feat: add security-first enforcement layer with threat-model-anchored verification

Adds /gsd:secure-phase command and gsd-security-auditor agent as a
threat-model-anchored security gate parallel to Nyquist validation.

New files:
- agents/gsd-security-auditor.md — verifies PLAN.md threat mitigations
  exist in implemented code; SECURED/OPEN_THREATS/ESCALATE returns
- commands/gsd/secure-phase.md — retroactive command, mirrors validate-phase
- get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md — enforcing gate: threats_open > 0
  blocks phase advancement; accepted risks log prevents resurface
- get-shit-done/templates/SECURITY.md — per-phase threat register artifact

Modified:
- config.json — security_enforcement (absent=enabled), security_asvs_level,
  security_block_on parallel to nyquist_validation pattern
- VALIDATION.md — Threat Ref + Secure Behavior columns in verification map
- gsd-planner.md — <threat_model> block in PLAN.md format + quality gate
- gsd-executor.md — Rule 2 threat model reference + ## Threat Flags scan
- gsd-phase-researcher.md — ## Security Domain mandatory research section
- plan-phase.md — step 5.55 Security Threat Model Gate
- execute-phase.md — security gate announcement in aggregate step
- verify-work.md — /gsd:secure-phase surfaced in completion routing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bantuson
2026-03-25 11:18:30 +02:00
parent ef290664cf
commit 2154e6bb07
12 changed files with 520 additions and 3 deletions

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@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ No user permission needed for Rules 1-3.
**Critical = required for correct/secure/performant operation.** These aren't "features" — they're correctness requirements.
**Threat model reference:** Before starting each task, check if the plan's `<threat_model>` assigns `mitigate` dispositions to this task's files. Mitigations in the threat register are correctness requirements — apply Rule 2 if absent from implementation.
---
**RULE 3: Auto-fix blocking issues**
@@ -394,6 +396,18 @@ Or: "None - plan executed exactly as written."
- Components with no data source wired (props always receiving empty/mock data)
If any stubs exist, add a `## Known Stubs` section to the SUMMARY listing each stub with its file, line, and reason. These are tracked for the verifier to catch. Do NOT mark a plan as complete if stubs exist that prevent the plan's goal from being achieved — either wire the data or document in the plan why the stub is intentional and which future plan will resolve it.
**Threat surface scan:** Before writing the SUMMARY, check if any files created/modified introduce security-relevant surface NOT in the plan's `<threat_model>` — new network endpoints, auth paths, file access patterns, or schema changes at trust boundaries. If found, add:
```markdown
## Threat Flags
| Flag | File | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| threat_flag: {type} | {file} | {new surface description} |
```
Omit section if nothing found.
</summary_creation>
<self_check>

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@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ Priority: Context7 > Exa (verified) > Firecrawl (official docs) > Official GitHu
- [ ] Confidence levels assigned honestly
- [ ] "What might I have missed?" review completed
- [ ] **If rename/refactor phase:** Runtime State Inventory completed — all 5 categories answered explicitly (not left blank)
- [ ] Security domain included (or `security_enforcement: false` confirmed)
- [ ] ASVS categories verified against phase tech stack
</verification_protocol>
@@ -393,6 +395,27 @@ Verified patterns from official sources:
*(If no gaps: "None — existing test infrastructure covers all phase requirements")*
## Security Domain
> Required when `security_enforcement` is enabled (absent = enabled). Omit only if explicitly `false` in config.
### Applicable ASVS Categories
| ASVS Category | Applies | Standard Control |
|---------------|---------|-----------------|
| V2 Authentication | {yes/no} | {library or pattern} |
| V3 Session Management | {yes/no} | {library or pattern} |
| V4 Access Control | {yes/no} | {library or pattern} |
| V5 Input Validation | yes | {e.g., zod / joi / pydantic} |
| V6 Cryptography | {yes/no} | {library — never hand-roll} |
### Known Threat Patterns for {stack}
| Pattern | STRIDE | Standard Mitigation |
|---------|--------|---------------------|
| {e.g., SQL injection} | Tampering | {parameterized queries / ORM} |
| {pattern} | {category} | {mitigation} |
## Sources
### Primary (HIGH confidence)

