mirror of
https://github.com/glittercowboy/get-shit-done
synced 2026-04-25 17:25:23 +02:00
feat: add security-first enforcement layer with threat-model-anchored verification
Adds /gsd:secure-phase command and gsd-security-auditor agent as a threat-model-anchored security gate parallel to Nyquist validation. New files: - agents/gsd-security-auditor.md — verifies PLAN.md threat mitigations exist in implemented code; SECURED/OPEN_THREATS/ESCALATE returns - commands/gsd/secure-phase.md — retroactive command, mirrors validate-phase - get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md — enforcing gate: threats_open > 0 blocks phase advancement; accepted risks log prevents resurface - get-shit-done/templates/SECURITY.md — per-phase threat register artifact Modified: - config.json — security_enforcement (absent=enabled), security_asvs_level, security_block_on parallel to nyquist_validation pattern - VALIDATION.md — Threat Ref + Secure Behavior columns in verification map - gsd-planner.md — <threat_model> block in PLAN.md format + quality gate - gsd-executor.md — Rule 2 threat model reference + ## Threat Flags scan - gsd-phase-researcher.md — ## Security Domain mandatory research section - plan-phase.md — step 5.55 Security Threat Model Gate - execute-phase.md — security gate announcement in aggregate step - verify-work.md — /gsd:secure-phase surfaced in completion routing Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ No user permission needed for Rules 1-3.
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**Critical = required for correct/secure/performant operation.** These aren't "features" — they're correctness requirements.
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**Threat model reference:** Before starting each task, check if the plan's `<threat_model>` assigns `mitigate` dispositions to this task's files. Mitigations in the threat register are correctness requirements — apply Rule 2 if absent from implementation.
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---
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**RULE 3: Auto-fix blocking issues**
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@@ -394,6 +396,18 @@ Or: "None - plan executed exactly as written."
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- Components with no data source wired (props always receiving empty/mock data)
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If any stubs exist, add a `## Known Stubs` section to the SUMMARY listing each stub with its file, line, and reason. These are tracked for the verifier to catch. Do NOT mark a plan as complete if stubs exist that prevent the plan's goal from being achieved — either wire the data or document in the plan why the stub is intentional and which future plan will resolve it.
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**Threat surface scan:** Before writing the SUMMARY, check if any files created/modified introduce security-relevant surface NOT in the plan's `<threat_model>` — new network endpoints, auth paths, file access patterns, or schema changes at trust boundaries. If found, add:
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```markdown
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## Threat Flags
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| Flag | File | Description |
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|------|------|-------------|
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| threat_flag: {type} | {file} | {new surface description} |
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```
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Omit section if nothing found.
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</summary_creation>
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<self_check>
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@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ Priority: Context7 > Exa (verified) > Firecrawl (official docs) > Official GitHu
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- [ ] Confidence levels assigned honestly
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- [ ] "What might I have missed?" review completed
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- [ ] **If rename/refactor phase:** Runtime State Inventory completed — all 5 categories answered explicitly (not left blank)
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- [ ] Security domain included (or `security_enforcement: false` confirmed)
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- [ ] ASVS categories verified against phase tech stack
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</verification_protocol>
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@@ -393,6 +395,27 @@ Verified patterns from official sources:
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*(If no gaps: "None — existing test infrastructure covers all phase requirements")*
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## Security Domain
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> Required when `security_enforcement` is enabled (absent = enabled). Omit only if explicitly `false` in config.
