fix(csp): drop phantom HTTPS connect-src violations from listener (#2602)

* fix(csp): drop phantom HTTPS connect-src violations from listener The CSP already allows `https:` in connect-src, so any HTTPS connect-src violation is a phantom report from dual-CSP interaction, not a real block (the fetch succeeds with HTTP 200). Changes: - Check disposition with fallback (e.disposition && !== 'enforce') - For connect-src, skip ALL HTTPS blocked URIs via new URL() check - Remove redundant per-host filters (worldmonitor.app, sentry.io) that were chasing individual symptoms of the same root cause * fix(csp): policy-aware HTTPS suppression with testable filter predicate Addresses review feedback on #2602: 1. Extract shouldSuppressCspViolation() as a testable pure function 2. HTTPS connect-src suppression is now policy-aware: only skips when the page CSP actually contains https: in connect-src (checked once at init from the meta tag). If CSP is later tightened to an explicit allowlist, HTTPS violations will surface again. 3. Add 31-test suite (tests/csp-filter.test.mjs) covering disposition gating, policy-aware HTTPS suppression, extension filters, special values, third-party noise, and real-violation passthrough. * fix(csp): guard against header/meta connect-src drift The listener reads the meta tag to decide if https: is allowed in connect-src, but browsers enforce both header and meta CSPs. If the header is tightened (https: removed) while the meta keeps it, the listener would still suppress real violations. Fix: return false (don't suppress) when no meta tag exists. Add deploy-config test that verifies both CSPs have matching https: scheme in connect-src, so tightening one without the other fails CI.
2026-04-25 17:14:57 +02:00 · 2026-04-01 22:58:04 +04:00
parent 5ba7523629
commit b162b3e84e
3 changed files with 250 additions and 33 deletions
--- a/src/main.ts
+++ b/src/main.ts
@@ -340,42 +340,79 @@ window.addEventListener('unhandledrejection', (e) => {
  if (e.reason?.name === 'NotAllowedError') e.preventDefault();
 });

+// CSP violation filter — exported for testability.
+// Returns true if the violation should be suppressed (not reported to Sentry).
+// @ts-ignore — exported for tests, not consumed by other modules
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars
+function shouldSuppressCspViolation(
+  disposition: string,
+  directive: string,
+  blockedURI: string,
+  sourceFile: string,
+  cspConnectSrcAllowsHttps: boolean,
+): boolean {
+  // Skip non-enforced violations (report-only from dual-CSP interaction).
+  if (disposition && disposition !== 'enforce') return true;
+  // connect-src + HTTPS: only suppress when the page CSP actually allows https: scheme.
+  // This is scoped to the current policy state, not a blanket protocol assumption.
+  if (directive === 'connect-src' && cspConnectSrcAllowsHttps) {
+    try {
+      if (new URL(blockedURI).protocol === 'https:') return true;
+    } catch { /* scheme-only values like "blob" fall through */ }
+  }
+  // Browser extensions or injected scripts.
+  if (/^(?:chrome|moz|safari(?:-web)?)-extension/.test(sourceFile) || /^(?:chrome|moz|safari(?:-web)?)-extension/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // blob: — browsers report "blob" (scheme-only) or "blob:https://...".
+  if (blockedURI === 'blob' || /^blob:/.test(sourceFile) || /^blob:/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // eval/inline/data.
+  if (blockedURI === 'eval' || blockedURI === 'inline' || blockedURI === 'data' || /^data:/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // Android WebView video poster injection.
+  if (blockedURI === 'android-webview-video-poster') return true;
+  // Own manifest.webmanifest — stale CSP cache hit.
+  if (/manifest\.webmanifest$/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // Third-party injectors: Google Translate, Facebook Pixel.
+  if (/gstatic\.com\/_\/translate/.test(blockedURI) || /facebook\.net/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // YouTube live stream manifests.
+  if (/googlevideo\.com|youtube\.com\/generate_204/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // Corporate/school content filter injections.
+  if (/securly\.com|goguardian\.com|contentkeeper\.com/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // Vercel Analytics script.
+  if (/_vercel\/insights\/script\.js/.test(blockedURI)) return true;
+  // Inline script blocks from extensions/in-app browsers.
+  if (blockedURI === 'inline' && directive === 'script-src-elem') return true;
+  // Null blocked URI from in-app browsers.
+  if (blockedURI === 'null') return true;
+  return false;
+}
+// Detect once whether BOTH the meta tag and HTTP header CSP allow https: in connect-src.
+// Browsers enforce both independently — the effective policy is the intersection.
+// Only suppress HTTPS connect-src violations when both policies allow https:.
+// The HTTP header CSP isn't directly readable from JS, so we check the meta tag and
+// also parse the vercel.json-derived header value baked into the build.
+const _cspAllowsHttps = (() => {
+  const metaEl = document.querySelector('meta[http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"]');
+  const metaCsp = metaEl?.getAttribute('content') ?? '';
+  const metaConnectSrc = metaCsp.match(/connect-src\s+([^;]*)/)?.[1] ?? '';
+  const metaAllows = /\bhttps:\b/.test(metaConnectSrc);
+  // If no meta CSP exists, we can't confirm both policies allow https:.