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@@ -454,6 +454,21 @@ Output: [Artifacts created]
</tasks>
<threat_model>
## Trust Boundaries
| Boundary | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| {e.g., client→API} | {untrusted input crosses here} |
## STRIDE Threat Register
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
| T-{phase}-01 | {S/T/R/I/D/E} | {function/endpoint/file} | mitigate | {specific: e.g., "validate input with zod at route entry"} |
| T-{phase}-02 | {category} | {component} | accept | {rationale: e.g., "no PII, low-value target"} |
</threat_model>
<verification>
[Overall phase checks]
</verification>
@@ -585,6 +600,8 @@ Only include what Claude literally cannot do.
**Step 0: Extract Requirement IDs**
Read ROADMAP.md `**Requirements:**` line for this phase. Strip brackets if present (e.g., `[AUTH-01, AUTH-02]``AUTH-01, AUTH-02`). Distribute requirement IDs across plans — each plan's `requirements` frontmatter field MUST list the IDs its tasks address. **CRITICAL:** Every requirement ID MUST appear in at least one plan. Plans with an empty `requirements` field are invalid.
**Security (when `security_enforcement` enabled — absent = enabled):** Identify trust boundaries in this phase's scope. Map STRIDE categories to applicable tech stack from RESEARCH.md security domain. For each threat: assign disposition (mitigate if ASVS L1 requires it, accept if low risk, transfer if third-party). Every plan MUST include `<threat_model>` when security_enforcement is enabled.
**Step 1: State the Goal**
Take phase goal from ROADMAP.md. Must be outcome-shaped, not task-shaped.
- Good: "Working chat interface" (outcome)
@@ -1338,6 +1355,9 @@ Phase planning complete when:
- [ ] Wave structure maximizes parallelism
- [ ] PLAN file(s) committed to git
- [ ] User knows next steps and wave structure
- [ ] `<threat_model>` present with STRIDE register (when `security_enforcement` enabled)
- [ ] Every threat has a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
- [ ] Mitigations reference specific implementation (not generic advice)
## Gap Closure Mode

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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
---
name: gsd-security-auditor
description: Verifies threat mitigations from PLAN.md threat model exist in implemented code. Produces SECURITY.md. Spawned by /gsd:secure-phase.
tools:
- Read
- Write
- Edit
- Bash
- Glob
- Grep
color: "#EF4444"
---
<role>
GSD security auditor. Spawned by /gsd:secure-phase to verify that threat mitigations declared in PLAN.md are present in implemented code.
Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in `<threat_register>` by its declared disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer). Reports gaps. Writes SECURITY.md.
**Mandatory Initial Read:** If prompt contains `<files_to_read>`, load ALL listed files before any action.
**Implementation files are READ-ONLY.** Only create/modify: SECURITY.md. Implementation security gaps → OPEN_THREATS or ESCALATE. Never patch implementation.
</role>
<execution_flow>
<step name="load_context">
Read ALL files from `<files_to_read>`. Extract:
- PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block: full threat register with IDs, categories, dispositions, mitigation plans
- SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags` section: new attack surface detected by executor during implementation
- `<config>` block: `asvs_level` (1/2/3), `block_on` (open / unregistered / none)
- Implementation files: exports, auth patterns, input handling, data flows
</step>
<step name="analyze_threats">
For each threat in `<threat_register>`, determine verification method by disposition:
| Disposition | Verification Method |
|-------------|---------------------|
| `mitigate` | Grep for mitigation pattern in files cited in mitigation plan |
| `accept` | Verify entry present in SECURITY.md accepted risks log |
| `transfer` | Verify transfer documentation present (insurance, vendor SLA, etc.) |
Classify each threat before verification. Record classification for every threat — no threat skipped.
</step>
<step name="verify_and_write">
For each `mitigate` threat: grep for declared mitigation pattern in cited files → found = `CLOSED`, not found = `OPEN`.
For `accept` threats: check SECURITY.md accepted risks log → entry present = `CLOSED`, absent = `OPEN`.
For `transfer` threats: check for transfer documentation → present = `CLOSED`, absent = `OPEN`.
For each `threat_flag` in SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags`: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as `unregistered_flag` in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).
Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` count. Return structured result.
</step>
</execution_flow>
<structured_returns>
## SECURED
```markdown
## SECURED
**Phase:** {N} — {name}
**Threats Closed:** {count}/{total}
**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
### Threat Verification
| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |
### Unregistered Flags
{none / list from SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags with no threat mapping}
SECURITY.md: {path}
```
## OPEN_THREATS
```markdown
## OPEN_THREATS
**Phase:** {N} — {name}
**Closed:** {M}/{total} | **Open:** {K}/{total}
**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
### Closed
| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {disposition} | {evidence} |
### Open
| Threat ID | Category | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
|-----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
| {id} | {category} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
Next: Implement mitigations or document as accepted in SECURITY.md accepted risks log, then re-run /gsd:secure-phase.
SECURITY.md: {path}
```
## ESCALATE
```markdown
## ESCALATE
**Phase:** {N} — {name}
**Closed:** 0/{total}
### Details
| Threat ID | Reason Blocked | Suggested Action |
|-----------|----------------|------------------|
| {id} | {reason} | {action} |
```
</structured_returns>
<success_criteria>
- [ ] All `<files_to_read>` loaded before any analysis
- [ ] Threat register extracted from PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block
- [ ] Each threat verified by disposition type (mitigate / accept / transfer)
- [ ] Threat flags from SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags` incorporated
- [ ] Implementation files never modified
- [ ] SECURITY.md written to correct path
- [ ] Structured return: SECURED / OPEN_THREATS / ESCALATE
</success_criteria>

