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* feat(resilience): SWF manifest expansion + KIA split + new schema fields Phase 1 of plan 2026-04-25-001 (Codex-approved round 5). Manifest-only data correction; no construct change, no cache prefix bump. Schema additions (loader-validated, misplacement-rejected): - top-level: aum_usd, aum_year, aum_verified (primary-source AUM) - under classification: aum_pct_of_audited (fraction multiplier), excluded_overlaps_with_reserves (boolean; documentation-only) Manifest expansion (13 → 21 funds, 6 → 13 countries): - UAE: +ICD ($320B verified), +ADQ ($199B verified), +EIA (unverified — loaded for documentation, excluded from scoring per data-integrity rule) - KW: kia split into kia-grf (5%, access=0.9) + kia-fgf (95%, access=0.20). Corrects ~18× over-statement of crisis-deployable Kuwait sovereign wealth (audit found combined-AUM × 0.7 access applied $750B as "deployable" against ~$15B actual GRF stabilization capacity). - CN: +CIC ($1.35T), +NSSF ($400B, statutorily-gated 0.20 tier), +SAFE-IC ($417B, excluded — overlaps SAFE FX reserves) - HK: +HKMA-EF ($498B, excluded — overlaps HKMA reserves) - KR: +KIC ($182B, IFSWF full member) - AU: +Future Fund ($192B, pension-locked) - OM: +OIA ($50B, IFSWF member) - BH: +Mumtalakat ($19B) - TL: +Petroleum Fund ($22B, GPFG-style high-transparency) Re-audits (Phase 1E): - ADIA access 0.3 → 0.4 (rubric flagged; ruler-discretionary deployment empirically demonstrated) - Mubadala access 0.4 → 0.5 (rubric flagged); transparency 0.6 → 0.7 (LM=10 + IFSWF full member alignment) Rubric (docs/methodology/swf-classification-rubric.md): - New "Statutorily-gated long-horizon" 0.20 access tier added between 0.1 (sanctions/frozen) and 0.3 (intergenerational/ruler-discretionary). Anchored by KIA-FGF (Decree 106 of 1976; Council-of-Ministers + Emir decree gate; crossed once in extremis during COVID). Seeder: - Two new pure helpers: shouldSkipFundForBuffer (excluded/unverified decision) and applyAumPctOfAudited (sleeve fraction multiplier) - Manifest-AUM bypass: if aum_verified=true AND aum_usd present, use that value directly (skip Wikipedia) - Skip funds with excluded_overlaps_with_reserves=true (no double-counting against reserveAdequacy / liquidReserveAdequacy) - Skip funds with aum_verified=false (load for documentation only) Tests (+25 net): - 15 schema-extension tests (misplacement rejection, value-range gates, rationale-pairing coherence, backward-compat with pre-PR entries) - 10 helper tests (shouldSkipFundForBuffer + applyAumPctOfAudited predicates and arithmetic; KIA-GRF + KIA-FGF sum equals combined AUM) - Existing manifest test updated for the kia → kia-grf+kia-fgf split Full suite: 6,940 tests pass (+50 net), typecheck clean, no new lint. Predicted ranking deltas (informational, NOT acceptance criteria per plan §"Hard non-goals"): - AE sovFiscBuf likely 39 → 47-49 (Phase 1A + 1E) - KW sovFiscBuf likely 98 → 53-57 (Phase 1B) - CN, HK (excluded), KR, AU acquire newly-defined sovFiscBuf scores - GCC ordering shifts toward QA > KW > AE; AE-KW gap likely 6 → ~3-4 Real outcome will be measured post-deploy via cohort audit per plan §Phase 4. * fix(resilience): completeness denominator excludes documentation-only funds PR-3391 review (P1 catch): the per-country `expectedFunds` denominator counted ALL manifest entries (`funds.length`) including those skipped from buffer scoring by design — `excluded_overlaps_with_reserves: true` (SAFE-IC, HKMA-EF) and `aum_verified: false` (EIA). Result: countries with mixed scorable + non-scorable rosters showed `completeness < 1.0` even when every scorable fund matched. UAE (4 scorable + EIA) would show 0.8; CN (CIC + NSSF + SAFE-IC excluded) would show 0.67. The downstream scorer then derated those countries' coverage based on a fake-partial signal. Three call sites all carried the same bug: - per-country `expectedFunds` in fetchSovereignWealth main loop - `expectedFundsTotal` + `expectedCountries` in buildCoverageSummary - `countManifestFundsForCountry` (missing-country path) All three now filter via `shouldSkipFundForBuffer` to count only scorable manifest entries. Documentation-only funds neither expected nor matched — they don't appear in the ratio at all. Tests added (+4): - AE complete with all 4 scorable matched (EIA documented but excluded) - CN complete with CIC + NSSF matched (SAFE-IC documented but excluded) - Missing-country path returns scorable count not raw manifest count - Country with ONLY documentation-only entries excluded from expectedCountries Full suite: 6,944 tests pass (+4 net), typecheck clean. * fix(resilience): address Greptile P2s on PR #3391 manifest Three review findings, all in the manifest YAML: 1. **KIA-GRF access 0.9 → 0.7** (rubric alignment): GRF deployment requires active Council-of-Ministers authorization (2020 COVID precedent demonstrates this), not rule-triggered automatic deployment. The rubric's 0.9 tier ("Pure automatic stabilization") reserved for funds where political authorization is post-hoc / symbolic (Chile ESSF candidate). KIA-GRF correctly fits 0.7 ("Explicit stabilization with rule") — the same tier the pre-split combined-KIA was assigned. Updated rationale clarifies the tier choice. Rubric's 0.7 precedent column already lists "KIA General Reserve Fund" — now consistent with the manifest. 