self, "_ancestors_link_definition", None) is None:
if self.depth <= 1:
ancestors_links = []
else:
mapping = self.compute_ancestors_links_paths_mapping()
ancestors_links = mapping.get(self.path[: -self.steplen], [])
self._ancestors_link_definition = get_equivalent_link_definition(
ancestors_links
)
return self._ancestors_link_definition
@ancestors_link_definition.setter
def ancestors_link_definition(self, definition):
"""Cache the ancestors_link_definition."""
self._ancestors_link_definition = definition
@property
def ancestors_link_reach(self):
"""Link reach equivalent to all document's ancestors."""
return self.ancestors_link_definition["link_reach"]
@property
def ancestors_link_role(self):
"""Link role equivalent to all document's ancestors."""
return self.ancestors_link_definition["link_role"]
@property
def computed_link_definition(self):
"""
Link reach/role on the document, combining inherited ancestors' link
definitions and the document's own link definition.
"""
if getattr(self, "_computed_link_definition", None) is None:
self._computed_link_definition = get_equivalent_link_definition(
[self.ancestors_link_definition, self.link_definition]
)
return self._computed_link_definition
@property
def computed_link_reach(self):
"""Actual link reach on the document."""
return self.computed_link_definition["link_reach"]
@property
def computed_link_role(self):
"""Actual link role on the document."""
return self.computed_link_definition["link_role"]
def get_abilities(self, user):
def get_abilities(self, user, ancestors_links=None):
"""
Compute and return abilities for a given user on the document.
"""
# First get the role based on specific access
role = self.get_role(user)
if self.depth <= 1 or getattr(self, "is_highest_ancestor_for_user", False):
ancestors_links = []
elif ancestors_links is None:
ancestors_links = self.compute_ancestors_links(user=user)
roles = set(
self.get_roles(user)
) # at this point only roles based on specific access
# Characteristics that are based only on specific access
is_owner = role == RoleChoices.OWNER
is_owner = RoleChoices.OWNER in roles
is_deleted = self.ancestors_deleted_at and not is_owner
is_owner_or_admin = (is_owner or role == RoleChoices.ADMIN) and not is_deleted
is_owner_or_admin = (is_owner or RoleChoices.ADMIN in roles) and not is_deleted
# Compute access roles before adding link roles because we don't
# want anonymous users to access versions (we wouldn't know from
# which date to allow them anyway)
# Anonymous users should also not see document accesses
has_access_role = bool(role) and not is_deleted
has_access_role = bool(roles) and not is_deleted
can_update_from_access = (
is_owner_or_admin or role == RoleChoices.EDITOR
is_owner_or_admin or RoleChoices.EDITOR in roles
) and not is_deleted
link_select_options = LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(
**self.ancestors_link_definition
)
link_definition = get_equivalent_link_definition(
[
self.ancestors_link_definition,
{"link_reach": self.link_reach, "link_role": self.link_role},
]
# Add roles provided by the document link, taking into account its ancestors
links_definitions = self.get_links_definitions(ancestors_links)
public_roles = links_definitions.get(LinkReachChoices.PUBLIC, set())
authenticated_roles = (
links_definitions.get(LinkReachChoices.AUTHENTICATED, set())
if user.is_authenticated
else set()
)
roles = roles | public_roles | authenticated_roles
link_reach = link_definition["link_reach"]
if link_reach == LinkReachChoices.PUBLIC or (
link_reach == LinkReachChoices.AUTHENTICATED and user.is_authenticated
):
role = RoleChoices.max(role, link_definition["link_role"])
can_get = bool(role) and not is_deleted
can_get = bool(roles) and not is_deleted
can_update = (
is_owner_or_admin or role == RoleChoices.EDITOR
is_owner_or_admin or RoleChoices.EDITOR in roles
) and not is_deleted
can_create_children = can_update and user.is_authenticated
can_destroy = (
is_owner
if self.is_root()
else (is_owner_or_admin or (user.is_authenticated and self.creator == user))
)
ai_allow_reach_from = settings.AI_ALLOW_REACH_FROM
ai_access = any(
@@ -779,24 +836,22 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
"ai_translate": ai_access,
"attachment_upload": can_update,
"media_check": can_get,
"can_edit": can_update,
"children_list": can_get,
"children_create": can_create_children,
"children_create": can_update and user.is_authenticated,
"collaboration_auth": can_get,
"cors_proxy": can_get,
"descendants": can_get,
"destroy": can_destroy,
"duplicate": can_get and user.is_authenticated,
"destroy": is_owner,
"duplicate": can_get,
"favorite": can_get and user.is_authenticated,
"link_configuration": is_owner_or_admin,
"invite_owner": is_owner,
"mask": can_get and user.is_authenticated,
"move": is_owner_or_admin and not self.ancestors_deleted_at,
"partial_update": can_update,
"restore": is_owner,
"retrieve": can_get,
"media_auth": can_get,
"link_select_options": link_select_options,
"link_select_options": LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(ancestors_links),
"tree": can_get,
"update": can_update,
"versions_destroy": is_owner_or_admin,
@@ -821,8 +876,8 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
)
with override(language):
msg_html = render_to_string("mail/html/template.html", context)
msg_plain = render_to_string("mail/text/template.txt", context)
msg_html = render_to_string("mail/html/invitation.html", context)
msg_plain = render_to_string("mail/text/invitation.txt", context)
subject = str(subject) # Force translation
try:
@@ -891,8 +946,7 @@ class Document(MP_Node, BaseModel):
if self.depth > 1:
self._meta.model.objects.filter(pk=self.get_parent().pk).update(
numchild=models.F("numchild") - 1,
has_deleted_children=True,
numchild=models.F("numchild") - 1
)
# Mark all descendants as soft deleted
@@ -956,7 +1010,6 @@ class LinkTrace(BaseModel):
related_name="link_traces",
)
user = models.ForeignKey(User, on_delete=models.CASCADE, related_name="link_traces")
is_masked = models.BooleanField(default=False)
class Meta:
db_table = "impress_link_trace"
@@ -1035,7 +1088,7 @@ class DocumentAccess(BaseAccess):
violation_error_message=_("This team is already in this document."),
),
models.CheckConstraint(
condition=models.Q(user__isnull=False, team="")
check=models.Q(user__isnull=False, team="")
| models.Q(user__isnull=True, team__gt=""),
name="check_document_access_either_user_or_team",
violation_error_message=_("Either user or team must be set, not both."),
@@ -1050,230 +1103,52 @@ class DocumentAccess(BaseAccess):
super().save(*args, **kwargs)
self.document.invalidate_nb_accesses_cache()
@property
def target_key(self):
"""Get a unique key for the actor targeted by the access, without possible conflict."""
return f"user:{self.user_id!s}" if self.user_id else f"team:{self.team:s}"
def delete(self, *args, **kwargs):
"""Override delete to clear the document's cache for number of accesses."""
super().delete(*args, **kwargs)
self.document.invalidate_nb_accesses_cache()
def set_user_roles_tuple(self, ancestors_role, current_role):
"""
Set a precomputed (ancestor_role, current_role) tuple for this instance.
This avoids querying the database in `get_roles_tuple()` and is useful
when roles are already known, such as in bulk serialization.
Args:
ancestor_role (str | None): Highest role on any ancestor document.
current_role (str | None): Role on the current document.
"""
# pylint: disable=attribute-defined-outside-init
self._prefetched_user_roles_tuple = (ancestors_role, current_role)
def get_user_roles_tuple(self, user):
"""
Return a tuple of:
- the highest role the user has on any ancestor of the document
- the role the user has on the current document
If roles have been explicitly set using `set_user_roles_tuple()`,
those will be returned instead of querying the database.
This allows viewsets or serializers to precompute roles for performance
when handling multiple documents at once.
Args:
user (User): The user whose roles are being evaluated.
Returns:
tuple[str | None, str | None]: (max_ancestor_role, current_document_role)
"""
if not user.is_authenticated:
return None, None
try:
return self._prefetched_user_roles_tuple
except AttributeError:
pass
ancestors = (
self.document.get_ancestors() | Document.objects.filter(pk=self.document_id)
).filter(ancestors_deleted_at__isnull=True)
access_tuples = DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=user.teams),
document__in=ancestors,
).values_list("document_id", "role")
ancestors_roles = []
current_roles = []
for doc_id, role in access_tuples:
if doc_id == self.document_id:
current_roles.append(role)
else:
ancestors_roles.append(role)
return RoleChoices.max(*ancestors_roles), RoleChoices.max(*current_roles)
def get_abilities(self, user):
"""
Compute and return abilities for a given user on the document access.
"""
ancestors_role, current_role = self.get_user_roles_tuple(user)
role = RoleChoices.max(ancestors_role, current_role)
is_owner_or_admin = role in PRIVILEGED_ROLES
roles = self._get_roles(self.document, user)
is_owner_or_admin = bool(set(roles).intersection(set(PRIVILEGED_ROLES)))
if self.role == RoleChoices.OWNER:
can_delete = role == RoleChoices.OWNER and (
# check if document is not root trying to avoid an extra query
self.document.depth > 1
or DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
document_id=self.document_id, role=RoleChoices.OWNER
).count()
> 1
can_delete = (
RoleChoices.OWNER in roles
and self.document.accesses.filter(role=RoleChoices.OWNER).count() > 1
)
set_role_to = (
[RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.READER]
if can_delete
else []
)
set_role_to = RoleChoices.values if can_delete else []
else:
can_delete = is_owner_or_admin
set_role_to = []
if RoleChoices.OWNER in roles:
set_role_to.append(RoleChoices.OWNER)
if is_owner_or_admin:
set_role_to.extend(
[RoleChoices.READER, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.ADMIN]
[RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.READER]
)
if role == RoleChoices.OWNER:
set_role_to.append(RoleChoices.OWNER)
# Filter out roles that would be lower than the one the user already has
ancestors_role_priority = RoleChoices.get_priority(
getattr(self, "max_ancestors_role", None)
)
set_role_to = [
candidate_role
for candidate_role in set_role_to
if RoleChoices.get_priority(candidate_role) >= ancestors_role_priority
]
if len(set_role_to) == 1:
set_role_to = []
# Remove the current role as we don't want to propose it as an option
try:
set_role_to.remove(self.role)
except ValueError:
pass
return {
"destroy": can_delete,
"update": bool(set_role_to) and is_owner_or_admin,
"partial_update": bool(set_role_to) and is_owner_or_admin,
"retrieve": (self.user and self.user.id == user.id) or is_owner_or_admin,
"retrieve": self.user and self.user.id == user.id or is_owner_or_admin,
"set_role_to": set_role_to,
}
class DocumentAskForAccess(BaseModel):
"""Relation model to ask for access to a document."""
document = models.ForeignKey(
Document, on_delete=models.CASCADE, related_name="ask_for_accesses"
)
user = models.ForeignKey(
User, on_delete=models.CASCADE, related_name="ask_for_accesses"
)
role = models.CharField(
max_length=20, choices=RoleChoices.choices, default=RoleChoices.READER
)
class Meta:
db_table = "impress_document_ask_for_access"
verbose_name = _("Document ask for access")
verbose_name_plural = _("Document ask for accesses")
constraints = [
models.UniqueConstraint(
fields=["user", "document"],
name="unique_document_ask_for_access_user",
violation_error_message=_(
"This user has already asked for access to this document."
),
),
]
def __str__(self):
return f"{self.user!s} asked for access to document {self.document!s}"
def get_abilities(self, user):
"""Compute and return abilities for a given user."""
roles = []
if user.is_authenticated:
teams = user.teams
try:
roles = self.user_roles or []
except AttributeError:
try:
roles = self.document.accesses.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=teams),
).values_list("role", flat=True)
except (self._meta.model.DoesNotExist, IndexError):
roles = []
is_admin_or_owner = bool(
set(roles).intersection({RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN})
)
return {
"destroy": is_admin_or_owner,
"update": is_admin_or_owner,
"partial_update": is_admin_or_owner,
"retrieve": is_admin_or_owner,
"accept": is_admin_or_owner,
}
def accept(self, role=None):
"""Accept a document ask for access resource."""
if role is None:
role = self.role
DocumentAccess.objects.update_or_create(
document=self.document,
user=self.user,
defaults={"role": role},
create_defaults={"role": role},
)
self.delete()
def send_ask_for_access_email(self, email, language=None):
"""
Method allowing a user to send an email notification when asking for access to a document.
"""
language = language or get_language()
sender = self.user
sender_name = sender.full_name or sender.email
sender_name_email = (
f"{sender.full_name:s} ({sender.email})"
if sender.full_name
else sender.email
)
with override(language):
context = {
"title": _("{name} would like access to a document!").format(
name=sender_name
),
"message": _(
"{name} would like access to the following document:"
).format(name=sender_name_email),
}
subject = (
context["title"]
if not self.document.title
else _("{name} is asking for access to the document: {title}").format(
name=sender_name, title=self.document.title
)
)
self.document.send_email(subject, [email], context, language)
class Template(BaseModel):
"""HTML and CSS code used for formatting the print around the MarkDown body."""
@@ -1296,10 +1171,10 @@ class Template(BaseModel):
def __str__(self):
return self.title
def get_role(self, user):
def get_roles(self, user):
"""Return the roles a user has on a resource as an iterable."""
if not user.is_authenticated:
return None
return []
try:
roles = self.user_roles or []
@@ -1310,20 +1185,21 @@ class Template(BaseModel):
).values_list("role", flat=True)
except (models.ObjectDoesNotExist, IndexError):
roles = []
return RoleChoices.max(*roles)
return roles
def get_abilities(self, user):
"""
Compute and return abilities for a given user on the template.
"""
role = self.get_role(user)
is_owner_or_admin = role in PRIVILEGED_ROLES
can_get = self.is_public or bool(role)
can_update = is_owner_or_admin or role == RoleChoices.EDITOR
roles = self.get_roles(user)
is_owner_or_admin = bool(
set(roles).intersection({RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN})
)
can_get = self.is_public or bool(roles)
can_update = is_owner_or_admin or RoleChoices.EDITOR in roles
return {
"destroy": role == RoleChoices.OWNER,
"destroy": RoleChoices.OWNER in roles,
"generate_document": can_get,
"accesses_manage": is_owner_or_admin,
"update": can_update,
@@ -1360,7 +1236,7 @@ class TemplateAccess(BaseAccess):
violation_error_message=_("This team is already in this template."),
),
models.CheckConstraint(
condition=models.Q(user__isnull=False, team="")
check=models.Q(user__isnull=False, team="")
| models.Q(user__isnull=True, team__gt=""),
name="check_template_access_either_user_or_team",
violation_error_message=_("Either user or team must be set, not both."),
@@ -1370,65 +1246,11 @@ class TemplateAccess(BaseAccess):
def __str__(self):
return f"{self.user!s} is {self.role:s} in template {self.template!s}"
def get_role(self, user):
"""
Get the role a user has on a resource.
"""
if not user.is_authenticated:
return None
try:
roles = self.user_roles or []
except AttributeError:
teams = user.teams
try:
roles = self.template.accesses.filter(
models.Q(user=user) | models.Q(team__in=teams),
).values_list("role", flat=True)
except (Template.DoesNotExist, IndexError):
roles = []
return RoleChoices.max(*roles)
def get_abilities(self, user):
"""
Compute and return abilities for a given user on the template access.
"""
role = self.get_role(user)
is_owner_or_admin = role in PRIVILEGED_ROLES
if self.role == RoleChoices.OWNER:
can_delete = (role == RoleChoices.OWNER) and self.template.accesses.filter(
role=RoleChoices.OWNER
).count() > 1
set_role_to = (
[RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.READER]
if can_delete
else []
)
else:
can_delete = is_owner_or_admin
set_role_to = []
if role == RoleChoices.OWNER:
set_role_to.append(RoleChoices.OWNER)
if is_owner_or_admin:
set_role_to.extend(
[RoleChoices.ADMIN, RoleChoices.EDITOR, RoleChoices.READER]
)
# Remove the current role as we don't want to propose it as an option
try:
set_role_to.remove(self.role)
except ValueError:
pass
return {
"destroy": can_delete,
"update": bool(set_role_to),
"partial_update": bool(set_role_to),
"retrieve": bool(role),
"set_role_to": set_role_to,
}
return self._get_abilities(self.template, user)
class Invitation(BaseModel):