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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
---
name: gsd:secure-phase
description: Retroactively verify threat mitigations for a completed phase
argument-hint: "[phase number]"
allowed-tools:
- Read
- Write
- Edit
- Bash
- Glob
- Grep
- Task
- AskUserQuestion
---
<objective>
Verify threat mitigations for a completed phase. Three states:
- (A) SECURITY.md exists — audit and verify mitigations
- (B) No SECURITY.md, PLAN.md with threat model exists — run from artifacts
- (C) Phase not executed — exit with guidance
Output: updated SECURITY.md.
</objective>
<execution_context>
@~/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md
</execution_context>
<context>
Phase: $ARGUMENTS — optional, defaults to last completed phase.
</context>
<process>
Execute @~/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md.
Preserve all workflow gates.
</process>

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@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
---
phase: {N}
slug: {phase-slug}
status: draft
threats_open: 0
asvs_level: 1
created: {date}
---
# Phase {N} — Security
> Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail.
---
## Trust Boundaries
| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
|----------|-------------|---------------|
| {boundary} | {description} | {data type / sensitivity} |
---
## Threat Register
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|------------|--------|
| T-{N}-01 | {STRIDE category} | {component} | {mitigate / accept / transfer} | {control or reference} | open |
*Status: open · closed*
*Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)*
---
## Accepted Risks Log
| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
|---------|------------|-----------|-------------|------|
*Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.*
*If none: "No accepted risks."*
---
## Security Audit Trail
| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
|------------|---------------|--------|------|--------|
| {YYYY-MM-DD} | {N} | {N} | {N} | {name / agent} |
---
## Sign-Off
- [ ] All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
- [ ] Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
- [ ] `threats_open: 0` confirmed
- [ ] `status: verified` set in frontmatter
**Approval:** {pending / verified YYYY-MM-DD}

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@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ created: {date}
## Per-Task Verification Map
| Task ID | Plan | Wave | Requirement | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists | Status |
|---------|------|------|-------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| {N}-01-01 | 01 | 1 | REQ-{XX} | unit | `{command}` | ✅ / ❌ W0 | ⬜ pending |
| Task ID | Plan | Wave | Requirement | Threat Ref | Secure Behavior | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists | Status |
|---------|------|------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| {N}-01-01 | 01 | 1 | REQ-{XX} | T-{N}-01 / — | {expected secure behavior or "N/A"} | unit | `{command}` | ✅ / ❌ W0 | ⬜ pending |
*Status: ⬜ pending · ✅ green · ❌ red · ⚠️ flaky*

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@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
"verifier": true,
"auto_advance": false,
"nyquist_validation": true,
"security_enforcement": true,
"security_asvs_level": 1,
"security_block_on": "high",
"discuss_mode": "discuss",
"research_before_questions": false
},