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### Applicable ASVS Categories
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| ASVS Category | Applies | Standard Control |
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|---------------|---------|-----------------|
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| V2 Authentication | {yes/no} | {library or pattern} |
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| V3 Session Management | {yes/no} | {library or pattern} |
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| V4 Access Control | {yes/no} | {library or pattern} |
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| V5 Input Validation | yes | {e.g., zod / joi / pydantic} |
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| V6 Cryptography | {yes/no} | {library — never hand-roll} |
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### Known Threat Patterns for {stack}
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| Pattern | STRIDE | Standard Mitigation |
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|---------|--------|---------------------|
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| {e.g., SQL injection} | Tampering | {parameterized queries / ORM} |
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| {pattern} | {category} | {mitigation} |
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## Sources
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### Primary (HIGH confidence)
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@@ -454,6 +454,21 @@ Output: [Artifacts created]
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</tasks>
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<threat_model>
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## Trust Boundaries
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| Boundary | Description |
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|----------|-------------|
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| {e.g., client→API} | {untrusted input crosses here} |
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## STRIDE Threat Register
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| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
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|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
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| T-{phase}-01 | {S/T/R/I/D/E} | {function/endpoint/file} | mitigate | {specific: e.g., "validate input with zod at route entry"} |
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| T-{phase}-02 | {category} | {component} | accept | {rationale: e.g., "no PII, low-value target"} |
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</threat_model>
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<verification>
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[Overall phase checks]
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</verification>
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@@ -585,6 +600,8 @@ Only include what Claude literally cannot do.
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**Step 0: Extract Requirement IDs**
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Read ROADMAP.md `**Requirements:**` line for this phase. Strip brackets if present (e.g., `[AUTH-01, AUTH-02]` → `AUTH-01, AUTH-02`). Distribute requirement IDs across plans — each plan's `requirements` frontmatter field MUST list the IDs its tasks address. **CRITICAL:** Every requirement ID MUST appear in at least one plan. Plans with an empty `requirements` field are invalid.
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**Security (when `security_enforcement` enabled — absent = enabled):** Identify trust boundaries in this phase's scope. Map STRIDE categories to applicable tech stack from RESEARCH.md security domain. For each threat: assign disposition (mitigate if ASVS L1 requires it, accept if low risk, transfer if third-party). Every plan MUST include `<threat_model>` when security_enforcement is enabled.
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**Step 1: State the Goal**
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Take phase goal from ROADMAP.md. Must be outcome-shaped, not task-shaped.
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- Good: "Working chat interface" (outcome)
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@@ -1338,6 +1355,9 @@ Phase planning complete when:
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- [ ] Wave structure maximizes parallelism
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- [ ] PLAN file(s) committed to git
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- [ ] User knows next steps and wave structure
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- [ ] `<threat_model>` present with STRIDE register (when `security_enforcement` enabled)
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- [ ] Every threat has a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
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- [ ] Mitigations reference specific implementation (not generic advice)
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## Gap Closure Mode
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128
agents/gsd-security-auditor.md
Normal file
128
agents/gsd-security-auditor.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
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---
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name: gsd-security-auditor
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description: Verifies threat mitigations from PLAN.md threat model exist in implemented code. Produces SECURITY.md. Spawned by /gsd:secure-phase.
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tools:
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- Read
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- Write
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- Edit
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- Bash
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- Glob
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- Grep
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color: "#EF4444"
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---
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<role>
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GSD security auditor. Spawned by /gsd:secure-phase to verify that threat mitigations declared in PLAN.md are present in implemented code.
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Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in `<threat_register>` by its declared disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer). Reports gaps. Writes SECURITY.md.
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**Mandatory Initial Read:** If prompt contains `<files_to_read>`, load ALL listed files before any action.
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**Implementation files are READ-ONLY.** Only create/modify: SECURITY.md. Implementation security gaps → OPEN_THREATS or ESCALATE. Never patch implementation.
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</role>
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<execution_flow>
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<step name="load_context">
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Read ALL files from `<files_to_read>`. Extract:
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- PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block: full threat register with IDs, categories, dispositions, mitigation plans
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- SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags` section: new attack surface detected by executor during implementation
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- `<config>` block: `asvs_level` (1/2/3), `block_on` (open / unregistered / none)
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- Implementation files: exports, auth patterns, input handling, data flows
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</step>
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<step name="analyze_threats">
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For each threat in `<threat_register>`, determine verification method by disposition:
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| Disposition | Verification Method |
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|-------------|---------------------|
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| `mitigate` | Grep for mitigation pattern in files cited in mitigation plan |
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| `accept` | Verify entry present in SECURITY.md accepted risks log |
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| `transfer` | Verify transfer documentation present (insurance, vendor SLA, etc.) |
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Classify each threat before verification. Record classification for every threat — no threat skipped.
