This wrapper was added in order to eliminate the number of file
descriptors used accessing `/dev/urandom`, but these days `osrandom` and
by proxy `rand` will try to use `getrandom` on Linux and similar system
APIs on other platforms [^1].
This is a trial balloon for removing the wrapper, since almost all
modern Linux systems have `getrandom` (available since Linux
3.17).
[^1]: https://docs.rs/getrandom/0.3.4/getrandom/#supported-targets
Testing: Should not change observable behavior (only in random ways), so
should
be covered by WPT tests.
Signed-off-by: Martin Robinson <mrobinson@igalia.com>
This implements LazyDOMString (from now on DOMString) as outlined in
https://github.com/servo/servo/issues/39479.
Constructing from a *mut JSString we keep the in a
RootedTraceableBox<Heap<*mut JSString>> and transform
the string into a rust string if necessary via the `make_rust_string`
method.
Methods used in script are implemented on this string. Currently we
transform the string at all times.
But in the future more efficient implementations are possible.
We implement the safety critical sections in a separate module
DOMStringInner which allows simple constructors, `make_rust_string` and
the `bytes` method.
This method returns the new type `EncodedBytes` which contains the
reference to the underlying string in either format.
Testing: WPT tests still seem to work, so this should test this
functionality.
---------
Signed-off-by: Narfinger <Narfinger@users.noreply.github.com>
This change makes it so that `<iframe>` sanboxing is equivalent to the
one used for Content Security Policy, which is how the specification is
written. In addition, these sandboxing flags are passed through to
`<iframe>` `Document`s via `LoadData` and stored as
`Document::creation_sandboxing_flag_set`. The flags are used to
calculate the final `Document::active_sandboxing_flag_set` when loading
a `Document`.
This change makes it so that `<iframe>`s actually behave in a sandboxed
way, the same way that `Document`s with CSP configurations do. For
instance, now scripts and popups are blocked by default in `<iframe>`s
with the
`sandbox` attribute.
Testing: This causes many WPT tests to start to pass or to move from
ERROR to TIMEOUT or failing later. Some tests start to fail:
-
`/html/semantics/embedded-content/the-canvas-element/canvas-descendants-focusability-005.html`:
This test uses a combination of `<iframe allow>` and Canvas fallback
content, which we do not support.
-
`/html/semantics/embedded-content/the-iframe-element/iframe_sandbox_navigate_other_frame_popup.sub.html`:
This test is now failing because the iframe is sanboxed but in the
ScriptThread now due to `allow-same-origin`. More implementation is
needed to add support for the "one permitted sandbox navigator concept."
Fixes: This is part of #31973.
---------
Signed-off-by: Martin Robinson <mrobinson@igalia.com>
Co-authored-by: Oriol Brufau <obrufau@igalia.com>
This is part of the future work of implementing LazyDOMString as
outlined in https://github.com/servo/servo/issues/39479.
We use str() method or direct implementations on DOMString for these
methods. We also change some types.
Signed-off-by: Narfinger <Narfinger@users.noreply.github.com>
Testing: This is essentially just renaming a method and a type and
should not change functionality.
Signed-off-by: Narfinger <Narfinger@users.noreply.github.com>
Adding an optional message to be attached to a NotFoundError.
Testing: Just a refactor
Part of #39053
---------
Signed-off-by: Rodion Borovyk <rodion.borovyk@gmail.com>
Previously, when we click any element, it would trigger "scroll into
view". What's worse, for an anchor `<a>`, clicking it would "scroll into
view" instead of navigating to the url until you retry the click. The
reason is that we built `scrollIntoView` into the focus transaction
system with default option. However, the default `preventScroll` for
`FocusOption` is false according to spec, which triggers "scroll into
view" by default with focus triggered by interaction.
This PR
1. Adds spec document for those which really expects "scroll into view",
i.e. `<form>` when validating data.
2. Make sure when we begin focus transaction, we prevent "scroll into
view".
3. `Focus` method of element/document stays unchanged, which by default
scroll into view if no parameter provided according to spec.
Testing: Manually tested on `servo.org` and other websites, and examples
with `<form>` still correctly scroll into view when validation fails.
Fixes: #38616
---------
Signed-off-by: Euclid Ye <yezhizhenjiakang@gmail.com>
This should be the final PR for the Hash Function series that is
trivial.
Of note: I decided to transform `HashMapTracedValues<Atom,..>` to use
FxBuildHasher. This is likely not going to improve performance as Atom's
already have a unique u32 that is used as the Hash but it safes a few
bytes for the RandomState that is normally in the HashMap.
Signed-off-by: Narfinger <Narfinger@users.noreply.github.com>
Testing: Hash function changes should not change functionality, we
slightly decrease the size and unit tests still work.
Signed-off-by: Narfinger <Narfinger@users.noreply.github.com>
Implements document's active sandboxing flags. These are currently
populated only from CSP-derived sandboxing flags for a new document,
when defined in the CSP.
Testing: 1 new pass, and some new wpt's are added to test points in the
spec where these flags influence behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Shane Handley <shanehandley@fastmail.com>