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ from core import enums
AI_ACTIONS = {
"prompt": (
"Answer the prompt using markdown formatting for structure and emphasis. "
"Return the content directly without wrapping it in code blocks or markdown delimiters. "
"Answer the prompt in markdown format. "
"Preserve the language and markdown formatting. "
"Do not provide any other information. "
"Preserve the language."

View File

@@ -41,35 +41,3 @@ class CollaborationService:
f"Failed to notify WebSocket server. Status code: {response.status_code}, "
f"Response: {response.text}"
)
def get_document_connection_info(self, room, session_key):
"""
Get the connection info for a document.
"""
endpoint = "get-connections"
querystring = {
"room": room,
"sessionKey": session_key,
}
endpoint_url = f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}{endpoint}/"
headers = {"Authorization": settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET}
try:
response = requests.get(
endpoint_url, headers=headers, params=querystring, timeout=10
)
except requests.RequestException as e:
raise requests.HTTPError("Failed to get document connection info.") from e
if response.status_code == 200:
result = response.json()
return result.get("count", 0), result.get("exists", False)
if response.status_code == 404:
return 0, False
raise requests.HTTPError(
f"Failed to get document connection info. Status code: {response.status_code}, "
f"Response: {response.text}"
)

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
"""Converter services."""
from base64 import b64encode
from django.conf import settings
import requests
@@ -19,6 +17,14 @@ class ServiceUnavailableError(ConversionError):
"""Raised when the conversion service is unavailable."""
class InvalidResponseError(ConversionError):
"""Raised when the conversion service returns an invalid response."""
class MissingContentError(ConversionError):
"""Raised when the response is missing required content."""
class YdocConverter:
"""Service class for conversion-related operations."""
@@ -26,9 +32,9 @@ class YdocConverter:
def auth_header(self):
"""Build microservice authentication header."""
# Note: Yprovider microservice accepts only raw token, which is not recommended
return f"Bearer {settings.Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY}"
return settings.Y_PROVIDER_API_KEY
def convert(self, text):
def convert_markdown(self, text):
"""Convert a Markdown text into our internal format using an external microservice."""
if not text:
@@ -37,17 +43,36 @@ class YdocConverter:
try:
response = requests.post(
f"{settings.Y_PROVIDER_API_BASE_URL}{settings.CONVERSION_API_ENDPOINT}/",
data=text,
json={
"content": text,
},
headers={
"Authorization": self.auth_header,
"Content-Type": "text/markdown",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
timeout=settings.CONVERSION_API_TIMEOUT,
verify=settings.CONVERSION_API_SECURE,
)
response.raise_for_status()
return b64encode(response.content).decode("utf-8")
conversion_response = response.json()
except requests.RequestException as err:
raise ServiceUnavailableError(
"Failed to connect to conversion service",
) from err
except ValueError as err:
raise InvalidResponseError(
"Could not parse conversion service response"
) from err
try:
document_content = conversion_response[
settings.CONVERSION_API_CONTENT_FIELD
]
except KeyError as err:
raise MissingContentError(
f"Response missing required field: {settings.CONVERSION_API_CONTENT_FIELD}"
) from err
return document_content

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
"""Send mail using celery task."""
from django.conf import settings
from core import models
from impress.celery_app import app
@app.task
def send_ask_for_access_mail(ask_for_access_id):
"""Send mail using celery task."""
# Send email to document owners/admins
ask_for_access = models.DocumentAskForAccess.objects.get(id=ask_for_access_id)
owner_admin_accesses = models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
document=ask_for_access.document, role__in=models.PRIVILEGED_ROLES
).select_related("user")
for access in owner_admin_accesses:
if access.user and access.user.email:
ask_for_access.send_ask_for_access_email(
access.user.email,
access.user.language or settings.LANGUAGE_CODE,
)