2. **Duplicate `# ── Australia ──` header before Oman** (copy-paste artifact): removed the orphaned header at the Oman section; added proper `# ── Australia ──` header above the Future Fund entry where it actually belongs (after Timor-Leste). 3. **NSSF `aum_pct_of_audited: 1.0` removed** (no-op): a multiplier of 1.0 is identity. The schema field is OPTIONAL and only meant for fund-of-funds split entries (e.g. KIA-GRF/FGF). Setting it to 1.0 forced the loader to require an `aum_pct_of_audited` rationale paragraph with no computational benefit. Both the field and the paragraph are now removed; NSSF remains a single- sleeve entry that scores its full audited AUM. Full suite: 6,944 tests pass, typecheck clean.
292 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
292 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
# SWF classification rubric (haircut factors for sovereignFiscalBuffer)
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Central rubric for classifying sovereign wealth funds under the
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resilience `sovereignFiscalBuffer` dimension. Supports
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`scripts/shared/swf-classification-manifest.yaml`.
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Every fund in the manifest has three coefficients in its
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`classification:` block:
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```yaml
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classification:
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access: 0..1
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liquidity: 0..1
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transparency: 0..1
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```
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These multiply together to form the haircut the scorer applies when
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computing effective SWF months of reserve coverage:
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```
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effectiveMonths = rawSwfMonths × access × liquidity × transparency
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score = 100 × (1 − exp(−effectiveMonths / 12))
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```
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This doc defines **what each coefficient value means** with named
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tiers + concrete precedents, so:
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1. Every rating in the manifest is defensible by pointing to a
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tier + precedent.
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2. Future manifest PRs that add or revise ratings have an explicit
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benchmark to evaluate against.
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3. A reviewer can audit the manifest without re-deriving the
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rubric from first principles each time.
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**Scope boundary.** This is a methodology doc, not a ground-truth
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table. The coefficient values live in the manifest YAML; the
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rubric here explains the semantic tiers those values live on.
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Revising a fund's rating is a manifest-YAML edit cited against a
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tier here, not a rubric edit.
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---
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## Axis 1 — Access
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"How directly can the state deploy fund assets into budget support
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during a fiscal shock?"
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Operationalized as a combination of legal mechanism (is there a
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withdrawal rule?), political clarity (who authorizes deployment?),
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and historical precedent (has deployment actually happened?).
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Deployment SPEED (weeks vs months vs years) is the core signal.