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</step>
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<step name="verify_and_write">
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For each `mitigate` threat: grep for declared mitigation pattern in cited files → found = `CLOSED`, not found = `OPEN`.
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For `accept` threats: check SECURITY.md accepted risks log → entry present = `CLOSED`, absent = `OPEN`.
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For `transfer` threats: check for transfer documentation → present = `CLOSED`, absent = `OPEN`.
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For each `threat_flag` in SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags`: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as `unregistered_flag` in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).
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Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` count. Return structured result.
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</step>
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</execution_flow>
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<structured_returns>
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## SECURED
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```markdown
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## SECURED
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**Phase:** {N} — {name}
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**Threats Closed:** {count}/{total}
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**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
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### Threat Verification
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| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
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| {id} | {category} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |
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### Unregistered Flags
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{none / list from SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags with no threat mapping}
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SECURITY.md: {path}
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```
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## OPEN_THREATS
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```markdown
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## OPEN_THREATS
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**Phase:** {N} — {name}
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**Closed:** {M}/{total} | **Open:** {K}/{total}
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**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
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### Closed
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| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
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| {id} | {category} | {disposition} | {evidence} |
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### Open
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| Threat ID | Category | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
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|-----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
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| {id} | {category} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
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Next: Implement mitigations or document as accepted in SECURITY.md accepted risks log, then re-run /gsd:secure-phase.
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SECURITY.md: {path}
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```
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## ESCALATE
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```markdown
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## ESCALATE
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**Phase:** {N} — {name}
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**Closed:** 0/{total}
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### Details
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| Threat ID | Reason Blocked | Suggested Action |
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|-----------|----------------|------------------|
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| {id} | {reason} | {action} |
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```
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</structured_returns>
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<success_criteria>
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- [ ] All `<files_to_read>` loaded before any analysis
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- [ ] Threat register extracted from PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block
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- [ ] Each threat verified by disposition type (mitigate / accept / transfer)
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- [ ] Threat flags from SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags` incorporated
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- [ ] Implementation files never modified
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- [ ] SECURITY.md written to correct path
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- [ ] Structured return: SECURED / OPEN_THREATS / ESCALATE
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</success_criteria>
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35
commands/gsd/secure-phase.md
Normal file
35
commands/gsd/secure-phase.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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---
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name: gsd:secure-phase
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description: Retroactively verify threat mitigations for a completed phase
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argument-hint: "[phase number]"
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allowed-tools:
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- Read
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- Write
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- Edit
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- Bash
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- Glob
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- Grep
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- Task
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- AskUserQuestion
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---
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<objective>
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Verify threat mitigations for a completed phase. Three states:
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- (A) SECURITY.md exists — audit and verify mitigations
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- (B) No SECURITY.md, PLAN.md with threat model exists — run from artifacts
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- (C) Phase not executed — exit with guidance
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Output: updated SECURITY.md.
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</objective>
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<execution_context>
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@~/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md
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</execution_context>
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<context>
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Phase: $ARGUMENTS — optional, defaults to last completed phase.
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</context>
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<process>
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Execute @~/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md.
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Preserve all workflow gates.
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</process>
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61
get-shit-done/templates/SECURITY.md
Normal file
61
get-shit-done/templates/SECURITY.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
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---
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phase: {N}
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slug: {phase-slug}
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status: draft
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threats_open: 0
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asvs_level: 1
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created: {date}
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---
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# Phase {N} — Security
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> Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail.