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
"""
Test document accesses API endpoints for users in impress's core app.
"""
# pylint: disable=too-many-lines
import random
from uuid import uuid4
@@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ from uuid import uuid4
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import choices, factories, models
from core import factories, models
from core.api import serializers
from core.tests.conftest import TEAM, USER, VIA
from core.tests.test_services_collaboration_services import ( # pylint: disable=unused-import
@@ -52,7 +51,12 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_unrelated():
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == []
assert response.json() == {
"count": 0,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [],
}
def test_api_document_accesses_list_unexisting_document():
@@ -65,46 +69,39 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_list_unexisting_document():
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{uuid4()!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 404
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Not found."}
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 0,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [],
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"role",
[role for role in choices.RoleChoices if role not in choices.PRIVILEGED_ROLES],
"role", [role for role in models.RoleChoices if role not in models.PRIVILEGED_ROLES]
)
def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_related_non_privileged(
via, role, mock_user_teams, django_assert_num_queries
via, role, mock_user_teams
):
"""
Authenticated users with no privileged role should only be able to list document
accesses associated with privileged roles for a document, including from ancestors.
Authenticated users should be able to list document accesses for a document
to which they are directly related, whatever their role in the document.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
# Create documents structured as a tree
unreadable_ancestor = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
# make all documents below the grand parent readable without a specific access for the user
grand_parent = factories.DocumentFactory(
parent=unreadable_ancestor, link_reach="authenticated"
)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=grand_parent)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=document)
owner = factories.UserFactory()
accesses = []
# Create accesses related to each document
accesses = (
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=unreadable_ancestor),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=grand_parent),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=parent),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document),
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document),
document_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
user=owner, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child)
accesses.append(document_access)
document = document_access.document
if via == USER:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(
document=document,
@@ -119,404 +116,140 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_related_non_privileged(
role=role,
)
# Accesses for other documents to which the user is related should not be listed either
other_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(user=user)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=other_access.document)
with django_assert_num_queries(3):
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
# Make sure only privileged roles are returned
privileged_accesses = [
acc for acc in accesses if acc.role in choices.PRIVILEGED_ROLES
]
assert len(content) == len(privileged_accesses)
assert sorted(content, key=lambda x: x["id"]) == sorted(
[
{
"id": str(access.id),
"document": {
"id": str(access.document_id),
"path": access.document.path,
"depth": access.document.depth,
},
"user": {
"full_name": access.user.full_name,
"short_name": access.user.short_name,
}
if access.user
else None,
"team": access.team,
"role": access.role,
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": access.role,
"abilities": {
"destroy": False,
"partial_update": False,
"retrieve": False,
"set_role_to": [],
"update": False,
},
}
for access in privileged_accesses
],
key=lambda x: x["id"],
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"role", [role for role in choices.RoleChoices if role in choices.PRIVILEGED_ROLES]
)
def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_related_privileged(
via, role, mock_user_teams, django_assert_num_queries
):
"""
Authenticated users with a privileged role should be able to list all
document accesses whatever the role, including from ancestors.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
# Create documents structured as a tree
unreadable_ancestor = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
# make all documents below the grand parent readable without a specific access for the user
grand_parent = factories.DocumentFactory(
parent=unreadable_ancestor, link_reach="authenticated"
)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=grand_parent)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=document)
if via == USER:
user_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(
document=document,
user=user,
role=role,
)
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
user_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(
document=document,
team="lasuite",
role=role,
)
else:
raise RuntimeError()
# Create accesses related to each document
ancestors_accesses = [
# Access on unreadable ancestor should still be listed
# as the related user gains access to our document
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=unreadable_ancestor),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=grand_parent),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=parent),
]
document_accesses = [
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document),
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document),
user_access,
]
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child)
access1 = factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
access2 = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
accesses.append(access1)
accesses.append(access2)
# Accesses for other documents to which the user is related should not be listed either
other_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(user=user)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=other_access.document)
with django_assert_num_queries(3):
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
)
# Return only owners
owners_accesses = [
access for access in accesses if access.role in models.PRIVILEGED_ROLES
]
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert len(content) == 7
assert sorted(content, key=lambda x: x["id"]) == sorted(
assert content["count"] == len(owners_accesses)
assert sorted(content["results"], key=lambda x: x["id"]) == sorted(
[
{
"id": str(access.id),
"document": {
"id": str(access.document_id),
"path": access.document.path,
"depth": access.document.depth,
},
"user": {
"id": str(access.user.id),
"email": access.user.email,
"language": access.user.language,
"id": None,
"email": None,
"full_name": access.user.full_name,
"short_name": access.user.short_name,
}
if access.user
else None,
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": access.role,
"team": access.team,
"role": access.role,
"abilities": access.get_abilities(user),
}
for access in ancestors_accesses + document_accesses
for access in owners_accesses
],
key=lambda x: x["id"],
)
def test_api_document_accesses_retrieve_set_role_to_child():
"""Check set_role_to for an access with no access on the ancestor."""
user, other_user = factories.UserFactory.create_batch(2)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory()
parent_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent, user=user, role="owner"
)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
document_access_other_user = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role="editor"
)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert len(content) == 2
result_dict = {
result["id"]: result["abilities"]["set_role_to"] for result in content
}
assert result_dict[str(document_access_other_user.id)] == [
"reader",
"editor",
"administrator",
"owner",
]
assert result_dict[str(parent_access.id)] == []
# Add an access for the other user on the parent
parent_access_other_user = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent, user=other_user, role="editor"
)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert len(content) == 3
result_dict = {
result["id"]: result["abilities"]["set_role_to"] for result in content
}
assert result_dict[str(document_access_other_user.id)] == [
"editor",
"administrator",
"owner",
]
assert result_dict[str(parent_access.id)] == []
assert result_dict[str(parent_access_other_user.id)] == [
"reader",
"editor",
"administrator",
"owner",
]
for access in content["results"]:
assert access["role"] in models.PRIVILEGED_ROLES
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"roles,results",
[
[
["administrator", "reader", "reader", "reader"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
],
],
[
["owner", "reader", "reader", "reader"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
],
],
[
["owner", "reader", "reader", "owner"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
],
],
],
)
def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_related_same_user(roles, results):
"""
The maximum role across ancestor documents and set_role_to optionsfor
a given user should be filled as expected.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
# Create documents structured as a tree
grand_parent = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="authenticated")
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=grand_parent)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
# Create accesses for another user
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
accesses = [
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user, role=roles[0]
),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=grand_parent, user=other_user, role=roles[1]
),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent, user=other_user, role=roles[2]
),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=roles[3]
),
]
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert len(content) == 4
for result in content:
assert (
result["max_ancestors_role"] is None
if result["user"]["id"] == str(user.id)
else choices.RoleChoices.max(roles[1], roles[2])
)
result_dict = {
result["id"]: result["abilities"]["set_role_to"] for result in content
}
assert [result_dict[str(access.id)] for access in accesses] == results
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"roles,results",
[
[
["administrator", "reader", "reader", "reader"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
],
],
[
["owner", "reader", "reader", "reader"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
],
],
[
["owner", "reader", "reader", "owner"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
],
],
[
["reader", "reader", "reader", "owner"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
[],
[],
["reader", "editor", "administrator", "owner"],
],
],
[
["reader", "administrator", "reader", "editor"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
[],
[],
],
],
[
["editor", "editor", "administrator", "editor"],
[
["reader", "editor", "administrator"],
[],
["editor", "administrator"],
[],
],
],
],
)
def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_related_same_team(
roles, results, mock_user_teams
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", models.PRIVILEGED_ROLES)
def test_api_document_accesses_list_authenticated_related_privileged_roles(
via, role, mock_user_teams
):
"""
The maximum role across ancestor documents and set_role_to optionsfor
a given team should be filled as expected.
Authenticated users should be able to list document accesses for a document
to which they are directly related, whatever their role in the document.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
# Create documents structured as a tree
grand_parent = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="authenticated")
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=grand_parent)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
owner = factories.UserFactory()
accesses = []
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
accesses = [
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user, role=roles[0]
),
# Create accesses for a team
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=grand_parent, team="lasuite", role=roles[1]
),
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent, team="lasuite", role=roles[2]
),
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, team="lasuite", role=roles[3]
),
]
document_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
user=owner, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
accesses.append(document_access)
document = document_access.document
user_access = None
if via == USER:
user_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(
document=document,
user=user,
role=role,
)
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
user_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(
document=document,
team="lasuite",
role=role,
)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
access1 = factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
access2 = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
accesses.append(access1)
accesses.append(access2)
# Accesses for other documents to which the user is related should not be listed either
other_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(user=user)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=other_access.document)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
)
access2_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=access2.user).data
base_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=user).data
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert len(content) == 4
for result in content:
assert (
result["max_ancestors_role"] is None
if result["user"] and result["user"]["id"] == str(user.id)
else choices.RoleChoices.max(roles[1], roles[2])
)
result_dict = {
result["id"]: result["abilities"]["set_role_to"] for result in content
}
assert [result_dict[str(access.id)] for access in accesses] == results
assert len(content["results"]) == 4
assert sorted(content["results"], key=lambda x: x["id"]) == sorted(
[
{
"id": str(user_access.id),
"user": base_user if via == "user" else None,
"team": "lasuite" if via == "team" else "",
"role": user_access.role,
"abilities": user_access.get_abilities(user),
},
{
"id": str(access1.id),
"user": None,
"team": access1.team,
"role": access1.role,
"abilities": access1.get_abilities(user),
},
{
"id": str(access2.id),
"user": access2_user,
"team": "",
"role": access2.role,
"abilities": access2.get_abilities(user),
},
{
"id": str(document_access.id),
"user": serializers.UserSerializer(instance=owner).data,
"team": "",
"role": models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
"abilities": document_access.get_abilities(user),
},
],
key=lambda x: x["id"],
)
def test_api_document_accesses_retrieve_anonymous():
@@ -574,9 +307,7 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_retrieve_authenticated_unrelated():
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", models.RoleChoices)
def test_api_document_accesses_retrieve_authenticated_related(
via,
role,
mock_user_teams,
via, role, mock_user_teams
):
"""
A user who is related to a document should be allowed to retrieve the
@@ -602,7 +333,7 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_retrieve_authenticated_related(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
)
if not role in choices.PRIVILEGED_ROLES:
if not role in models.PRIVILEGED_ROLES:
assert response.status_code == 403
else:
access_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=access.user).data
@@ -610,16 +341,9 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_retrieve_authenticated_related(
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(access.id),
"document": {
"id": str(access.document_id),
"path": access.document.path,
"depth": access.document.depth,
},
"user": access_user,
"team": "",
"role": access.role,
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": access.role,
"abilities": access.get_abilities(user),
}
@@ -724,9 +448,7 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_update_authenticated_reader_or_editor(
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("create_for", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_update_administrator_except_owner(
create_for,
via,
mock_user_teams,
mock_reset_connections, # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name
@@ -759,31 +481,32 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_update_administrator_except_owner(
new_values = {
"id": uuid4(),
"user_id": factories.UserFactory().id,
"role": random.choice(["administrator", "editor", "reader"]),
}
if create_for == USER:
new_values["user_id"] = factories.UserFactory().id
elif create_for == TEAM:
new_values["team"] = "new-team"
for field, value in new_values.items():
new_data = {**old_values, field: value}
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, str(access.user_id)):
if new_data["role"] == old_values["role"]:
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data=new_data,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.status_code == 403
else:
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, str(access.user_id)):
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data=new_data,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
access.refresh_from_db()
updated_values = serializers.DocumentAccessSerializer(instance=access).data
if field in ["role", "max_role"]:
assert updated_values == {
**old_values,
"role": new_values["role"],
"max_role": new_values["role"],
}
if field == "role":
assert updated_values == {**old_values, "role": new_values["role"]}
else:
assert updated_values == old_values
@@ -878,7 +601,7 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_update_administrator_to_owner(
for field, value in new_values.items():
new_data = {**old_values, field: value}
# We are not allowed or not really updating the role
if field == "role":
if field == "role" or new_data["role"] == old_values["role"]:
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data=new_data,
@@ -901,9 +624,7 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_update_administrator_to_owner(
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("create_for", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_update_owner(
create_for,
via,
mock_user_teams,
mock_reset_connections, # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name
@@ -934,39 +655,42 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_update_owner(
new_values = {
"id": uuid4(),
"user_id": factories.UserFactory().id,
"role": random.choice(models.RoleChoices.values),
}
if create_for == USER:
new_values["user_id"] = factories.UserFactory().id
elif create_for == TEAM:
new_values["team"] = "new-team"
for field, value in new_values.items():
new_data = {**old_values, field: value}
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, str(access.user_id)):
if (
new_data["role"] == old_values["role"]
): # we are not really updating the role
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data=new_data,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
else:
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, str(access.user_id)):
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data=new_data,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.status_code == 200
access.refresh_from_db()
updated_values = serializers.DocumentAccessSerializer(instance=access).data
if field in ["role", "max_role"]:
assert updated_values == {
**old_values,
"role": new_values["role"],
"max_role": new_values["role"],
}
if field == "role":
assert updated_values == {**old_values, "role": new_values["role"]}
else:
assert updated_values == old_values
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_update_owner_self_root(
def test_api_document_accesses_update_owner_self(
via,
mock_user_teams,
mock_reset_connections, # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name
@@ -1027,51 +751,6 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_update_owner_self_root(
assert access.role == new_role
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_update_owner_self_child(
via,
mock_user_teams,
mock_reset_connections, # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name
):
"""
A user who is owner of a document should be allowed to update
their own user access even if they are the only owner in the document,
provided the document is not a root.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory()
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
access = None
if via == USER:
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user, role="owner"
)
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
access = factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, team="lasuite", role="owner"
)
old_values = serializers.DocumentAccessSerializer(instance=access).data
new_role = random.choice(["administrator", "editor", "reader"])
user_id = str(access.user_id) if via == USER else None
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, user_id):
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data={**old_values, "role": new_role},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
access.refresh_from_db()
assert access.role == new_role
# Delete
@@ -1252,16 +931,17 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_delete_owners(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 1
assert response.status_code == 204
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 1
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_delete_owners_last_owner_root(via, mock_user_teams):
def test_api_document_accesses_delete_owners_last_owner(via, mock_user_teams):
"""
It should not be possible to delete the last owner access from a root document
It should not be possible to delete the last owner access from a document
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
@@ -1284,63 +964,3 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_delete_owners_last_owner_root(via, mock_user_team
assert response.status_code == 403
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 2
def test_api_document_accesses_delete_owners_last_owner_child_user(
mock_reset_connections, # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name
):
"""
It should be possible to delete the last owner access from a document that is not a root.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory()
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
access = None
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user, role="owner"
)
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 2
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, str(access.user_id)):
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 1
@pytest.mark.skip(
reason="Pending fix on https://github.com/suitenumerique/docs/issues/969"
)
def test_api_document_accesses_delete_owners_last_owner_child_team(
mock_user_teams,
mock_reset_connections, # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name
):
"""
It should be possible to delete the last owner access from a document that
is not a root.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory()
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
access = None
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
access = factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, team="lasuite", role="owner"
)
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 2
with mock_reset_connections(document.id, str(access.user_id)):
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.count() == 1

View File

@@ -103,37 +103,32 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_reader_or_editor(
assert not models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(user=other_user).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [1, 2, 3])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator_share_to_user(
via, depth, mock_user_teams
):
def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator(via, mock_user_teams):
"""
Administrators of a document (direct or by heritage) should be able to create
document accesses except for the "owner" role.
Administrators of a document should be able to create document accesses
except for the "owner" role.
An email should be sent to the accesses to notify them of the adding.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
documents = []
for i in range(depth):
parent = documents[i - 1] if i > 0 else None
documents.append(factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent))
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
if via == USER:
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], user=user, role="administrator"
document=document, user=user, role="administrator"
)
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], team="lasuite", role="administrator"
document=document, team="lasuite", role="administrator"
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory(language="en-us")
document = documents[-1]
# It should not be allowed to create an owner access
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
{
@@ -145,7 +140,7 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator_share_to_user(
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "Only owners of a document can assign other users as owners."
"detail": "Only owners of a resource can assign other users as owners."
}
# It should be allowed to create a lower access
@@ -170,16 +165,9 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator_share_to_user(
other_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=other_user).data
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
"document": {
"id": str(new_document_access.document_id),
"depth": new_document_access.document.depth,
"path": new_document_access.document.path,
},
"id": str(new_document_access.id),
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": role,
"role": role,
"team": "",
"role": role,
"user": other_user,
}
assert len(mail.outbox) == 1
@@ -194,119 +182,28 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator_share_to_user(
assert "docs/" + str(document.id) + "/" in email_content
@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [1, 2, 3])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator_share_to_team(
via, depth, mock_user_teams
):
def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_owner(via, mock_user_teams):
"""
Administrators of a document (direct or by heritage) should be able to create
document accesses except for the "owner" role.
Owners of a document should be able to create document accesses whatever the role.
An email should be sent to the accesses to notify them of the adding.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
documents = []
for i in range(depth):
parent = documents[i - 1] if i > 0 else None
documents.append(factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent))
if via == USER:
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], user=user, role="administrator"
)
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], team="lasuite", role="administrator"
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory(language="en-us")
document = documents[-1]
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
{
"team": "new-team",
"role": "owner",
},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "Only owners of a document can assign other users as owners."
}
# It should be allowed to create a lower access
role = random.choice(
[role[0] for role in models.RoleChoices.choices if role[0] != "owner"]
)
assert len(mail.outbox) == 0
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
{
"team": "new-team",
"role": role,
},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(team="new-team").count() == 1
new_document_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(team="new-team").get()
other_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=other_user).data
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
"document": {
"id": str(new_document_access.document_id),
"depth": new_document_access.document.depth,
"path": new_document_access.document.path,
},
"id": str(new_document_access.id),
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": role,
"role": role,
"team": "new-team",
"user": None,
}
assert len(mail.outbox) == 0
@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [1, 2, 3])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_owner_share_to_user(
via, depth, mock_user_teams
):
"""
Owners of a document (direct or by heritage) should be able to create document accesses
whatever the role. An email should be sent to the accesses to notify them of the adding.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
documents = []
for i in range(depth):
parent = documents[i - 1] if i > 0 else None
documents.append(factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent))
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
if via == USER:
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], user=user, role="owner"
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, user=user, role="owner")
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], team="lasuite", role="owner"
document=document, team="lasuite", role="owner"
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory(language="en-us")
document = documents[-1]
role = random.choice([role[0] for role in models.RoleChoices.choices])
assert len(mail.outbox) == 0
@@ -325,18 +222,11 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_owner_share_to_user(
new_document_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(user=other_user).get()
other_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=other_user).data
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
"document": {
"id": str(new_document_access.document_id),
"depth": new_document_access.document.depth,
"path": new_document_access.document.path,
},
"id": str(new_document_access.id),
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": role,
"role": role,
"team": "",
"user": other_user,
"team": "",
"role": role,
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
}
assert len(mail.outbox) == 1
email = mail.outbox[0]
@@ -350,71 +240,6 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_owner_share_to_user(
assert "docs/" + str(document.id) + "/" in email_content
@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [1, 2, 3])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_create_authenticated_owner_share_to_team(
via, depth, mock_user_teams
):
"""
Owners of a document (direct or by heritage) should be able to create document accesses
whatever the role. An email should be sent to the accesses to notify them of the adding.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
documents = []
for i in range(depth):
parent = documents[i - 1] if i > 0 else None
documents.append(factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent))
if via == USER:
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], user=user, role="owner"
)
elif via == TEAM:
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(
document=documents[0], team="lasuite", role="owner"
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory(language="en-us")
document = documents[-1]
role = random.choice([role[0] for role in models.RoleChoices.choices])
assert len(mail.outbox) == 0
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
{
"team": "new-team",
"role": role,
},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
assert models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(team="new-team").count() == 1
new_document_access = models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(team="new-team").get()
other_user = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=other_user).data
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
"document": {
"id": str(new_document_access.document_id),
"path": new_document_access.document.path,
"depth": new_document_access.document.depth,
},
"id": str(new_document_access.id),
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": role,
"role": role,
"team": "new-team",
"user": None,
}
assert len(mail.outbox) == 0
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_document_accesses_create_email_in_receivers_language(via, mock_user_teams):
"""
@@ -461,18 +286,11 @@ def test_api_document_accesses_create_email_in_receivers_language(via, mock_user
).get()
other_user_data = serializers.UserSerializer(instance=other_user).data
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
"document": {
"id": str(new_document_access.document_id),
"path": new_document_access.document.path,
"depth": new_document_access.document.depth,
},
"id": str(new_document_access.id),
"max_ancestors_role": None,
"max_role": role,
"role": role,
"team": "",
"user": other_user_data,
"team": "",
"role": role,
"abilities": new_document_access.get_abilities(user),
}
assert len(mail.outbox) == index + 1
email = mail.outbox[index]