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| Tier | Value | Meaning | Concrete precedents |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Nil access | **0.1** | Sanctions, asset freeze, or political paralysis makes deployment effectively impossible within a crisis window | Russia NWF (post-2022 asset freeze), Libya LIA (sanctions + frozen assets), Iran NDFI (sanctions + access concerns). Currently deferred from v1 for this reason. |
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| Statutorily-gated long-horizon | **0.20** | Withdrawals require statutory supermajority / bicameral-equivalent action; gate has been crossed in extreme cases (single, capped draw under emergency law) but NOT for ordinary stabilization. Distinct from "Intergenerational savings" (0.3) because the gate is *statutory* rather than ruler-discretionary — Council-of-Ministers + parliamentary or constitutional thresholds replace head-of-state direction. | KIA Future Generations Fund (Decree 106 of 1976; Council-of-Ministers + Emir decree required; gate crossed once during COVID for a small capped draw). Phase 1B addition (Plan 2026-04-25-001). |
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| Intergenerational savings | **0.3** | Pure long-horizon wealth-preservation mandate; no explicit stabilization rule; withdrawal requires ruler / head-of-state / parliamentary discretion with no codified trigger | ADIA (Abu Dhabi, intergenerational mandate, ruler-discretionary); Brunei BIA (deferred candidate) |
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| Hybrid / constrained | **0.5** | Mandate mixes strategic + savings + partial stabilization; deployment is mechanically possible but constrained by strategic allocation locked to policy objectives (Vision 2030, industrial policy, geopolitical holdings) | PIF (Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030-locked), QIA (Qatar, long-horizon wealth-management with amiri-decree deployment), Mubadala (UAE, strategic + financial hybrid), Ireland ISIF (strategic-development mandate) |
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| Explicit stabilization with rule | **0.7** | Legislated or rule-based mechanism for fiscal support during specific shock classes, with historical precedent of actual deployment | KIA General Reserve Fund (legislated finance of budget shortfalls from oil-revenue swings). NO GPFG is BORDERLINE — has a fiscal rule capping withdrawal at ~3% expected real return, which is an access MECHANISM but also an access CONSTRAINT (see below). NOTE: GIC is discussed in the alignment table below as a candidate for this tier based on its NIRC framework, but the current manifest rates it 0.6 — so it's a 0.7 *candidate*, not a 0.7 *precedent*. |
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| Pure automatic stabilization | **0.9** | Deployment triggers automatically when a named macro signal crosses a threshold; stabilization is the primary mandate; political authorization is post-hoc or symbolic | Chile ESSF (deploys when copper revenue falls below a rule-based target); deferred v1 candidate |
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### Edge case — fiscal-rule caps
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A fiscal rule like Norway's ~3%-of-expected-real-return withdrawal
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cap creates an ambiguous access signal:
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- **Positive direction**: the rule makes access PREDICTABLE and
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mechanically available for budget support every year, without
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political negotiation.
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- **Negative direction**: the rule CAPS how much can be tapped,
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so in a severe shock the fund cannot be liquidated beyond the
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rule. The mechanism protects the savings against panic but
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rate-limits the stabilization function.
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**Rubric treatment**: fiscal-rule-capped funds sit at the 0.5-0.7
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boundary. Norway's GPFG at 0.6 (current manifest value) is
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defensible as "between hybrid-constrained and rule-based
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stabilization."
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### Edge case — state holding companies
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Temasek-style state-holding-company assets can be deployed for
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fiscal support only via DIVIDEND FLOW, not via primary-asset
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liquidation (which would disrupt portfolio companies). This
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mechanism is slow (dividends are typically annual) and bounded
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(can't exceed portfolio earnings in a shock year). Rubric
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treatment: 0.3-0.4 tier, NOT the 0.5 hybrid tier — the
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mechanical deployment path is materially slower than QIA's
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amiri-decree route.
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---
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## Axis 2 — Liquidity
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"What share of the fund's AUM is in listed public markets and
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thus liquidatable within days/weeks without fire-sale discount?"
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Operationalized as (public equities + listed fixed income +
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cash) ÷ total AUM, per the fund's most recent published asset
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mix. When the disclosure is a range (ADIA publishes 55-70%, not
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an exact ratio), the rubric uses the **upper-bound** of the
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range — the fund's own public statement is that it COULD be up
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to that figure, and haircut factors are designed to reward
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disclosed LIQUIDITY CAPACITY, not the conservative worst case.
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ADIA's 70% upper bound lands in the 0.7 tier (65-85%); if
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future ADIA disclosures tighten the range so the upper bound
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drops below 65%, the rubric directs the rating to 0.5.