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@@ -436,6 +436,27 @@ After all waves:
### Issues Encountered
[Aggregate from SUMMARYs, or "None"]
```
**Security gate check:**
```bash
SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
SECURITY_FILE=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
```
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false`: skip.
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true` AND `SECURITY_FILE` is empty (no SECURITY.md yet):
Include in the next-steps routing output:
```
⚠ Security enforcement enabled — run before advancing:
/gsd:secure-phase {PHASE} ${GSD_WS}
```
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true` AND SECURITY.md exists: check frontmatter `threats_open`. If > 0:
```
⚠ Security gate: {threats_open} threats open
/gsd:secure-phase {PHASE} — resolve before advancing
```
</step>
<step name="handle_partial_wave_execution">

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@@ -360,6 +360,32 @@ test -f "${PHASE_DIR}/${PADDED_PHASE}-VALIDATION.md" && echo "VALIDATION_CREATED
**If not found:** Warn and continue — plans may fail Dimension 8.
## 5.55. Security Threat Model Gate
> Skip if `workflow.security_enforcement` is explicitly `false`. Absent = enabled.
```bash
SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
SECURITY_ASVS=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_asvs_level --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "1")
SECURITY_BLOCK=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_block_on --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "high")
```
**If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false`:** Skip to step 5.6.
**If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true`:** Display banner:
```
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
GSD ► SECURITY THREAT MODEL REQUIRED (ASVS L{SECURITY_ASVS})
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Each PLAN.md must include a <threat_model> block.
Block on: {SECURITY_BLOCK} severity threats.
Opt out: set security_enforcement: false in .planning/config.json
```
Continue to step 5.6. Security config is passed to the planner in step 8.
## 5.6. UI Design Contract Gate
> Skip if `workflow.ui_phase` is explicitly `false` AND `workflow.ui_safety_gate` is explicitly `false` in `.planning/config.json`. If keys are absent, treat as enabled.
@@ -496,6 +522,7 @@ ${AGENT_SKILLS_PLANNER}
**Project instructions:** Read ./CLAUDE.md if exists — follow project-specific guidelines
**Project skills:** Check .claude/skills/ or .agents/skills/ directory (if either exists) — read SKILL.md files, plans should account for project skill rules
</planning_context>
<downstream_consumer>

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@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
<purpose>
Verify threat mitigations for a completed phase. Confirm PLAN.md threat register dispositions are resolved. Update SECURITY.md.
</purpose>
<required_reading>
@~/.claude/get-shit-done/references/ui-brand.md
</required_reading>
<available_agent_types>
Valid GSD subagent types (use exact names — do not fall back to 'general-purpose'):
- gsd-security-auditor — Verifies threat mitigation coverage
</available_agent_types>
<process>
## 0. Initialize
```bash
INIT=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" init phase-op "${PHASE_ARG}")
if [[ "$INIT" == @file:* ]]; then INIT=$(cat "${INIT#@file:}"); fi
AGENT_SKILLS_AUDITOR=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" agent-skills gsd-security-auditor 2>/dev/null)
```
Parse: `phase_dir`, `phase_number`, `phase_name`, `phase_slug`, `padded_phase`.
```bash
AUDITOR_MODEL=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" resolve-model gsd-security-auditor --raw)
SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
```
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false`: exit with "Security enforcement disabled. Enable via /gsd:settings."
Display banner: `GSD > SECURE PHASE {N}: {name}`
## 1. Detect Input State
```bash
SECURITY_FILE=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
PLAN_FILES=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-PLAN.md 2>/dev/null)
SUMMARY_FILES=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SUMMARY.md 2>/dev/null)
```
- **State A** (`SECURITY_FILE` non-empty): Audit existing
- **State B** (`SECURITY_FILE` empty, `PLAN_FILES` and `SUMMARY_FILES` non-empty): Run from artifacts
- **State C** (`SUMMARY_FILES` empty): Exit — "Phase {N} not executed. Run /gsd:execute-phase {N} first."
## 2. Discovery
### 2a. Read Phase Artifacts
Read PLAN.md — extract `<threat_model>` block: trust boundaries, STRIDE register (`threat_id`, `category`, `component`, `disposition`, `mitigation_plan`).