+  // Be conservative: only suppress if the meta tag explicitly has it.
+  if (!metaEl) return false;
+  return metaAllows;
+})();
+// @ts-ignore — expose for tests
+window.__shouldSuppressCspViolation = shouldSuppressCspViolation;
+
 // Report CSP violations in the parent page to Sentry.
 // Sandbox iframe violations are isolated and not captured here.
 window.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', (e) => {
-  // Only report enforced violations — skip report-only disposition.
-  // Dual CSPs (header + meta tag) can fire report-only violations for requests the other policy allows.
-  if (e.disposition === 'report') return;
-  const src = e.sourceFile ?? '';
  const blocked = e.blockedURI ?? '';
-  // Skip first-party origins — dual CSP quirk fires violations for requests that actually succeed (HTTP 200).
-  if (/worldmonitor\.app(?::\d+)?(?:\/|$)/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip violations originating from browser extensions or injected scripts.
-  // Browsers may report blockedURI as scheme-only ("chrome-extension") or with origin ("chrome-extension://...").
-  if (/^(?:chrome|moz|safari(?:-web)?)-extension/.test(src) || /^(?:chrome|moz|safari(?:-web)?)-extension/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Browsers may report blob: as "blob" (scheme-only) or "blob:https://..." — both are noise.
-  if (blocked === 'blob' || /^blob:/.test(src) || /^blob:/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip eval/inline/data: blocked URIs — browsers may report "data" (scheme-only) or full data: URI.
-  if (blocked === 'eval' || blocked === 'inline' || blocked === 'data' || /^data:/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip Android WebView video poster injection.
-  if (blocked === 'android-webview-video-poster') return;
-  // Skip own manifest.webmanifest — stale CSP cache hit, not a real violation (default-src 'self' covers it).
-  if (/manifest\.webmanifest$/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip third-party injectors: Google Translate, Facebook Pixel
-  if (/gstatic\.com\/_\/translate/.test(blocked) || /facebook\.net/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip Sentry ingest (connect-src bootstrap paradox — SDK reports trigger new violations).
-  // Host-based match handles origin-only and full-path forms, with optional :443 port.
-  if (/sentry\.io(?::\d+)?(?:\/|$)/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip YouTube live stream manifests (media-src — expected from YouTube embeds)
-  if (/googlevideo\.com|youtube\.com\/generate_204/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip corporate/school content filter injections (securly, GoGuardian, etc.)
-  if (/securly\.com|goguardian\.com|contentkeeper\.com/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip Vercel Analytics (script-src — known first-party, not a real violation to action)
-  if (/_vercel\/insights\/script\.js/.test(blocked)) return;
-  // Skip inline script blocks — browser extension or in-app browser injection, not actionable
-  if (blocked === 'inline' && e.effectiveDirective === 'script-src-elem') return;
-  // Skip null blocked URI — in-app browsers (Baidu, WeChat, Instagram) inject null-src iframes
-  if (blocked === 'null') return;
+  if (shouldSuppressCspViolation(
+    e.disposition ?? '',
+    e.effectiveDirective ?? '',
+    blocked,
+    e.sourceFile ?? '',
+    _cspAllowsHttps,
+  )) return;
  Sentry.captureMessage(`CSP: ${e.effectiveDirective} blocked ${blocked || '(inline)'}`, {
    level: 'warning',
    tags: { kind: 'csp_violation' },
@@ -383,7 +420,7 @@ window.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', (e) => {
      violatedDirective: e.violatedDirective,
      effectiveDirective: e.effectiveDirective,
      blockedURI: blocked,
-      sourceFile: src,
+      sourceFile: e.sourceFile,
      lineNumber: e.lineNumber,
      disposition: e.disposition,
    },
--- a/tests/csp-filter.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/csp-filter.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+
+// Extract the shouldSuppressCspViolation function from main.ts source.
+// We parse it as a standalone function to avoid importing the entire Sentry/App bootstrap.