View File

@@ -175,11 +175,8 @@ def test_api_documents_ai_transform_authenticated_success(mock_create, reach, ro
{
"role": "system",
"content": (
"Answer the prompt using markdown formatting for structure and emphasis. "
"Return the content directly without wrapping it in code blocks or markdown delimiters. "
"Preserve the language and markdown formatting. "
"Do not provide any other information. "
"Preserve the language."
"Answer the prompt in markdown format. Preserve the language and markdown "
"formatting. Do not provide any other information. Preserve the language."
),
},
{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"},
@@ -252,11 +249,8 @@ def test_api_documents_ai_transform_success(mock_create, via, role, mock_user_te
{
"role": "system",
"content": (
"Answer the prompt using markdown formatting for structure and emphasis. "
"Return the content directly without wrapping it in code blocks or markdown delimiters. "
"Preserve the language and markdown formatting. "
"Do not provide any other information. "
"Preserve the language."
"Answer the prompt in markdown format. Preserve the language and markdown "
"formatting. Do not provide any other information. Preserve the language."
),
},
{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"},

View File

@@ -1,770 +0,0 @@
"""Test API for document ask for access."""
import uuid
from django.core import mail
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core.api.serializers import UserSerializer
from core.factories import (
DocumentAskForAccessFactory,
DocumentFactory,
UserDocumentAccessFactory,
UserFactory,
)
from core.models import DocumentAccess, DocumentAskForAccess, RoleChoices
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
## Create
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_anonymous():
"""Anonymous users should not be able to create a document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
client = APIClient()
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_invalid_document_id():
"""Invalid document ID should return a 404 error."""
user = UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{uuid.uuid4()}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_authenticated():
"""
Authenticated users should be able to create a document ask for access.
An email should be sent to document owners and admins to notify them.
"""
owner_user = UserFactory(language="en-us")
admin_user = UserFactory(language="en-us")
document = DocumentFactory(
users=[
(owner_user, RoleChoices.OWNER),
(admin_user, RoleChoices.ADMIN),
]
)
user = UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
assert len(mail.outbox) == 0
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 201
assert DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
document=document,
user=user,
role=RoleChoices.READER,
).exists()
# Verify emails were sent to both owner and admin
assert len(mail.outbox) == 2
# Check that emails were sent to the right recipients
email_recipients = [email.to[0] for email in mail.outbox]
assert owner_user.email in email_recipients
assert admin_user.email in email_recipients
# Check email content for both users
for email in mail.outbox:
email_content = " ".join(email.body.split())
email_subject = " ".join(email.subject.split())
# Check that the requesting user's name is in the email
user_name = user.full_name or user.email
assert user_name.lower() in email_content.lower()
# Check that the subject mentions access request
assert "access" in email_subject.lower()
# Check that the document title is mentioned if it exists
if document.title:
assert document.title.lower() in email_subject.lower()
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_authenticated_non_root_document():
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to create a document ask for access on a non-root
document.
"""
parent = DocumentFactory()
child = DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
user = UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_authenticated_specific_role():
"""
Authenticated users should be able to create a document ask for access with a specific role.
"""
document = DocumentFactory()
user = UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/",
data={"role": RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 201
assert DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
document=document,
user=user,
role=RoleChoices.EDITOR,
).exists()
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_authenticated_already_has_access():
"""Authenticated users with existing access can ask for access with a different role."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, RoleChoices.READER)])
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/",
data={"role": RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 201
assert DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
document=document,
user=user,
role=RoleChoices.EDITOR,
).exists()
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_create_authenticated_already_has_ask_for_access():
"""
Authenticated users with existing ask for access can not ask for a new access on this document.
"""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, RoleChoices.READER)])
DocumentAskForAccessFactory(document=document, user=user, role=RoleChoices.READER)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/",
data={"role": RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert response.json() == {"detail": "You already ask to access to this document."}
## List
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_anonymous():
"""Anonymous users should not be able to list document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_authenticated():
"""Authenticated users should be able to list document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(UserFactory())
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 0,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [],
}
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_authenticated_non_root_document():
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to list document ask for access on a non-root document.
"""
parent = DocumentFactory()
child = DocumentFactory(parent=parent)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(UserFactory())
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_authenticated_own_request():
"""Authenticated users should be able to list their own document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
user = UserFactory()
user_data = UserSerializer(instance=user).data
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 1,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [
{
"id": str(document_ask_for_access.id),
"document": str(document.id),
"user": user_data,
"role": RoleChoices.READER,
"created_at": document_ask_for_access.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"abilities": {
"accept": False,
"destroy": False,
"update": False,
"partial_update": False,
"retrieve": False,
},
}
],
}
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_authenticated_other_document():
"""Authenticated users should not be able to list document ask for access of other documents."""
document = DocumentFactory()
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(UserFactory())
other_document = DocumentFactory()
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=other_document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{other_document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 0,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [],
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.READER, RoleChoices.EDITOR])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_non_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Non owner or admin users should not be able to list document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 0,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [],
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Owner or admin users should be able to list document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_accesses = DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(
3, document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 3,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [
{
"id": str(document_ask_for_access.id),
"document": str(document.id),
"user": UserSerializer(instance=document_ask_for_access.user).data,
"role": RoleChoices.READER,
"created_at": document_ask_for_access.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"abilities": {
"accept": True,
"destroy": True,
"update": True,
"partial_update": True,
"retrieve": True,
},
}
for document_ask_for_access in document_ask_for_accesses
],
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_list_admin_non_root_document(role):
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to list document ask for access on a non-root document.
"""
user = UserFactory()
parent = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
child = DocumentFactory(parent=parent, users=[(user, role)])
DocumentAskForAccessFactory.create_batch(3, document=child, role=RoleChoices.READER)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id}/ask-for-access/")
assert response.status_code == 404
## Retrieve
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_retrieve_anonymous():
"""Anonymous users should not be able to retrieve document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_retrieve_authenticated():
"""Authenticated users should not be able to retrieve document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(UserFactory())
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.READER, RoleChoices.EDITOR])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_retrieve_authenticated_non_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Non owner or admin users should not be able to retrieve document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_retrieve_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Owner or admin users should be able to retrieve document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
user_data = UserSerializer(instance=document_ask_for_access.user).data
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document_ask_for_access.id),
"document": str(document.id),
"user": user_data,
"role": RoleChoices.READER,
"created_at": document_ask_for_access.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"abilities": {
"accept": True,
"destroy": True,
"update": True,
"partial_update": True,
"retrieve": True,
},
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_retrieve_authenticated_non_root_document(role):
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to retrieve document ask for access on a non-root
document.
"""
user = UserFactory()
parent = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
child = DocumentFactory(parent=parent, users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=child, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
## Delete
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_delete_anonymous():
"""Anonymous users should not be able to delete document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_delete_authenticated():
"""Authenticated users should not be able to delete document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(UserFactory())
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.READER, RoleChoices.EDITOR])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_delete_authenticated_non_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Non owner or admin users should not be able to delete document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_delete_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Owner or admin users should be able to delete document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert not DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
id=document_ask_for_access.id
).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_delete_authenticated_non_root_document(role):
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to delete document ask for access on a non-root
document.
"""
user = UserFactory()
parent = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
child = DocumentFactory(parent=parent, users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=child, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.delete(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
## Accept
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_anonymous():
"""Anonymous users should not be able to accept document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/"
)
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_authenticated():
"""Authenticated users should not be able to accept document ask for access."""
document = DocumentFactory()
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(UserFactory())
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.READER, RoleChoices.EDITOR])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_authenticated_non_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Non owner or admin users should not be able to accept document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_owner_or_admin(role):
"""Owner or admin users should be able to accept document ask for access."""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/"
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert not DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
id=document_ask_for_access.id
).exists()
assert DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
document=document, user=document_ask_for_access.user, role=RoleChoices.READER
).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_authenticated_specific_role(role):
"""
Owner or admin users should be able to accept document ask for access with a specific role.
"""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/",
data={"role": RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert not DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
id=document_ask_for_access.id
).exists()
assert DocumentAccess.objects.filter(
document=document, user=document_ask_for_access.user, role=RoleChoices.EDITOR
).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_authenticated_owner_or_admin_update_access(
role,
):
"""
Owner or admin users should be able to accept document ask for access and update the access.
"""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_access = UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, user=document_access.user, role=RoleChoices.EDITOR
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/",
data={"role": RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert not DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
id=document_ask_for_access.id
).exists()
document_access.refresh_from_db()
assert document_access.role == RoleChoices.EDITOR
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
# pylint: disable=line-too-long
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_authenticated_owner_or_admin_update_access_with_specific_role(
role,
):
"""
Owner or admin users should be able to accept document ask for access and update the access
with a specific role.
"""
user = UserFactory()
document = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
document_access = UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=document, user=document_access.user, role=RoleChoices.EDITOR
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/",
data={"role": RoleChoices.ADMIN},
)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert not DocumentAskForAccess.objects.filter(
id=document_ask_for_access.id
).exists()
document_access.refresh_from_db()
assert document_access.role == RoleChoices.ADMIN
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", [RoleChoices.OWNER, RoleChoices.ADMIN])
def test_api_documents_ask_for_access_accept_authenticated_non_root_document(role):
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to accept document ask for access on a non-root
document.
"""
user = UserFactory()
parent = DocumentFactory(users=[(user, role)])
child = DocumentFactory(parent=parent, users=[(user, role)])
document_ask_for_access = DocumentAskForAccessFactory(
document=child, role=RoleChoices.READER
)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id}/ask-for-access/{document_ask_for_access.id}/accept/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404

View File

@@ -439,56 +439,3 @@ def test_api_documents_attachment_upload_unsafe():
"application/octet-stream",
]
assert file_head["ContentDisposition"] == 'attachment; filename="script.exe"'
def test_api_documents_attachment_upload_unsafe_mime_types_disabled(settings):
"""A file with an unsafe mime type but checking disabled should not be tagged as unsafe."""
settings.DOCUMENT_ATTACHMENT_CHECK_UNSAFE_MIME_TYPES_ENABLED = False
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "owner")])
url = f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/attachment-upload/"
file = SimpleUploadedFile(
name="script.exe", content=b"\x4d\x5a\x90\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00"
)
with mock.patch.object(malware_detection, "analyse_file") as mock_analyse_file:
response = client.post(url, {"file": file}, format="multipart")
assert response.status_code == 201
pattern = re.compile(rf"^{document.id!s}/attachments/(.*)\.exe")
url_parsed = urlparse(response.json()["file"])
assert url_parsed.path == f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/media-check/"
query = parse_qs(url_parsed.query)
assert query["key"][0] is not None
file_path = query["key"][0]
match = pattern.search(file_path)
file_id = match.group(1)
document.refresh_from_db()
assert document.attachments == [f"{document.id!s}/attachments/{file_id!s}.exe"]
assert "-unsafe" not in file_id
# Validate that file_id is a valid UUID
uuid.UUID(file_id)
key = file_path.replace("/media/", "")
mock_analyse_file.assert_called_once_with(key, document_id=document.id)
# Now, check the metadata of the uploaded file
file_head = default_storage.connection.meta.client.head_object(
Bucket=default_storage.bucket_name, Key=key
)
assert file_head["Metadata"] == {
"owner": str(user.id),
"status": "processing",
}
# Depending the libmagic version, the content type may change.
assert file_head["ContentType"] in [
"application/x-dosexec",
"application/octet-stream",
]
assert file_head["ContentDisposition"] == 'attachment; filename="script.exe"'