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---
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## Trust Boundaries
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| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
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|----------|-------------|---------------|
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| {boundary} | {description} | {data type / sensitivity} |
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---
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## Threat Register
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| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
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|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|------------|--------|
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| T-{N}-01 | {STRIDE category} | {component} | {mitigate / accept / transfer} | {control or reference} | open |
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*Status: open · closed*
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*Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)*
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---
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## Accepted Risks Log
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| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
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|---------|------------|-----------|-------------|------|
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*Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.*
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*If none: "No accepted risks."*
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---
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## Security Audit Trail
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| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
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|------------|---------------|--------|------|--------|
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| {YYYY-MM-DD} | {N} | {N} | {N} | {name / agent} |
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---
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## Sign-Off
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- [ ] All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
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- [ ] Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
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- [ ] `threats_open: 0` confirmed
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- [ ] `status: verified` set in frontmatter
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**Approval:** {pending / verified YYYY-MM-DD}
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@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ created: {date}
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## Per-Task Verification Map
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| Task ID | Plan | Wave | Requirement | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists | Status |
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|---------|------|------|-------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
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| {N}-01-01 | 01 | 1 | REQ-{XX} | unit | `{command}` | ✅ / ❌ W0 | ⬜ pending |
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| Task ID | Plan | Wave | Requirement | Threat Ref | Secure Behavior | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists | Status |
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|---------|------|------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
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| {N}-01-01 | 01 | 1 | REQ-{XX} | T-{N}-01 / — | {expected secure behavior or "N/A"} | unit | `{command}` | ✅ / ❌ W0 | ⬜ pending |
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*Status: ⬜ pending · ✅ green · ❌ red · ⚠️ flaky*
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@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
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"verifier": true,
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"auto_advance": false,
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"nyquist_validation": true,
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"security_enforcement": true,
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"security_asvs_level": 1,
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"security_block_on": "high",
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"discuss_mode": "discuss",
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"research_before_questions": false
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},
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@@ -436,6 +436,27 @@ After all waves:
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### Issues Encountered
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[Aggregate from SUMMARYs, or "None"]
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```
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**Security gate check:**
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```bash
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SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
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SECURITY_FILE=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
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```
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If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false`: skip.
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If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true` AND `SECURITY_FILE` is empty (no SECURITY.md yet):
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Include in the next-steps routing output:
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```
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⚠ Security enforcement enabled — run before advancing:
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/gsd:secure-phase {PHASE} ${GSD_WS}
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```
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If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true` AND SECURITY.md exists: check frontmatter `threats_open`. If > 0:
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```
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⚠ Security gate: {threats_open} threats open
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/gsd:secure-phase {PHASE} — resolve before advancing
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```
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</step>
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<step name="handle_partial_wave_execution">
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@@ -360,6 +360,32 @@ test -f "${PHASE_DIR}/${PADDED_PHASE}-VALIDATION.md" && echo "VALIDATION_CREATED
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**If not found:** Warn and continue — plans may fail Dimension 8.
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## 5.55. Security Threat Model Gate
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> Skip if `workflow.security_enforcement` is explicitly `false`. Absent = enabled.
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```bash
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SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
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SECURITY_ASVS=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_asvs_level --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "1")
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SECURITY_BLOCK=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_block_on --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "high")
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```
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**If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false`:** Skip to step 5.6.
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**If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true`:** Display banner:
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```
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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GSD ► SECURITY THREAT MODEL REQUIRED (ASVS L{SECURITY_ASVS})
|
||||
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
|
||||
|
||||
Each PLAN.md must include a <threat_model> block.
|
||||
Block on: {SECURITY_BLOCK} severity threats.
|
||||
Opt out: set security_enforcement: false in .planning/config.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Continue to step 5.6. Security config is passed to the planner in step 8.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5.6. UI Design Contract Gate
|
||||
|
||||
> Skip if `workflow.ui_phase` is explicitly `false` AND `workflow.ui_safety_gate` is explicitly `false` in `.planning/config.json`. If keys are absent, treat as enabled.
|
||||
@@ -496,6 +522,7 @@ ${AGENT_SKILLS_PLANNER}
|
||||
|
||||
**Project instructions:** Read ./CLAUDE.md if exists — follow project-specific guidelines
|
||||
**Project skills:** Check .claude/skills/ or .agents/skills/ directory (if either exists) — read SKILL.md files, plans should account for project skill rules
|
||||
|
||||
</planning_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<downstream_consumer>
|
||||
|
||||
164
get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md
Normal file
164
get-shit-done/workflows/secure-phase.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
|
||||
<purpose>
|
||||
Verify threat mitigations for a completed phase. Confirm PLAN.md threat register dispositions are resolved. Update SECURITY.md.