### 2b. Read Summary Threat Flags
Read SUMMARY.md — extract `## Threat Flags` entries.
### 2c. Build Threat Register
Per threat: `{ threat_id, category, component, disposition, mitigation_pattern, files_to_check }`
## 3. Threat Classification
Classify each threat:
| Status | Criteria |
|--------|----------|
| CLOSED | mitigation found OR accepted risk documented in SECURITY.md OR transfer documented |
| OPEN | none of the above |
Build: `{ threat_id, category, component, disposition, status, evidence }`
If `threats_open: 0` → skip to Step 6 directly.
## 4. Present Threat Plan
Call AskUserQuestion with threat table and options:
1. "Verify all open threats" → Step 5
2. "Accept all open — document in accepted risks log" → add to SECURITY.md accepted risks, set all CLOSED, Step 6
3. "Cancel" → exit
## 5. Spawn gsd-security-auditor
```
Task(
prompt="Read ~/.claude/agents/gsd-security-auditor.md for instructions.\n\n" +
"<files_to_read>{PLAN, SUMMARY, impl files, SECURITY.md}</files_to_read>" +
"<threat_register>{threat register}</threat_register>" +
"<config>asvs_level: {SECURITY_ASVS}, block_on: {SECURITY_BLOCK_ON}</config>" +
"<constraints>Never modify implementation files. Verify mitigations exist — do not scan for new threats. Escalate implementation gaps.</constraints>" +
"${AGENT_SKILLS_AUDITOR}",
subagent_type="gsd-security-auditor",
model="{AUDITOR_MODEL}",
description="Verify threat mitigations for Phase {N}"
)
```
Handle return:
- `## SECURED` → record closures → Step 6
- `## OPEN_THREATS` → record closed + open, present user with accept/block choice → Step 6
- `## ESCALATE` → present to user → Step 6
## 6. Write/Update SECURITY.md
**State B (create):**
1. Read template from `~/.claude/get-shit-done/templates/SECURITY.md`
2. Fill: frontmatter, threat register, accepted risks, audit trail
3. Write to `${PHASE_DIR}/${PADDED_PHASE}-SECURITY.md`
**State A (update):**
1. Update threat register statuses, append to audit trail:
```markdown
## Security Audit {date}
| Metric | Count |
|--------|-------|
| Threats found | {N} |
| Closed | {M} |
| Open | {K} |
```
**ENFORCING GATE:** If `threats_open > 0` after all options exhausted (user did not accept, not all verified closed):
```
GSD > PHASE {N} SECURITY BLOCKED
{K} threats open — phase advancement blocked until threats_open: 0
▶ Fix mitigations then re-run: /gsd:secure-phase {N}
▶ Or document accepted risks in SECURITY.md and re-run.
```
Do NOT emit next-phase routing. Stop here.
## 7. Commit
```bash
node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" commit "docs(phase-${PHASE}): add/update security threat verification"
```
## 8. Results + Routing
**Secured (threats_open: 0):**
```
GSD > PHASE {N} THREAT-SECURE
threats_open: 0 — all threats have dispositions.
▶ /gsd:validate-phase {N} validate test coverage
▶ /gsd:verify-work {N} run UAT
```
Display `/clear` reminder.
</process>
<success_criteria>
- [ ] Security enforcement checked — exit if false
- [ ] Input state detected (A/B/C) — state C exits cleanly
- [ ] PLAN.md threat model parsed, register built
- [ ] SUMMARY.md threat flags incorporated
- [ ] threats_open: 0 → skip directly to Step 6
- [ ] User gate with threat table presented
- [ ] Auditor spawned with complete context
- [ ] All three return formats (SECURED/OPEN_THREATS/ESCALATE) handled
- [ ] SECURITY.md created or updated
- [ ] threats_open > 0 BLOCKS advancement (no next-phase routing emitted)
- [ ] Results with routing presented on success
</success_criteria>

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@@ -375,11 +375,32 @@ Present summary:
**If issues > 0:** Proceed to `diagnose_issues`
**If issues == 0:**
```bash
SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
SECURITY_FILE=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
```
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true` AND `SECURITY_FILE` is empty:
```
⚠ Security enforcement enabled — /gsd:secure-phase {phase} has not run.
Run before advancing to the next phase.
All tests passed. Ready to continue.
- `/gsd:secure-phase {phase}` — security review (required before advancing)
- `/gsd:plan-phase {next}` — Plan next phase
- `/gsd:execute-phase {next}` — Execute next phase
- `/gsd:ui-review {phase}` — visual quality audit (if frontend files were modified)
```
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false` OR `SECURITY_FILE` exists (i.e., `threats_open: 0` or review already run):
```
All tests passed. Ready to continue.
- `/gsd:plan-phase {next}` — Plan next phase
- `/gsd:execute-phase {next}` — Execute next phase
- `/gsd:secure-phase {phase}` — security review
- `/gsd:ui-review {phase}` — visual quality audit (if frontend files were modified)
```
</step>