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| Tier | Value | Meaning | Concrete precedents |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Illiquid-strategic dominant | **0.1** | Primarily domestic strategic holdings + policy banks + political stakes; < 30% public-market. No v1 fund sits here; reserved for future outliers | — (aspirational floor) |
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| Private + illiquid majority | **0.3** | 30-50% public-market; majority in private equity, real estate, infrastructure, or strategic holdings | PIF (estimated ~40% public, dominated by Aramco + domestic megaprojects). Current manifest values PIF liquidity = 0.4 — AT BOUNDARY, defensible under either 0.3 or 0.5 tier |
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| Mid-liquid mix | **0.5** | 50-65% public-market with material private sleeve | Mubadala (~50/50 per 2024 annual report); Temasek (~50% listed, ~50% unlisted per Temasek Review 2025); QIA (~60% public) — note current manifest QIA = 0.6, at the boundary of 0.5 and 0.7 tiers |
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| Majority public | **0.7** | 65-85% public-market with modest private allocation | ADIA (55-70% public-market range per 2024 review, balance in alternatives + real assets) |
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| Predominantly liquid | **0.9** | 85-95% public-market with modest cash + short-duration sleeves | KIA (~75-85% listed equities + fixed income — boundary 0.7/0.9, current manifest = 0.8); GIC (~90% public per 2024/25 annual report) |
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| Fully liquid | **1.0** | 100% listed public markets — equities + fixed income + listed real estate. No private at all | GPFG (NBIM 2025 — 100% listed, no private markets) |
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### Edge case — listed real estate
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GPFG's listed real estate counts toward its liquidity score; PIF's
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direct real estate holdings do NOT. The distinction matters for
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boundary calls (0.7 vs 0.9): listed = liquidatable daily;
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directly-owned = months to sell at disclosed valuations.
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---
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## Axis 3 — Transparency
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"How well-documented is the fund's governance + financials?"
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Operationalized as the Linaburg-Maduell (LM) Transparency Index
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score, normalized against IFSWF membership status and the
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granularity of the fund's annual reporting.
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The LM index is a 10-point scale (1 = lowest, 10 = highest). IFSWF
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membership is binary (member / observer / non-member). Annual-report
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granularity gates tier promotion independently of LM/IFSWF.
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| Tier | Value | Meaning | LM benchmark | Concrete precedents |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Opaque | **0.1** | No public AUM, no governance reporting, no LM score | LM ≤ 1 | Deferred candidates: BIA (Brunei) if LM pins at the floor post-audit |
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| Partial disclosure | **0.3** | Governance structure published but AUM undisclosed; no asset-mix disclosure; LM 2-4 | LM 2-4 | PIF (audited financials but line-item allocation limited; IFSWF observer not full member; LM ~4 per current manifest) |
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| Asset-class disclosed | **0.5** | Audited AUM or published ranges, asset-class-level mix, partial IFSWF engagement | LM 5-6 | ADIA (annual review with asset-class ranges, partial IFSWF engagement, LM=6). QIA (limited public disclosure, IFSWF full member with audited filings, LM=5) — QIA currently manifest=0.4 may be marginally under-rated. KIA (LM=6, partial IFSWF engagement) currently manifest=0.4 — arguably under-rated |
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| Audited AUM + returns | **0.7** | Audited AUM, asset-mix breakdown, benchmark-relative returns disclosed, IFSWF full member | LM 7-8 | GIC (asset-class breakdown + 20-year rolling returns, IFSWF full member, LM=8). Mubadala (audited AUM + asset-mix, IFSWF member, LM=10) — Mubadala LM=10 argues for 0.9 tier; current manifest=0.6 may be under-rated |
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| Holdings-level | **0.9** | Full asset-class + top-holdings disclosure; regular updates; IFSWF full compliance | LM 9-10 | Temasek (audited NPV + benchmarked returns + top-20 holdings + LM=10, current manifest=0.9 ✓) |
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| Full holdings-level daily | **1.0** | Daily returns disclosed, holdings-level reporting, full IFSWF compliance | LM=10 | GPFG (NBIM full audited AUM, daily returns, holdings-level reporting, LM=10, IFSWF full compliance) |
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### Edge case — LM score vs disclosure depth
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The LM index measures 10 governance signals (publication of
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financials, independent audit, public objectives, etc.). A fund
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can score LM=10 under the index while still publishing only
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RANGED asset-mix rather than exact holdings (Mubadala, Temasek).
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The rubric distinguishes these cases: LM=10 + holdings-level
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disclosure → 0.9-1.0 tier; LM=10 + asset-class-only disclosure →
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0.7-0.8 tier. Mubadala's current manifest 0.6 under-rates the
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LM=10 signal against the rubric.