|
||||
</purpose>
|
||||
|
||||
<required_reading>
|
||||
@~/.claude/get-shit-done/references/ui-brand.md
|
||||
</required_reading>
|
||||
|
||||
<available_agent_types>
|
||||
Valid GSD subagent types (use exact names — do not fall back to 'general-purpose'):
|
||||
- gsd-security-auditor — Verifies threat mitigation coverage
|
||||
</available_agent_types>
|
||||
|
||||
<process>
|
||||
|
||||
## 0. Initialize
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
INIT=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" init phase-op "${PHASE_ARG}")
|
||||
if [[ "$INIT" == @file:* ]]; then INIT=$(cat "${INIT#@file:}"); fi
|
||||
AGENT_SKILLS_AUDITOR=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" agent-skills gsd-security-auditor 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Parse: `phase_dir`, `phase_number`, `phase_name`, `phase_slug`, `padded_phase`.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
AUDITOR_MODEL=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" resolve-model gsd-security-auditor --raw)
|
||||
SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false`: exit with "Security enforcement disabled. Enable via /gsd:settings."
|
||||
|
||||
Display banner: `GSD > SECURE PHASE {N}: {name}`
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Detect Input State
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
SECURITY_FILE=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
|
||||
PLAN_FILES=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-PLAN.md 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
SUMMARY_FILES=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SUMMARY.md 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **State A** (`SECURITY_FILE` non-empty): Audit existing
|
||||
- **State B** (`SECURITY_FILE` empty, `PLAN_FILES` and `SUMMARY_FILES` non-empty): Run from artifacts
|
||||
- **State C** (`SUMMARY_FILES` empty): Exit — "Phase {N} not executed. Run /gsd:execute-phase {N} first."
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Discovery
|
||||
|
||||
### 2a. Read Phase Artifacts
|
||||
|
||||
Read PLAN.md — extract `<threat_model>` block: trust boundaries, STRIDE register (`threat_id`, `category`, `component`, `disposition`, `mitigation_plan`).
|
||||
|
||||
### 2b. Read Summary Threat Flags
|
||||
|
||||
Read SUMMARY.md — extract `## Threat Flags` entries.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2c. Build Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
Per threat: `{ threat_id, category, component, disposition, mitigation_pattern, files_to_check }`
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Threat Classification
|
||||
|
||||
Classify each threat:
|
||||
|
||||
| Status | Criteria |
|
||||
|--------|----------|
|
||||
| CLOSED | mitigation found OR accepted risk documented in SECURITY.md OR transfer documented |
|
||||
| OPEN | none of the above |
|
||||
|
||||
Build: `{ threat_id, category, component, disposition, status, evidence }`
|
||||
|
||||
If `threats_open: 0` → skip to Step 6 directly.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Present Threat Plan
|
||||
|
||||
Call AskUserQuestion with threat table and options:
|
||||
1. "Verify all open threats" → Step 5
|
||||
2. "Accept all open — document in accepted risks log" → add to SECURITY.md accepted risks, set all CLOSED, Step 6
|
||||
3. "Cancel" → exit
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Spawn gsd-security-auditor
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Task(
|
||||
prompt="Read ~/.claude/agents/gsd-security-auditor.md for instructions.\n\n" +
|
||||
"<files_to_read>{PLAN, SUMMARY, impl files, SECURITY.md}</files_to_read>" +
|
||||
"<threat_register>{threat register}</threat_register>" +
|
||||
"<config>asvs_level: {SECURITY_ASVS}, block_on: {SECURITY_BLOCK_ON}</config>" +
|
||||
"<constraints>Never modify implementation files. Verify mitigations exist — do not scan for new threats. Escalate implementation gaps.</constraints>" +
|
||||
"${AGENT_SKILLS_AUDITOR}",
|
||||
subagent_type="gsd-security-auditor",
|
||||
model="{AUDITOR_MODEL}",
|
||||
description="Verify threat mitigations for Phase {N}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Handle return:
|
||||