View File

@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
"""Test the can_edit endpoint in the viewset DocumentViewSet."""
from django.core.cache import cache
import pytest
import responses
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
@responses.activate
@pytest.mark.parametrize("ws_not_connected_ready_only", [True, False])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["editor", "reader"])
def test_api_documents_can_edit_anonymous(settings, ws_not_connected_ready_only, role):
"""Anonymous users can edit documents when link_role is editor."""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public", link_role=role)
client = APIClient()
session_key = client.session.session_key
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = ws_not_connected_ready_only
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 0, "exists": False})
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/")
if role == "reader":
assert response.status_code == 401
else:
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": True}
assert ws_resp.call_count == (1 if ws_not_connected_ready_only else 0)
@responses.activate
@pytest.mark.parametrize("ws_not_connected_ready_only", [True, False])
def test_api_documents_can_edit_authenticated_no_websocket(
settings, ws_not_connected_ready_only
):
"""
A user not connected to the websocket and no other user have already updated the document,
the document can be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = ws_not_connected_ready_only
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 0, "exists": False})
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": True}
assert ws_resp.call_count == (1 if ws_not_connected_ready_only else 0)
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_authenticated_no_websocket_user_already_editing(
settings,
):
"""
A user not connected to the websocket and another user have already updated the document,
the document can not be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 0, "exists": False})
cache.set(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}", "other_session_key")
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": False}
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_no_websocket_other_user_connected_to_websocket(
settings,
):
"""
A user not connected to the websocket and another user is connected to the websocket,
the document can not be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 3, "exists": False})
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": False}
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_user_connected_to_websocket(settings):
"""
A user connected to the websocket, the document can be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 3, "exists": True})
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": True}
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_websocket_server_unreachable_fallback_to_no_websocket(
settings,
):
"""
When the websocket server is unreachable, the document can be updated like if the user was
not connected to the websocket.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=500)
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": True}
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_websocket_server_unreachable_fallback_to_no_websocket_other_users(
settings,
):
"""
When the websocket server is unreachable, the behavior fallback to the no websocket one.
If an other user is already editing, the document can not be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=500)
cache.set(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}", "other_session_key")
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": False}
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") == "other_session_key"
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_websocket_server_room_not_found(
settings,
):
"""
When the websocket server returns a 404, the document can be updated like if the user was
not connected to the websocket.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=404)
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": True}
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_can_edit_websocket_server_room_not_found_other_already_editing(
settings,
):
"""
When the websocket server returns a 404 and another user is editing the document,
the response should be can-edit=False.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=404)
cache.set(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}", "other_session_key")
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/can-edit/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"can_edit": False}
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1

View File

@@ -98,9 +98,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_create_authenticated_success(reach, role, depth)
if i == 0:
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach, link_role=role)
else:
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
parent=document, link_reach="restricted"
)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=document, link_role="reader")
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
@@ -114,8 +112,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_create_authenticated_success(reach, role, depth)
child = Document.objects.get(id=response.json()["id"])
assert child.title == "my child"
assert child.link_reach == "restricted"
# Access objects on the child are not necessary
assert child.accesses.exists() is False
assert child.accesses.filter(role="owner", user=user).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize("depth", [1, 2, 3])
@@ -183,8 +180,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_create_related_success(role, depth):
child = Document.objects.get(id=response.json()["id"])
assert child.title == "my child"
assert child.link_reach == "restricted"
# Access objects on the child are not necessary
assert child.accesses.exists() is False
assert child.accesses.filter(role="owner", user=user).exists()
def test_api_documents_children_create_authenticated_title_null():

View File

@@ -14,18 +14,13 @@ from core import factories
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_standalone(
django_assert_num_queries,
):
def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_standalone():
"""Anonymous users should be allowed to retrieve the children of a public document."""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public")
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
with django_assert_num_queries(8):
APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
with django_assert_num_queries(4):
response = APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
response = APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
@@ -35,10 +30,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_standalone(
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -53,14 +44,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_standalone(
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -75,13 +62,13 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_standalone(
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_parent(django_assert_num_queries):
def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"""
Anonymous users should be allowed to retrieve the children of a document who
has a public ancestor.
@@ -96,10 +83,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_parent(django_assert_num_q
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
with django_assert_num_queries(9):
APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
with django_assert_num_queries(5):
response = APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
response = APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
@@ -109,10 +93,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_parent(django_assert_num_q
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": child1.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child1.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -127,14 +107,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_parent(django_assert_num_q
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": child2.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child2.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -149,7 +125,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_public_parent(django_assert_num_q
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
@@ -173,7 +149,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_anonymous_restricted_or_authenticated(reach
@pytest.mark.parametrize("reach", ["public", "authenticated"])
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated(
reach, django_assert_num_queries
reach,
):
"""
Authenticated users should be able to retrieve the children of a public/authenticated
@@ -187,13 +163,9 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authentic
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
with django_assert_num_queries(9):
client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
with django_assert_num_queries(5):
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 2,
@@ -202,10 +174,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authentic
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -220,14 +188,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authentic
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -242,7 +206,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authentic
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
@@ -250,7 +214,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authentic
@pytest.mark.parametrize("reach", ["public", "authenticated"])
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
reach, django_assert_num_queries
reach,
):
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve the children of a document who
@@ -267,11 +231,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_paren
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
with django_assert_num_queries(10):
client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
with django_assert_num_queries(6):
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
@@ -281,10 +241,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_paren
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child1.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child1.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -299,14 +255,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_paren
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child2.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child2.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -321,15 +273,13 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_paren
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_restricted(
django_assert_num_queries,
):
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_restricted():
"""
Authenticated users should not be allowed to retrieve the children of a document that is
restricted and to which they are not related.
@@ -343,20 +293,16 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_unrelated_restricted(
child1, _child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
with django_assert_num_queries(2):
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_direct(
django_assert_num_queries,
):
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve the children of a document
to which they are directly related whatever the role.
@@ -373,13 +319,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_direct(
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
with django_assert_num_queries(9):
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
link_role = None if document.link_reach == "restricted" else document.link_role
assert response.json() == {
"count": 2,
"next": None,
@@ -387,10 +330,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_direct(
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -405,14 +344,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_direct(
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -427,15 +362,13 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_direct(
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
}
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_parent(
django_assert_num_queries,
):
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve the children of a document if they
are related to one of its ancestors whatever the role.
@@ -456,11 +389,9 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_parent(
document=grand_parent, user=user
)
with django_assert_num_queries(10):
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"count": 2,
@@ -469,10 +400,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_parent(
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -487,14 +414,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_parent(
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": grand_parent_access.role,
"user_roles": [grand_parent_access.role],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -509,15 +432,13 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_parent(
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": grand_parent_access.role,
"user_roles": [grand_parent_access.role],
},
],
}
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_child(
django_assert_num_queries,
):
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_child():
"""
Authenticated users should not be allowed to retrieve all the children of a document
as a result of being related to one of its children.
@@ -533,20 +454,16 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_child(
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1, user=user)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
with django_assert_num_queries(2):
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_none(
mock_user_teams, django_assert_num_queries
):
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_none(mock_user_teams):
"""
Authenticated users should not be able to retrieve the children of a restricted document
related to teams in which the user is not.
@@ -563,9 +480,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_none(
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, team="myteam")
with django_assert_num_queries(2):
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
@@ -573,7 +488,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_none(
def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
mock_user_teams, django_assert_num_queries
mock_user_teams,
):
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve the children of a document to which they
@@ -591,8 +506,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
access = factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, team="myteam")
with django_assert_num_queries(9):
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/children/")
# pylint: disable=R0801
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -603,10 +517,6 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -621,14 +531,10 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -643,7 +549,7 @@ def test_api_documents_children_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
import pytest
import responses
from requests.exceptions import RequestException
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories
@@ -24,25 +23,10 @@ def test_api_docs_cors_proxy_valid_url():
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.headers["Content-Type"] == "image/png"
assert response.headers["Content-Disposition"] == "attachment;"
policy_list = sorted(response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"].split("; "))
assert policy_list == [
"base-uri 'none'",
"child-src 'none'",
"connect-src 'none'",
"default-src 'none'",
"font-src 'none'",
"form-action 'none'",
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
"frame-src 'none'",
"img-src 'none' data:",
"manifest-src 'none'",
"media-src 'none'",
"object-src 'none'",
"prefetch-src 'none'",
"script-src 'none'",
"style-src 'none'",
"worker-src 'none'",
]
assert (
response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"]
== "default-src 'none'; img-src 'none' data:;"
)
assert response.streaming_content
@@ -93,25 +77,10 @@ def test_api_docs_cors_proxy_authenticated_user_accessing_protected_doc():
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.headers["Content-Type"] == "image/png"
assert response.headers["Content-Disposition"] == "attachment;"
policy_list = sorted(response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"].split("; "))
assert policy_list == [
"base-uri 'none'",
"child-src 'none'",
"connect-src 'none'",
"default-src 'none'",
"font-src 'none'",
"form-action 'none'",
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
"frame-src 'none'",
"img-src 'none' data:",
"manifest-src 'none'",
"media-src 'none'",
"object-src 'none'",
"prefetch-src 'none'",
"script-src 'none'",
"style-src 'none'",
"worker-src 'none'",
]
assert (
response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"]
== "default-src 'none'; img-src 'none' data:;"
)
assert response.streaming_content
@@ -150,41 +119,3 @@ def test_api_docs_cors_proxy_unsupported_media_type():
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/cors-proxy/?url={url_to_fetch}"
)
assert response.status_code == 415
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url_to_fetch",
[
"ftp://external-url.com/assets/index.html",
"ftps://external-url.com/assets/index.html",
"invalid-url.com",
"ssh://external-url.com/assets/index.html",
],
)
def test_api_docs_cors_proxy_invalid_url(url_to_fetch):
"""Test the CORS proxy API for documents with an invalid URL."""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public")
client = APIClient()
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/cors-proxy/?url={url_to_fetch}"
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert response.json() == ["Enter a valid URL."]
@responses.activate
def test_api_docs_cors_proxy_request_failed():
"""Test the CORS proxy API for documents with a request failed."""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public")
client = APIClient()
url_to_fetch = "https://external-url.com/assets/index.html"
responses.get(url_to_fetch, body=RequestException("Connection refused"))
response = client.get(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/cors-proxy/?url={url_to_fetch}"
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert response.json() == {
"error": "Failed to fetch resource from https://external-url.com/assets/index.html"
}

View File

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
@pytest.fixture
def mock_convert_md():
"""Mock YdocConverter.convert to return a converted content."""
"""Mock YdocConverter.convert_markdown to return a converted content."""
with patch.object(
YdocConverter,
"convert",
"convert_markdown",
return_value="Converted document content",
) as mock:
yield mock
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ def test_api_documents_create_for_owner_invalid_sub():
data = {
"title": "My Document",
"content": "Document content",
"sub": "invalid süb",
"sub": "123!!",
"email": "john.doe@example.com",
}
@@ -163,7 +163,10 @@ def test_api_documents_create_for_owner_invalid_sub():
assert not Document.objects.exists()
assert response.json() == {
"sub": ["Enter a valid sub. This value should be ASCII only."]
"sub": [
"Enter a valid sub. This value may contain only letters, "
"numbers, and @/./+/-/_/: characters."
]
}

View File

@@ -32,10 +32,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_standalone():
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -50,16 +46,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_standalone():
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": "editor"
if (child1.link_reach == "public" and child1.link_role == "editor")
else document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -74,14 +64,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_standalone():
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -96,7 +82,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_standalone():
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
@@ -129,10 +115,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -147,14 +129,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": grand_child.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 5,
@@ -169,14 +147,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -191,7 +165,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
@@ -227,9 +201,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authen
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(
2, parent=document, link_reach="restricted"
)
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
grand_child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=child1)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
@@ -245,10 +217,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authen
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -263,14 +231,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authen
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": grand_child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -285,14 +249,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authen
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -307,7 +267,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authen
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
@@ -329,9 +289,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_pa
grand_parent = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=grand_parent, link_reach="restricted")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted", parent=parent)
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(
2, parent=document, link_reach="restricted"
)
child1, child2 = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, parent=document)
grand_child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=child1)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=child1)
@@ -346,10 +304,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_pa
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -364,14 +318,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_pa
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": grand_child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 5,
@@ -386,14 +336,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_pa
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -408,7 +354,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_pa
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
}
@@ -468,10 +414,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child1.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child1.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -486,14 +428,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": grand_child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_child.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": grand_child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -508,14 +446,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child2.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child2.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -530,7 +464,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
}
@@ -570,10 +504,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child1.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child1.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -588,14 +518,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": grand_parent_access.role,
"user_roles": [grand_parent_access.role],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": grand_child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_child.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": grand_child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 5,
@@ -610,14 +536,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": grand_parent_access.role,
"user_roles": [grand_parent_access.role],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child2.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child2.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 4,
@@ -632,7 +554,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": grand_parent_access.role,
"user_roles": [grand_parent_access.role],
},
],
}
@@ -718,10 +640,6 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"results": [
{
"abilities": child1.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child1.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child1.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -736,14 +654,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": child1.path,
"title": child1.title,
"updated_at": child1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": grand_child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": grand_child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_child.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": grand_child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_child.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_child.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -758,14 +672,10 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": grand_child.path,
"title": grand_child.title,
"updated_at": grand_child.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": child2.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child2.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child2.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(child2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -780,7 +690,7 @@ def test_api_documents_descendants_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": child2.path,
"title": child2.title,
"updated_at": child2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
}