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### Edge case — sealed filings
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KIA files detailed financials to the Kuwaiti National Assembly
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but the filings are SEALED from public disclosure. Under the
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rubric this sits at the 0.5 tier (asset-class disclosed + IFSWF
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engagement) rather than the 0.3 tier (no AUM), because the AUM
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is audited and disclosed to the oversight body — just not
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publicly. Current manifest = 0.4 is at the 0.3/0.5 boundary.
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---
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## Current manifest × rubric alignment (informational, not PR-changes)
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Reviewing each of the 8 current manifest values against the
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rubric tiers. **This PR does NOT edit the manifest.** The
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column "Rubric tier" shows where the rating falls under this
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rubric; "Manifest value" is the current YAML value; "Aligned?"
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flags whether the rating fits the rubric or looks off.
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| Fund | Axis | Manifest value | Rubric tier | Aligned? | Notes |
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|---|---|---:|---|---|---|
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| GPFG (NO) | access | 0.6 | Rule-constrained stabilization (between 0.5 and 0.7) | ✓ | Fiscal rule caps withdrawal — justifies boundary rating |
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| GPFG (NO) | liquidity | 1.0 | Fully liquid | ✓ | NBIM 2025 confirms 100% listed |
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| GPFG (NO) | transparency | 1.0 | Full holdings-level daily | ✓ | LM=10 + full IFSWF compliance |
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| ADIA (AE) | access | 0.3 | Intergenerational savings | ✓ | No explicit stabilization mandate; ruler-discretionary |
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| ADIA (AE) | liquidity | 0.7 | Majority public | ✓ | 55-70% public-market per 2024 review |
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| ADIA (AE) | transparency | 0.5 | Asset-class disclosed | ✓ | LM=6; IFSWF partial engagement |
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| Mubadala (AE) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained — below 0.5 tier | ⚠ | Current 0.4 is slightly under the 0.5 tier midpoint; 2024 ADQ merger arguably strengthens case for 0.5 |
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| Mubadala (AE) | liquidity | 0.5 | Mid-liquid mix | ✓ | ~50/50 per 2024 report |
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| Mubadala (AE) | transparency | 0.6 | Between 0.5 and 0.7 | ⚠ | LM=10 + IFSWF member argues for 0.7 (audited AUM + mix + returns); currently under-rated |
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| PIF (SA) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained — below 0.5 tier | ⚠ | 0.5 tier fits the hybrid-mandate description; 0.4 is conservative. Arguable either way |
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| PIF (SA) | liquidity | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | ⚠ | ~40% public-market sits at the top of 0.3 tier rather than middle of 0.5; 0.3 may be more honest |
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| PIF (SA) | transparency | 0.3 | Partial disclosure | ✓ | LM ~4 + IFSWF observer-only |
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| KIA (KW) | access | 0.7 | Explicit stabilization with rule | ✓ | General Reserve Fund's legislated budget-financing mandate is the canonical 0.7 example |
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| KIA (KW) | liquidity | 0.8 | Between 0.7 and 0.9 | ✓ | 75-85% listed; defensible boundary rating |
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| KIA (KW) | transparency | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | ⚠ | LM=6 + IFSWF partial-engagement argues for 0.5; current 0.4 is at the boundary; 0.5 may be slightly more accurate |
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| QIA (QA) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained — below 0.5 tier | ⚠ | Long-horizon wealth management with amiri-decree deployment. 0.5 fits the hybrid tier; 0.4 is conservative |
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| QIA (QA) | liquidity | 0.6 | Between 0.5 and 0.7 | ✓ | ~60% public-market sits at the tier boundary |
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| QIA (QA) | transparency | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | ⚠ | LM=5 + IFSWF full member with audited filings argues for 0.5; current 0.4 is at the boundary |
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| GIC (SG) | access | 0.6 | Rule-mechanism with NIRC | ⚠ | NIRC framework is explicit fiscal-contribution — arguably 0.7 tier (rule-based stabilization with historical precedent); current 0.6 is conservative |
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| GIC (SG) | liquidity | 0.9 | Predominantly liquid | ✓ | ~90% public per 2024/25 report |
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| GIC (SG) | transparency | 0.8 | Audited AUM + returns | ✓ | Asset-class + 20-year rolling returns; LM=8 |
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| Temasek (SG) | access | 0.4 | State holding company — dividend-flow only | ✓ | Mechanical deployment is dividend-bound; 0.3-0.4 tier fits |
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| Temasek (SG) | liquidity | 0.5 | Mid-liquid mix | ✓ | ~50% listed per 2025 Review |
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| Temasek (SG) | transparency | 0.9 | Holdings-level | ✓ | Top-20 exposures + LM=10 |
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**Summary of rubric-flagged ratings** — 8 coefficients across 5 funds
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(Mubadala ×2, PIF ×2, KIA ×1, QIA ×2, GIC ×1) out of 24 total
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(8 funds × 3 axes):
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- Mubadala access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); transparency 0.6 (arguably 0.7)
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- PIF access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); liquidity 0.4 (arguably 0.3)
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- KIA transparency 0.4 (arguably 0.5)
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- QIA access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); transparency 0.4 (arguably 0.5)
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- GIC access 0.6 (arguably 0.7)
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**None of these changes are made in this PR.** The flags are
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informational — a future manifest-edit PR (PR 4b per the plan)
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should evaluate each flag, cite the rubric tier, and either
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confirm the current rating with a stronger rationale or revise
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it to match the tier.