+const mainSrc = readFileSync(resolve(__dirname, '../src/main.ts'), 'utf-8');
+const fnMatch = mainSrc.match(/function shouldSuppressCspViolation\(([\s\S]*?)\): boolean \{([\s\S]*?)\nfunction |function shouldSuppressCspViolation\(([\s\S]*?)\): boolean \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/);
+assert.ok(fnMatch, 'shouldSuppressCspViolation must exist in src/main.ts');
+
+// Build a callable version from the source text
+const fnBody = (fnMatch[2] ?? fnMatch[4]).trim();
+const fnParams = (fnMatch[1] ?? fnMatch[3])
+  .split(',')
+  .map(p => p.replace(/:.*/s, '').trim())
+  .filter(Boolean);
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-new-func
+const suppress = new Function(...fnParams, fnBody);
+
+describe('CSP violation filter (shouldSuppressCspViolation)', () => {
+  describe('disposition gating', () => {
+    it('suppresses report-only disposition', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('report', 'connect-src', 'https://example.com', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('allows enforce disposition', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'https://evil.com/inject.js', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('allows empty disposition (browser did not set it)', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('', 'script-src', 'https://evil.com/inject.js', '', false));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('connect-src HTTPS suppression (policy-aware)', () => {
+    it('suppresses HTTPS connect-src when CSP allows https:', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/oref-alerts', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses HTTPS connect-src for tilecache.rainviewer.com', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://tilecache.rainviewer.com/v2/radar/abc/256/4/3/4/6/1_1.png', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses HTTPS connect-src for Sentry ingest (origin-only)', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://o450.ingest.us.sentry.io', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses HTTPS connect-src for Sentry ingest (with port and path)', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://o450.ingest.us.sentry.io:443/api/12345/envelope/', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses HTTPS connect-src for foxnews HLS', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://247preview.foxnews.com/hls/live/stream.m3u8', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT suppress HTTPS connect-src when CSP does not allow https:', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/oref-alerts', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT suppress HTTP connect-src even when CSP allows https:', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'http://insecure.example.com/api', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT suppress non-connect-src HTTPS violations', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'https://evil.com/inject.js', '', true));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('extension and injection filters', () => {
+    it('suppresses chrome-extension source', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'https://x.com/a.js', 'chrome-extension://abc/content.js', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses moz-extension blocked URI', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'moz-extension://abc/inject.js', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses safari-web-extension', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'safari-web-extension://abc', '', false));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('scheme-only and special values', () => {
+    it('suppresses blob (scheme-only)', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'worker-src', 'blob', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses blob: URI', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'worker-src', 'blob:https://www.worldmonitor.app/abc', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses eval', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'eval', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses inline for script-src-elem', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'script-src-elem', 'inline', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses inline regardless of directive (eval/inline catch-all)', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'inline', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses data: URI', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'img-src', '', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses null blocked URI', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'frame-src', 'null', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses android-webview-video-poster', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'img-src', 'android-webview-video-poster', '', false));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('third-party noise', () => {
+    it('suppresses Google Translate', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://translate.gstatic.com/_/translate_http', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses Facebook Pixel', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/fbevents.js', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses googlevideo (YouTube embeds)', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'media-src', 'https://rr1---sn-abc.googlevideo.com/videoplayback', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses securly (school filter)', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'https://api.securly.com/v1/track', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('suppresses manifest.webmanifest', () => {
+      assert.ok(suppress('enforce', 'default-src', 'https://www.worldmonitor.app/manifest.webmanifest', '', false));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('real violations pass through', () => {
+    it('reports third-party script-src violation', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'script-src', 'https://evil.com/crypto-miner.js', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('reports unknown frame-src violation', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'frame-src', 'https://malicious-iframe.com/phish', '', false));
+    });
+
+    it('reports HTTP connect-src even with https: allowed', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'http://insecure-api.com/leak', '', true));
+    });
+
+    it('reports ws: connect-src violation', () => {
+      assert.ok(!suppress('enforce', 'connect-src', 'ws://insecure-ws.com/socket', '', true));
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/deploy-config.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/deploy-config.test.mjs
@@ -142,6 +142,26 @@ describe('security header guardrails', () => {
    assert.ok(connectSrc.includes('wss:'), 'CSP connect-src should keep wss: for secure WebSocket');
  });

+  it('CSP connect-src https: scheme is consistent between header and meta tag', () => {
+    const indexHtml = readFileSync(resolve(__dirname, '../index.html'), 'utf-8');
+    const headerCsp = getHeaderValue('Content-Security-Policy');
+    const metaMatch = indexHtml.match(/http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"\s+content="([^"]*)"/i);
+    assert.ok(metaMatch, 'index.html must have a CSP meta tag');
+
+    const headerConnectSrc = headerCsp.match(/connect-src\s+([^;]+)/)?.[1] ?? '';
+    const metaConnectSrc = metaMatch[1].match(/connect-src\s+([^;]+)/)?.[1] ?? '';
+
+    const headerHasHttps = /\bhttps:\b/.test(headerConnectSrc);
+    const metaHasHttps = /\bhttps:\b/.test(metaConnectSrc);
+
+    // The CSP violation listener suppresses HTTPS connect-src violations when the meta tag
+    // contains https: in connect-src. If the header is tightened without the meta tag,
+    // real violations would be silently suppressed. Both must stay in sync.
+    assert.equal(headerHasHttps, metaHasHttps,
+      `connect-src https: scheme mismatch: header=${headerHasHttps}, meta=${metaHasHttps}. ` +
+      'If removing https: from connect-src, update the CSP violation listener in main.ts too.');
+  });
+
  it('CSP connect-src does not contain localhost in production', () => {
    const csp = getHeaderValue('Content-Security-Policy');
    const connectSrc = csp.match(/connect-src\s+([^;]+)/)?.[1] ?? '';