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ from django.utils import timezone
import pycrdt
import pytest
import requests
from freezegun import freeze_time
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ def test_api_documents_duplicate_forbidden():
def test_api_documents_duplicate_anonymous():
"""Anonymous users should not be able to duplicate documents even with read access."""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public", link_role="reader")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public")
response = APIClient().post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/duplicate/")
@@ -134,21 +133,19 @@ def test_api_documents_duplicate_success(index):
# Ensure access persists after the owner loses access to the original document
models.DocumentAccess.objects.filter(document=document).delete()
now = timezone.now()
with freeze_time(now):
response = client.get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=image_refs[0][1]
)
response = client.get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=image_refs[0][1]
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
authorization = response["Authorization"]
assert "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=" in authorization
assert (
"SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="
in authorization
)
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == timezone.now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
s3_url = urlparse(settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL)
response = requests.get(
@@ -171,17 +168,14 @@ def test_api_documents_duplicate_success(index):
assert response.status_code == 403
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["owner", "administrator"])
def test_api_documents_duplicate_with_accesses_admin(role):
"""
Accesses should be duplicated if the user requests it specifically and is owner or admin.
"""
def test_api_documents_duplicate_with_accesses():
"""Accesses should be duplicated if the user requests it specifically."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
users=[(user, role)],
users=[user],
title="document with accesses",
)
user_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
@@ -211,85 +205,3 @@ def test_api_documents_duplicate_with_accesses_admin(role):
assert duplicated_accesses.get(user=user).role == "owner"
assert duplicated_accesses.get(user=user_access.user).role == user_access.role
assert duplicated_accesses.get(team=team_access.team).role == team_access.role
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["editor", "reader"])
def test_api_documents_duplicate_with_accesses_non_admin(role):
"""
Accesses should not be duplicated if the user requests it specifically and is not owner
or admin.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
users=[(user, role)],
title="document with accesses",
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
# Duplicate the document via the API endpoint requesting to duplicate accesses
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/duplicate/",
{"with_accesses": True},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
duplicated_document = models.Document.objects.get(id=response.json()["id"])
assert duplicated_document.title == "Copy of document with accesses"
assert duplicated_document.content == document.content
assert duplicated_document.link_reach == document.link_reach
assert duplicated_document.link_role == document.link_role
assert duplicated_document.creator == user
assert duplicated_document.duplicated_from == document
assert duplicated_document.attachments == []
# Check that accesses were duplicated and the user who did the duplicate is forced as owner
duplicated_accesses = duplicated_document.accesses
assert duplicated_accesses.count() == 1
assert duplicated_accesses.get(user=user).role == "owner"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", ["editor", "reader"])
def test_api_documents_duplicate_non_root_document(role):
"""
Non-root documents can be duplicated but without accesses.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "owner")])
child = factories.DocumentFactory(
parent=document, users=[(user, role)], title="document with accesses"
)
assert child.accesses.count() == 1
# Duplicate the document via the API endpoint requesting to duplicate accesses
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{child.id!s}/duplicate/",
{"with_accesses": True},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
duplicated_document = models.Document.objects.get(id=response.json()["id"])
assert duplicated_document.title == "Copy of document with accesses"
assert duplicated_document.content == child.content
assert duplicated_document.link_reach == child.link_reach
assert duplicated_document.link_role == child.link_role
assert duplicated_document.creator == user
assert duplicated_document.duplicated_from == child
assert duplicated_document.attachments == []
# No access should be created for non root documents
duplicated_accesses = duplicated_document.accesses
assert duplicated_accesses.count() == 0
assert duplicated_document.is_sibling_of(child)
assert duplicated_document.is_child_of(document)

View File

@@ -45,10 +45,7 @@ def test_api_document_favorite_anonymous_user(method, reach):
],
)
def test_api_document_favorite_authenticated_post_allowed(reach, has_role):
"""
Authenticated users should be able to mark a document to which they have access
as favorite using POST.
"""
"""Authenticated users should be able to mark a document as favorite using POST."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
client = APIClient()
@@ -72,10 +69,7 @@ def test_api_document_favorite_authenticated_post_allowed(reach, has_role):
def test_api_document_favorite_authenticated_post_forbidden():
"""
Authenticated users should not be allowed to mark a document to which they don't
have access as favorite using POST.
"""
"""Authenticated users should be able to mark a document as favorite using POST."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
client = APIClient()

View File

@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ def test_api_document_favorite_list_authenticated_with_favorite():
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
# If the user doesn't have access to this document (e.g the user had access
# and this access was removed), it should not be in the favorite list anymore.
# User don't have access to this document, let say it had access and this access has been
# removed. It should not be in the favorite list anymore.
factories.DocumentFactory(favorited_by=[user])
document = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
@@ -59,10 +59,6 @@ def test_api_document_favorite_list_authenticated_with_favorite():
"results": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"content": document.content,
@@ -78,7 +74,7 @@ def test_api_document_favorite_list_authenticated_with_favorite():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": "reader",
"user_roles": ["reader"],
}
],
}

View File

@@ -63,10 +63,6 @@ def test_api_documents_list_format():
assert results[0] == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"depth": 1,
@@ -80,7 +76,7 @@ def test_api_documents_list_format():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
}
@@ -152,11 +148,11 @@ def test_api_documents_list_authenticated_direct(django_assert_num_queries):
str(child4_with_access.id),
}
with django_assert_num_queries(14):
with django_assert_num_queries(12):
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/")
# nb_accesses should now be cached
with django_assert_num_queries(6):
with django_assert_num_queries(4):
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/")
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -272,11 +268,11 @@ def test_api_documents_list_authenticated_link_reach_public_or_authenticated(
expected_ids = {str(document1.id), str(document2.id), str(visible_child.id)}
with django_assert_num_queries(11):
with django_assert_num_queries(10):
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/")
# nb_accesses should now be cached
with django_assert_num_queries(5):
with django_assert_num_queries(4):
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/")
assert response.status_code == 200

View File

@@ -312,84 +312,6 @@ def test_api_documents_list_filter_is_favorite_invalid():
assert len(results) == 5
# Filters: is_masked
def test_api_documents_list_filter_is_masked_true():
"""
Authenticated users should be able to filter documents they marked as masked.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, users=[user])
masked_documents = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(
3, users=[user], masked_by=[user]
)
unmasked_documents = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, users=[user])
for document in unmasked_documents:
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/?is_masked=true")
assert response.status_code == 200
results = response.json()["results"]
assert len(results) == 3
# Ensure all results are marked as masked by the current user
masked_documents_ids = [str(doc.id) for doc in masked_documents]
for result in results:
assert result["id"] in masked_documents_ids
def test_api_documents_list_filter_is_masked_false():
"""
Authenticated users should be able to filter documents they didn't mark as masked.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, users=[user])
masked_documents = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(
3, users=[user], masked_by=[user]
)
unmasked_documents = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, users=[user])
for document in unmasked_documents:
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/?is_masked=false")
assert response.status_code == 200
results = response.json()["results"]
assert len(results) == 4
# Ensure all results are not marked as masked by the current user
masked_documents_ids = [str(doc.id) for doc in masked_documents]
for result in results:
assert result["id"] not in masked_documents_ids
def test_api_documents_list_filter_is_masked_invalid():
"""Filtering with an invalid `is_masked` value should do nothing."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, users=[user])
factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(3, users=[user], masked_by=[user])
unmasked_documents = factories.DocumentFactory.create_batch(2, users=[user])
for document in unmasked_documents:
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
response = client.get("/api/v1.0/documents/?is_masked=invalid")
assert response.status_code == 200
results = response.json()["results"]
assert len(results) == 7
# Filters: title

View File

@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
"""Test mask document API endpoint for users in impress's core app."""
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach",
[
"restricted",
"authenticated",
"public",
],
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["post", "delete"])
def test_api_document_mask_anonymous_user(method, reach):
"""Anonymous users should not be able to mask/unmask documents."""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
response = getattr(APIClient(), method)(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/"
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "Authentication credentials were not provided."
}
# Verify in database
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.exists() is False
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach, has_role",
[
["restricted", True],
["authenticated", False],
["authenticated", True],
["public", False],
["public", True],
],
)
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_allowed(reach, has_role):
"""Authenticated users should be able to mask a document to which they have access."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
if has_role:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
# Try masking the document without a link trace
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 400
assert response.json() == {"detail": "User never accessed this document before."}
assert not models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(document=document, user=user).exists()
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
# Mask document
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 201
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Document was masked"}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=True
).exists()
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_forbidden():
"""
Authenticated users should no be allowed to mask a document
to which they don't have access.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
# Try masking
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
# Verify in database
assert (
models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(document=document, user=user).exists() is False
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach, has_role",
[
["restricted", True],
["authenticated", False],
["authenticated", True],
["public", False],
["public", True],
],
)
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_already_masked_allowed(reach, has_role):
"""POST should not create duplicate link trace if already marked."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach, masked_by=[user])
if has_role:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
# Try masking again
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Document was already masked"}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=True
).exists()
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_already_masked_forbidden():
"""POST should not create duplicate masks if already marked."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted", masked_by=[user])
# Try masking again
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(document=document, user=user).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach, has_role",
[
["restricted", True],
["authenticated", False],
["authenticated", True],
["public", False],
["public", True],
],
)
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_unmasked_allowed(reach, has_role):
"""POST should not create duplicate link trace if unmasked."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
if has_role:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
# Try masking again
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 201
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Document was masked"}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=True
).exists()
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_unmasked_forbidden():
"""POST should not create duplicate masks if unmasked."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
# Try masking again
response = client.post(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=False
).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach, has_role",
[
["restricted", True],
["authenticated", False],
["authenticated", True],
["public", False],
["public", True],
],
)
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_delete_allowed(reach, has_role):
"""Authenticated users should be able to unmask a document using DELETE."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach, masked_by=[user])
if has_role:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
# Unmask document
response = client.delete(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 204
assert response.content == b"" # No body
assert response.text == "" # Empty decoded text
assert "Content-Type" not in response.headers # No Content-Type for 204
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=False
).exists()
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_delete_forbidden():
"""
Authenticated users should not be allowed to unmask a document if
they don't have access to it.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted", masked_by=[user])
# Unmask document
response = client.delete(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=True
).exists()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach, has_role",
[
["restricted", True],
["authenticated", False],
["authenticated", True],
["public", False],
["public", True],
],
)
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_delete_not_masked_allowed(reach, has_role):
"""DELETE should be idempotent if the document is not masked."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
if has_role:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
# Try unmasking the document without a link trace
response = client.delete(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 400
assert response.json() == {"detail": "User never accessed this document before."}
assert not models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(document=document, user=user).exists()
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
# Unmask document
response = client.delete(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Document was already not masked"}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=False
).exists()
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_delete_not_masked_forbidden():
"""DELETE should be idempotent if the document is not masked."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="restricted")
# Try to unmask when no entry exists
response = client.delete(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
assert (
models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(document=document, user=user).exists() is False
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"reach, has_role",
[
["restricted", True],
["authenticated", False],
["authenticated", True],
["public", False],
["public", True],
],
)
def test_api_document_mask_authenticated_post_unmark_then_mark_again_allowed(
reach, has_role
):
"""A user should be able to mask, unmask, and mask a document again."""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=reach)
if has_role:
models.DocumentAccess.objects.create(document=document, user=user)
models.LinkTrace.objects.create(document=document, user=user, is_masked=False)
url = f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/mask/"
# Mask document
response = client.post(url)
assert response.status_code == 201
# Unmask document
response = client.delete(url)
assert response.status_code == 204
assert response.content == b"" # No body
assert response.text == "" # Empty decoded text
assert "Content-Type" not in response.headers # No Content-Type for 204
# Mask document again
response = client.post(url)
assert response.status_code == 201
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Document was masked"}
assert models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user, is_masked=True
).exists()