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### Directional impact of the flagged ratings (if revised upward)
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- Mubadala 0.4 → 0.5 on access, 0.6 → 0.7 on transparency: the
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access × transparency product moves from 0.24 to 0.35 (+46%).
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Combined with unchanged liquidity 0.5: haircut multiplier
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0.12 → 0.175. UAE gains material SWF-months.
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- PIF access 0.4 → 0.5: modest lift. PIF liquidity 0.4 → 0.3:
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modest dampening. Net: small.
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- KIA transparency 0.4 → 0.5: haircut multiplier 0.7×0.8×0.4
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= 0.224 → 0.7×0.8×0.5 = 0.28 (+25%). KW already top-quartile.
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- QIA access 0.4 → 0.5 + transparency 0.4 → 0.5: QIA haircut
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0.096 → 0.15 (+56%). Material lift for QA.
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- GIC access 0.6 → 0.7: haircut 0.432 → 0.504 (+17%). SG lift.
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The directional impact analysis is INFORMATIONAL and should NOT
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be treated as a decision to revise. Per the plan's anti-pattern
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note, rubric flags shouldn't be motivated by a target ranking
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outcome. A future manifest PR should revise ratings because the
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rubric + cited precedents support the change, not because the
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resulting ranking looks better.
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---
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## How to use this rubric
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### When adding a new fund to the manifest
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1. Locate each axis value on the tier table.
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2. Cite the tier PLUS at least one concrete precedent (annual
|
||
report page, LM index page, IFSWF profile URL).
|
||
3. If the fund sits between two tiers, pick the lower tier and
|
||
explain the boundary rating in the YAML `rationale:` block.
|
||
4. PR review checks: does the rationale's cited evidence actually
|
||
land the fund at the claimed tier?
|
||
|
||
### When revising an existing fund
|
||
|
||
1. Cite what EVIDENCE changed: new annual report, LM score
|
||
revision, IFSWF membership change, mandate amendment.
|
||
2. Map the new evidence to a tier per this rubric.
|
||
3. Update BOTH the coefficient AND the `rationale:` text in the
|
||
same PR.
|
||
4. For PRs that shift multiple coefficients: run the cohort-
|
||
sanity audit (see `docs/methodology/cohort-sanity-release-gate.md`)
|
||
and publish the contribution-decomposition table for the
|
||
affected countries.
|
||
|
||
### When the rubric itself needs revising
|
||
|
||
Out of scope for a manifest PR. A rubric revision requires:
|
||
|
||
1. A separate methodology-decision PR citing the construct gap
|
||
the revision fixes (e.g., "the current rubric doesn't handle
|
||
state holding companies well — add a dedicated tier").
|
||
2. Re-evaluation of every existing fund under the new rubric
|
||
(the rubric and the manifest must stay in lockstep).
|
||
3. Cohort-sanity audit snapshot before/after.
|
||
|
||
## References
|
||
|
||
- Manifest: `scripts/shared/swf-classification-manifest.yaml`
|
||
- Scorer: `server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_dimension-scorers.ts`
|
||
line 1654 (`scoreSovereignFiscalBuffer`)
|
||
- Saturating transform: `score = 100 × (1 − exp(−effectiveMonths / 12))`
|
||
- Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index methodology:
|
||
https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index
|
||
- IFSWF member directory: https://www.ifswf.org/members
|
||
- Santiago Principles self-assessments: https://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles
|
||
- Plan reference:
|
||
`docs/plans/2026-04-24-002-fix-resilience-cohort-ranking-structural-audit-plan.md`
|
||
§PR 4
|