- `## SECURED` → record closures → Step 6
|
||||
- `## OPEN_THREATS` → record closed + open, present user with accept/block choice → Step 6
|
||||
- `## ESCALATE` → present to user → Step 6
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Write/Update SECURITY.md
|
||||
|
||||
**State B (create):**
|
||||
1. Read template from `~/.claude/get-shit-done/templates/SECURITY.md`
|
||||
2. Fill: frontmatter, threat register, accepted risks, audit trail
|
||||
3. Write to `${PHASE_DIR}/${PADDED_PHASE}-SECURITY.md`
|
||||
|
||||
**State A (update):**
|
||||
1. Update threat register statuses, append to audit trail:
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown
|
||||
## Security Audit {date}
|
||||
| Metric | Count |
|
||||
|--------|-------|
|
||||
| Threats found | {N} |
|
||||
| Closed | {M} |
|
||||
| Open | {K} |
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**ENFORCING GATE:** If `threats_open > 0` after all options exhausted (user did not accept, not all verified closed):
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
GSD > PHASE {N} SECURITY BLOCKED
|
||||
{K} threats open — phase advancement blocked until threats_open: 0
|
||||
▶ Fix mitigations then re-run: /gsd:secure-phase {N}
|
||||
▶ Or document accepted risks in SECURITY.md and re-run.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Do NOT emit next-phase routing. Stop here.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Commit
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" commit "docs(phase-${PHASE}): add/update security threat verification"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Results + Routing
|
||||
|
||||
**Secured (threats_open: 0):**
|
||||
```
|
||||
GSD > PHASE {N} THREAT-SECURE
|
||||
threats_open: 0 — all threats have dispositions.
|
||||
▶ /gsd:validate-phase {N} validate test coverage
|
||||
▶ /gsd:verify-work {N} run UAT
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Display `/clear` reminder.
|
||||
|
||||
</process>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- [ ] Security enforcement checked — exit if false
|
||||
- [ ] Input state detected (A/B/C) — state C exits cleanly
|
||||
- [ ] PLAN.md threat model parsed, register built
|
||||
- [ ] SUMMARY.md threat flags incorporated
|
||||
- [ ] threats_open: 0 → skip directly to Step 6
|
||||
- [ ] User gate with threat table presented
|
||||
- [ ] Auditor spawned with complete context
|
||||
- [ ] All three return formats (SECURED/OPEN_THREATS/ESCALATE) handled
|
||||
- [ ] SECURITY.md created or updated
|
||||
- [ ] threats_open > 0 BLOCKS advancement (no next-phase routing emitted)
|
||||
- [ ] Results with routing presented on success
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
@@ -375,11 +375,32 @@ Present summary:
|
||||
**If issues > 0:** Proceed to `diagnose_issues`
|
||||
|
||||
**If issues == 0:**
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
SECURITY_CFG=$(node "$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs" config-get workflow.security_enforcement --raw 2>/dev/null || echo "true")
|
||||
SECURITY_FILE=$(ls "${PHASE_DIR}"/*-SECURITY.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `true` AND `SECURITY_FILE` is empty:
|
||||
```
|
||||
⚠ Security enforcement enabled — /gsd:secure-phase {phase} has not run.
|
||||
Run before advancing to the next phase.
|
||||
|
||||
All tests passed. Ready to continue.
|
||||
|
||||
- `/gsd:secure-phase {phase}` — security review (required before advancing)
|
||||
- `/gsd:plan-phase {next}` — Plan next phase
|
||||
- `/gsd:execute-phase {next}` — Execute next phase
|
||||
- `/gsd:ui-review {phase}` — visual quality audit (if frontend files were modified)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If `SECURITY_CFG` is `false` OR `SECURITY_FILE` exists (i.e., `threats_open: 0` or review already run):
|
||||
```
|
||||
All tests passed. Ready to continue.
|
||||
|
||||
- `/gsd:plan-phase {next}` — Plan next phase
|
||||
- `/gsd:execute-phase {next}` — Execute next phase
|
||||
- `/gsd:secure-phase {phase}` — security review
|
||||
- `/gsd:ui-review {phase}` — visual quality audit (if frontend files were modified)
|
||||
```
|
||||
</step>
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user