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ from django.utils import timezone
import pytest
import requests
from freezegun import freeze_time
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
@@ -53,11 +52,9 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_anonymous_public():
factories.DocumentFactory(id=document_id, link_reach="public", attachments=[key])
original_url = f"http://localhost/media/{key:s}"
now = timezone.now()
with freeze_time(now):
response = APIClient().get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=original_url
)
response = APIClient().get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=original_url
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -67,7 +64,7 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_anonymous_public():
"SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="
in authorization
)
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == timezone.now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
s3_url = urlparse(settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL)
file_url = f"{settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL:s}/impress-media-storage/{key:s}"
@@ -170,11 +167,9 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_anonymous_attachments():
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public")
factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent, link_reach="restricted", attachments=[key])
now = timezone.now()
with freeze_time(now):
response = APIClient().get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
response = APIClient().get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -184,7 +179,7 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_anonymous_attachments():
"SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="
in authorization
)
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == timezone.now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
s3_url = urlparse(settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL)
file_url = f"{settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL:s}/impress-media-storage/{key:s}"
@@ -226,11 +221,9 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_authenticated_public_or_authenticated(reach):
factories.DocumentFactory(id=document_id, link_reach=reach, attachments=[key])
now = timezone.now()
with freeze_time(now):
response = client.get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
response = client.get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -240,7 +233,7 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_authenticated_public_or_authenticated(reach):
"SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="
in authorization
)
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == timezone.now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
s3_url = urlparse(settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL)
file_url = f"{settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL:s}/impress-media-storage/{key:s}"
@@ -314,11 +307,9 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_related(via, mock_user_teams):
mock_user_teams.return_value = ["lasuite", "unknown"]
factories.TeamDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, team="lasuite")
now = timezone.now()
with freeze_time(now):
response = client.get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
response = client.get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -328,7 +319,7 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_related(via, mock_user_teams):
"SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="
in authorization
)
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == timezone.now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
s3_url = urlparse(settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL)
file_url = f"{settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL:s}/impress-media-storage/{key:s}"
@@ -382,12 +373,10 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_missing_status_metadata():
factories.DocumentFactory(id=document_id, link_reach="public", attachments=[key])
now = timezone.now()
original_url = f"http://localhost/media/{key:s}"
with freeze_time(now):
response = APIClient().get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=original_url
)
response = APIClient().get(
"/api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=original_url
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -397,7 +386,7 @@ def test_api_documents_media_auth_missing_status_metadata():
"SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date, Signature="
in authorization
)
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
assert response["X-Amz-Date"] == timezone.now().strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
s3_url = urlparse(settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL)
file_url = f"{settings.AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL:s}/impress-media-storage/{key:s}"

View File

@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ def test_api_documents_move_authenticated_target_roles_mocked(
target_role, target_parent_role, position
):
"""
Only authenticated users with sufficient permissions on the target document (or its
parent depending on the position chosen), should be allowed to move documents.
Authenticated users with insufficient permissions on the target document (or its
parent depending on the position chosen), should not be allowed to move documents.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
@@ -208,107 +208,6 @@ def test_api_documents_move_authenticated_target_roles_mocked(
assert document.is_root() is True
def test_api_documents_move_authenticated_no_owner_user_and_team():
"""
Moving a document with no owner to the root of the tree should automatically declare
the owner of the previous root of the document as owner of the document itself.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent_owner = factories.UserFactory()
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(
users=[(parent_owner, "owner")], teams=[("lasuite", "owner")]
)
# A document with no owner
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent, users=[(user, "administrator")])
child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=document)
target = factories.DocumentFactory()
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/move/",
data={"target_document_id": str(target.id), "position": "first-sibling"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"message": "Document moved successfully."}
assert list(target.get_siblings()) == [document, parent, target]
document.refresh_from_db()
assert list(document.get_children()) == [child]
assert document.accesses.count() == 3
assert document.accesses.get(user__isnull=False, role="owner").user == parent_owner
assert document.accesses.get(user__isnull=True, role="owner").team == "lasuite"
assert document.accesses.get(role="administrator").user == user
def test_api_documents_move_authenticated_no_owner_same_user():
"""
Moving a document should not fail if the user moving a document with no owner was
at the same time owner of the previous root and has a role on the document being moved.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(
users=[(user, "owner")], teams=[("lasuite", "owner")]
)
# A document with no owner
document = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=parent, users=[(user, "reader")])
child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=document)
target = factories.DocumentFactory()
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/move/",
data={"target_document_id": str(target.id), "position": "first-sibling"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"message": "Document moved successfully."}
assert list(target.get_siblings()) == [document, parent, target]
document.refresh_from_db()
assert list(document.get_children()) == [child]
assert document.accesses.count() == 2
assert document.accesses.get(user__isnull=False, role="owner").user == user
assert document.accesses.get(user__isnull=True, role="owner").team == "lasuite"
def test_api_documents_move_authenticated_no_owner_same_team():
"""
Moving a document should not fail if the team that is owner of the document root was
already declared on the document with a different role.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(teams=[("lasuite", "owner")])
# A document with no owner but same team
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
parent=parent, users=[(user, "administrator")], teams=[("lasuite", "reader")]
)
child = factories.DocumentFactory(parent=document)
target = factories.DocumentFactory()
response = client.post(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/move/",
data={"target_document_id": str(target.id), "position": "first-sibling"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"message": "Document moved successfully."}
assert list(target.get_siblings()) == [document, parent, target]
document.refresh_from_db()
assert list(document.get_children()) == [child]
assert document.accesses.count() == 2
assert document.accesses.get(user__isnull=False, role="administrator").user == user
assert document.accesses.get(user__isnull=True, role="owner").team == "lasuite"
def test_api_documents_move_authenticated_deleted_document():
"""
It should not be possible to move a deleted document or its descendants, even

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
"""
Tests for Documents API endpoint in impress's core app: retrieve
"""
# pylint: disable=too-many-lines
import random
from datetime import timedelta
@@ -12,7 +11,7 @@ from django.utils import timezone
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import choices, factories, models
from core import factories, models
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
@@ -32,14 +31,13 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_standalone():
"ai_transform": False,
"ai_translate": False,
"attachment_upload": document.link_role == "editor",
"can_edit": document.link_role == "editor",
"children_create": False,
"children_list": True,
"collaboration_auth": True,
"cors_proxy": True,
"descendants": True,
"destroy": False,
"duplicate": False,
"duplicate": True,
# Anonymous user can't favorite a document even with read access
"favorite": False,
"invite_owner": False,
@@ -47,9 +45,8 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_standalone():
"link_select_options": {
"authenticated": ["reader", "editor"],
"public": ["reader", "editor"],
"restricted": None,
"restricted": ["reader", "editor"],
},
"mask": False,
"media_auth": True,
"media_check": True,
"move": False,
@@ -62,10 +59,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_standalone():
"versions_list": False,
"versions_retrieve": False,
},
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -80,7 +73,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_standalone():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
@@ -98,7 +91,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_parent():
assert response.status_code == 200
links = document.get_ancestors().values("link_reach", "link_role")
links_definition = choices.get_equivalent_link_definition(links)
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": {
@@ -107,22 +99,18 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_parent():
"ai_transform": False,
"ai_translate": False,
"attachment_upload": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"can_edit": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"children_create": False,
"children_list": True,
"collaboration_auth": True,
"descendants": True,
"cors_proxy": True,
"destroy": False,
"duplicate": False,
"duplicate": True,
# Anonymous user can't favorite a document even with read access
"favorite": False,
"invite_owner": False,
"link_configuration": False,
"link_select_options": models.LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(
**links_definition
),
"mask": False,
"link_select_options": models.LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(links),
"media_auth": True,
"media_check": True,
"move": False,
@@ -135,10 +123,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_parent():
"versions_list": False,
"versions_retrieve": False,
},
"ancestors_link_reach": "public",
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": "public",
"computed_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -153,7 +137,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_parent():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
@@ -212,7 +196,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated(
"ai_transform": document.link_role == "editor",
"ai_translate": document.link_role == "editor",
"attachment_upload": document.link_role == "editor",
"can_edit": document.link_role == "editor",
"children_create": document.link_role == "editor",
"children_list": True,
"collaboration_auth": True,
@@ -226,9 +209,8 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated(
"link_select_options": {
"authenticated": ["reader", "editor"],
"public": ["reader", "editor"],
"restricted": None,
"restricted": ["reader", "editor"],
},
"mask": True,
"media_auth": True,
"media_check": True,
"move": False,
@@ -241,10 +223,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated(
"versions_list": False,
"versions_retrieve": False,
},
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -259,7 +237,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated(
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
assert (
models.LinkTrace.objects.filter(document=document, user=user).exists() is True
@@ -285,7 +263,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(rea
assert response.status_code == 200
links = document.get_ancestors().values("link_reach", "link_role")
links_definition = choices.get_equivalent_link_definition(links)
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": {
@@ -294,7 +271,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(rea
"ai_transform": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"ai_translate": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"attachment_upload": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"can_edit": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"children_create": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"children_list": True,
"collaboration_auth": True,
@@ -305,13 +281,10 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(rea
"favorite": True,
"invite_owner": False,
"link_configuration": False,
"link_select_options": models.LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(
**links_definition
),
"mask": True,
"move": False,
"link_select_options": models.LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(links),
"media_auth": True,
"media_check": True,
"move": False,
"partial_update": grand_parent.link_role == "editor",
"restore": False,
"retrieve": True,
@@ -321,10 +294,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(rea
"versions_list": False,
"versions_retrieve": False,
},
"ancestors_link_reach": reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.link_role,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -339,7 +308,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(rea
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
@@ -435,10 +404,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_direct():
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
@@ -453,7 +418,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
}
@@ -479,7 +444,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_parent():
)
assert response.status_code == 200
links = document.get_ancestors().values("link_reach", "link_role")
link_definition = choices.get_equivalent_link_definition(links)
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": {
@@ -488,21 +452,17 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_parent():
"ai_transform": access.role != "reader",
"ai_translate": access.role != "reader",
"attachment_upload": access.role != "reader",
"can_edit": access.role != "reader",
"children_create": access.role != "reader",
"children_list": True,
"collaboration_auth": True,
"descendants": True,
"cors_proxy": True,
"destroy": access.role in ["administrator", "owner"],
"destroy": access.role == "owner",
"duplicate": True,
"favorite": True,
"invite_owner": access.role == "owner",
"link_configuration": access.role in ["administrator", "owner"],
"link_select_options": models.LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(
**link_definition
),
"mask": True,
"link_select_options": models.LinkReachChoices.get_select_options(links),
"media_auth": True,
"media_check": True,
"move": access.role in ["administrator", "owner"],
@@ -515,10 +475,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_parent():
"versions_list": True,
"versions_retrieve": True,
},
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": "restricted",
"computed_link_role": None,
"content": document.content,
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
@@ -533,7 +489,7 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_parent():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
}
@@ -629,16 +585,16 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_none(mock_user_teams)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"teams,role",
"teams,roles",
[
[["readers"], "reader"],
[["unknown", "readers"], "reader"],
[["editors"], "editor"],
[["unknown", "editors"], "editor"],
[["readers"], ["reader"]],
[["unknown", "readers"], ["reader"]],
[["editors"], ["editor"]],
[["unknown", "editors"], ["editor"]],
],
)
def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_members(
teams, role, mock_user_teams
teams, roles, mock_user_teams
):
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve a document to which they
@@ -671,10 +627,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_members(
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -689,20 +641,20 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": role,
"user_roles": roles,
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"teams,role",
"teams,roles",
[
[["administrators"], "administrator"],
[["editors", "administrators"], "administrator"],
[["unknown", "administrators"], "administrator"],
[["administrators"], ["administrator"]],
[["editors", "administrators"], ["administrator", "editor"]],
[["unknown", "administrators"], ["administrator"]],
],
)
def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_administrators(
teams, role, mock_user_teams
teams, roles, mock_user_teams
):
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve a document to which they
@@ -737,10 +689,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_administrators(
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -755,21 +703,21 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_administrators(
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": role,
"user_roles": roles,
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"teams,role",
"teams,roles",
[
[["owners"], "owner"],
[["owners", "administrators"], "owner"],
[["members", "administrators", "owners"], "owner"],
[["unknown", "owners"], "owner"],
[["owners"], ["owner"]],
[["owners", "administrators"], ["owner", "administrator"]],
[["members", "administrators", "owners"], ["owner", "administrator"]],
[["unknown", "owners"], ["owner"]],
],
)
def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_owners(
teams, role, mock_user_teams
teams, roles, mock_user_teams
):
"""
Authenticated users should be allowed to retrieve a restricted document to which
@@ -803,10 +751,6 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_owners(
assert response.json() == {
"id": str(document.id),
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"content": document.content,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
@@ -821,11 +765,11 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_authenticated_related_team_owners(
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": role,
"user_roles": roles,
}
def test_api_documents_retrieve_user_role(django_assert_max_num_queries):
def test_api_documents_retrieve_user_roles(django_assert_max_num_queries):
"""
Roles should be annotated on querysets taking into account all documents ancestors.
"""
@@ -848,14 +792,15 @@ def test_api_documents_retrieve_user_role(django_assert_max_num_queries):
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=parent, user=user),
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, user=user),
)
expected_role = choices.RoleChoices.max(*[access.role for access in accesses])
expected_roles = {access.role for access in accesses}
with django_assert_max_num_queries(14):
response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["user_role"] == expected_role
user_roles = response.json()["user_roles"]
assert set(user_roles) == expected_roles
def test_api_documents_retrieve_numqueries_with_link_trace(django_assert_num_queries):

View File

@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ def test_api_documents_trashbin_format():
"ai_transform": True,
"ai_translate": True,
"attachment_upload": True,
"can_edit": True,
"children_create": True,
"children_list": True,
"collaboration_auth": True,
@@ -89,9 +88,8 @@ def test_api_documents_trashbin_format():
"link_select_options": {
"authenticated": ["reader", "editor"],
"public": ["reader", "editor"],
"restricted": None,
"restricted": ["reader", "editor"],
},
"mask": True,
"media_auth": True,
"media_check": True,
"move": False, # Can't move a deleted document
@@ -104,10 +102,6 @@ def test_api_documents_trashbin_format():
"versions_list": True,
"versions_retrieve": True,
},
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"depth": 1,
@@ -120,7 +114,7 @@ def test_api_documents_trashbin_format():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": "owner",
"user_roles": ["owner"],
}

View File

@@ -32,19 +32,13 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_standalone(django_assert_num_q
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -63,13 +57,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_standalone(django_assert_num_q
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"ancestors_link_reach": document.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -84,15 +74,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_standalone(django_assert_num_q
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": sibling1.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": sibling1.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": sibling1.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": sibling1.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": sibling1.computed_link_role,
"created_at": sibling1.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(sibling1.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -107,15 +93,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_standalone(django_assert_num_q
"path": sibling1.path,
"title": sibling1.title,
"updated_at": sibling1.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": sibling2.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": sibling2.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": sibling2.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": sibling2.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": sibling2.computed_link_role,
"created_at": sibling2.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(sibling2.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -130,11 +112,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_standalone(django_assert_num_q
"path": sibling2.path,
"title": sibling2.title,
"updated_at": sibling2.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 1,
@@ -149,7 +129,7 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_standalone(django_assert_num_q
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
@@ -183,28 +163,18 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
response = APIClient().get(f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/tree/")
assert response.status_code == 200
expected_tree = {
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": grand_parent.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": grand_parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -223,11 +193,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -246,15 +214,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": document_sibling.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": document_sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document_sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": document_sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document_sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document_sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -273,11 +237,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"updated_at": document_sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -292,15 +254,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": parent_sibling.get_abilities(AnonymousUser()),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent_sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent_sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": parent_sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent_sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent_sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -319,11 +277,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"updated_at": parent_sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": grand_parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_parent.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -338,9 +294,8 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_anonymous_public_parent():
"path": grand_parent.path,
"title": grand_parent.title,
"updated_at": grand_parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
assert response.json() == expected_tree
@pytest.mark.parametrize("reach", ["restricted", "authenticated"])
@@ -386,21 +341,13 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -419,11 +366,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -438,15 +383,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(sibling.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -461,11 +402,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated
"path": sibling.path,
"title": sibling.title,
"updated_at": sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 1,
@@ -480,7 +419,7 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_unrelated_public_or_authenticated
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
@@ -521,26 +460,16 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": grand_parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": grand_parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -559,11 +488,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -582,15 +509,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": document_sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document_sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document_sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": document_sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document_sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document_sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -609,11 +532,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
"updated_at": document_sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -628,15 +549,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
{
"abilities": parent_sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent_sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent_sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": parent_sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent_sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent_sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -655,11 +572,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
"updated_at": parent_sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": grand_parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_parent.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -674,7 +589,7 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_public_or_authenticated_parent(
"path": grand_parent.path,
"title": grand_parent.title,
"updated_at": grand_parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": None,
"user_roles": [],
}
@@ -724,21 +639,13 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_direct():
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -757,11 +664,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -776,15 +681,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(sibling.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -799,11 +700,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": sibling.path,
"title": sibling.title,
"updated_at": sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 1,
@@ -818,7 +717,7 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_direct():
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
}
@@ -863,26 +762,16 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": grand_parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": grand_parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": grand_parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": child.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": child.ancestors_link_role,
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"children": [],
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -901,11 +790,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -924,15 +811,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": document_sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": document_sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": document_sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": document_sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document_sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document_sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -951,11 +834,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"updated_at": document_sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 3,
@@ -970,15 +851,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": parent_sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": parent_sibling.ancestors_link_reach,
"ancestors_link_role": parent_sibling.ancestors_link_role,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": parent_sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent_sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent_sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -997,11 +874,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"updated_at": parent_sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": grand_parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": grand_parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": grand_parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(grand_parent.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -1016,7 +891,7 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_parent():
"path": grand_parent.path,
"title": grand_parent.title,
"updated_at": grand_parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
}
@@ -1074,21 +949,13 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"abilities": parent.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": None,
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"children": [
{
"abilities": document.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"children": [
{
"abilities": child.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": child.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": child.computed_link_role,
"created_at": child.created_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
@@ -1107,11 +974,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"updated_at": child.updated_at.isoformat().replace(
"+00:00", "Z"
),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": document.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": document.computed_link_role,
"created_at": document.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(document.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -1126,15 +991,11 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": document.path,
"title": document.title,
"updated_at": document.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
{
"abilities": sibling.get_abilities(user),
"ancestors_link_reach": "restricted",
"ancestors_link_role": None,
"children": [],
"computed_link_reach": sibling.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": sibling.computed_link_role,
"created_at": sibling.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(sibling.creator.id),
"depth": 2,
@@ -1149,11 +1010,9 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": sibling.path,
"title": sibling.title,
"updated_at": sibling.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
},
],
"computed_link_reach": parent.computed_link_reach,
"computed_link_role": parent.computed_link_role,
"created_at": parent.created_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"creator": str(parent.creator.id),
"depth": 1,
@@ -1168,5 +1027,5 @@ def test_api_documents_tree_list_authenticated_related_team_members(
"path": parent.path,
"title": parent.title,
"updated_at": parent.updated_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"user_role": access.role,
"user_roles": [access.role],
}

View File

@@ -5,10 +5,8 @@ Tests for Documents API endpoint in impress's core app: update
import random
from django.contrib.auth.models import AnonymousUser
from django.core.cache import cache
import pytest
import responses
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
@@ -46,7 +44,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_anonymous_forbidden(reach, role, via_parent):
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
response = APIClient().put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
@@ -93,9 +90,8 @@ def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_unrelated_forbidden(
old_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(instance=document).data
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory(),
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
@@ -145,9 +141,8 @@ def test_api_documents_update_anonymous_or_authenticated_unrelated(
old_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(instance=document).data
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory(),
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
@@ -160,10 +155,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_anonymous_or_authenticated_unrelated(
for key, value in document_values.items():
if key in [
"id",
"ancestors_link_reach",
"ancestors_link_role",
"computed_link_reach",
"computed_link_role",
"accesses",
"created_at",
"creator",
@@ -215,7 +206,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_reader(via, via_parent, mock_user_te
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
@@ -268,7 +258,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_editor_administrator_or_owner(
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
@@ -281,10 +270,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_editor_administrator_or_owner(
for key, value in document_values.items():
if key in [
"id",
"ancestors_link_reach",
"ancestors_link_role",
"computed_link_reach",
"computed_link_role",
"created_at",
"creator",
"depth",
@@ -302,359 +287,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_editor_administrator_or_owner(
assert value == new_document_values[key]
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_no_websocket(settings):
"""
When a user updates the document, not connected to the websocket and is the first to update,
the document should be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 0, "exists": False})
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") == session_key
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_authenticated_no_websocket_user_already_editing(settings):
"""
When a user updates the document, not connected to the websocket and is not the first to update,
the document should not be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 0, "exists": False})
cache.set(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}", "other_session_key")
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {"detail": "You are not allowed to edit this document."}
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_no_websocket_other_user_connected_to_websocket(settings):
"""
When a user updates the document, not connected to the websocket and another user is connected
to the websocket, the document should not be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 3, "exists": False})
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {"detail": "You are not allowed to edit this document."}
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_user_connected_to_websocket(settings):
"""
When a user updates the document, connected to the websocket, the document should be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, json={"count": 3, "exists": True})
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_websocket_server_unreachable_fallback_to_no_websocket(
settings,
):
"""
When the websocket server is unreachable, the document should be updated like if the user was
not connected to the websocket.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=500)
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") == session_key
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_websocket_server_unreachable_fallback_to_no_websocket_other_users(
settings,
):
"""
When the websocket server is unreachable, the behavior fallback to the no websocket one.
If an other user is already editing, the document should not be updated.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=500)
cache.set(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}", "other_session_key")
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") == "other_session_key"
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_websocket_server_room_not_found_fallback_to_no_websocket_other_users(
settings,
):
"""
When the WebSocket server does not have the room created, the logic should fallback to
no-WebSocket. If another user is already editing, the update must be denied.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = True
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=404)
cache.set(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}", "other_session_key")
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") == "other_session_key"
assert ws_resp.call_count == 1
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_force_websocket_param_to_true(settings):
"""
When the websocket parameter is set to true, the document should be updated without any check.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=500)
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
assert ws_resp.call_count == 0
@responses.activate
def test_api_documents_update_feature_flag_disabled(settings):
"""
When the feature flag is disabled, the document should be updated without any check.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(with_owned_document=True)
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
session_key = client.session.session_key
document = factories.DocumentFactory(users=[(user, "editor")])
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = False
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
settings.COLLABORATION_WS_NOT_CONNECTED_READY_ONLY = False
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}get-connections/"
f"?room={document.id}&sessionKey={session_key}"
)
ws_resp = responses.get(endpoint_url, status=500)
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert cache.get(f"docs:no-websocket:{document.id}") is None
assert ws_resp.call_count == 0
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
def test_api_documents_update_administrator_or_owner_of_another(via, mock_user_teams):
"""
@@ -685,7 +317,6 @@ def test_api_documents_update_administrator_or_owner_of_another(via, mock_user_t
new_document_values = serializers.DocumentSerializer(
instance=factories.DocumentFactory()
).data
new_document_values["websocket"] = True
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{other_document.id!s}/",
new_document_values,

View File

@@ -47,10 +47,10 @@ def test_api_documents_update_new_attachment_keys_anonymous(django_assert_num_qu
factories.DocumentFactory(attachments=[image_keys[3]], link_reach="restricted")
expected_keys = {image_keys[i] for i in [0, 1]}
with django_assert_num_queries(11):
with django_assert_num_queries(9):
response = APIClient().put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
{"content": get_ydoc_with_mages(image_keys), "websocket": True},
{"content": get_ydoc_with_mages(image_keys)},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -60,10 +60,10 @@ def test_api_documents_update_new_attachment_keys_anonymous(django_assert_num_qu
# Check that the db query to check attachments readability for extracted
# keys is not done if the content changes but no new keys are found
with django_assert_num_queries(7):
with django_assert_num_queries(5):
response = APIClient().put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
{"content": get_ydoc_with_mages(image_keys[:2]), "websocket": True},
{"content": get_ydoc_with_mages(image_keys[:2])},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ def test_api_documents_update_new_attachment_keys_authenticated(
factories.DocumentFactory(attachments=[image_keys[4]], users=[user])
expected_keys = {image_keys[i] for i in [0, 1, 2, 4]}
with django_assert_num_queries(12):
with django_assert_num_queries(10):
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
{"content": get_ydoc_with_mages(image_keys)},
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ def test_api_documents_update_new_attachment_keys_authenticated(
# Check that the db query to check attachments readability for extracted
# keys is not done if the content changes but no new keys are found
with django_assert_num_queries(8):
with django_assert_num_queries(6):
response = client.put(
f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/",
{"content": get_ydoc_with_mages(image_keys[:2])},

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
"""Test user light serializer."""
import pytest
from core import factories
from core.api.serializers import UserLightSerializer
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
def test_user_light_serializer():
"""Test user light serializer."""
user = factories.UserFactory(
email="test@test.com",
full_name="John Doe",
short_name="John",
)
serializer = UserLightSerializer(user)
assert serializer.data["full_name"] == "John Doe"
assert serializer.data["short_name"] == "John"
def test_user_light_serializer_no_full_name():
"""Test user light serializer without full name."""
user = factories.UserFactory(
email="test_foo@test.com",
full_name=None,
short_name="John",
)
serializer = UserLightSerializer(user)
assert serializer.data["full_name"] == "test_foo"
assert serializer.data["short_name"] == "John"
def test_user_light_serializer_no_short_name():
"""Test user light serializer without short name."""
user = factories.UserFactory(
email="test_foo@test.com",
full_name=None,
short_name=None,
)
serializer = UserLightSerializer(user)
assert serializer.data["full_name"] == "test_foo"
assert serializer.data["short_name"] == "test_foo"

View File

@@ -48,7 +48,12 @@ def test_api_template_accesses_list_authenticated_unrelated():
f"/api/v1.0/templates/{template.id!s}/accesses/",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == []
assert response.json() == {
"count": 0,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
"results": [],
}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("via", VIA)
@@ -91,8 +96,8 @@ def test_api_template_accesses_list_authenticated_related(via, mock_user_teams):
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert len(content) == 3
assert sorted(content, key=lambda x: x["id"]) == sorted(
assert len(content["results"]) == 3
assert sorted(content["results"], key=lambda x: x["id"]) == sorted(
[
{
"id": str(user_access.id),

View File

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ def test_api_template_accesses_create_authenticated_administrator(via, mock_user
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "Only owners of a template can assign other users as owners."
"detail": "Only owners of a resource can assign other users as owners."
}
# It should be allowed to create a lower access

View File

@@ -62,25 +62,6 @@ def test_api_config(is_authenticated):
"AI_FEATURE_ENABLED": False,
"theme_customization": {},
}
policy_list = sorted(response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"].split("; "))
assert policy_list == [
"base-uri 'none'",
"child-src 'none'",
"connect-src 'none'",
"default-src 'none'",
"font-src 'none'",
"form-action 'none'",
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
"frame-src 'none'",
"img-src 'none'",
"manifest-src 'none'",
"media-src 'none'",
"object-src 'none'",
"prefetch-src 'none'",
"script-src 'none'",
"style-src 'none'",
"worker-src 'none'",
]
@override_settings(

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More